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This dissertation deals with the role of the teacher in fifth- and fourth-century Athens 
through an examination of the scope of the Greek word didaskalos. The first part of this 
investigation consists of an analysis of the various types of educational figures whose 
roles overlapped to some extent that of the didaskalos, beginning with the legendary 
educators Cheiron, Phoenix, and Mentor, and touching upon the characters of the 
erastês, the paidagôgos, and the Sophist. The second part is a study of the mechanism 
and process for teaching as described in the literary sources, focusing in particular on 
the importance of imitation in the student-teacher relationship. The third part 
approaches the aims and effects of teaching as described by Greek authors, especially 
the various ways that physis can be influenced by ones teacher, especially for the 
worse. The final part deals with the figure of Socrates, in particular, the way he is 
portrayed as a didaskalos in the texts of Aristophanes, Plato, and Xenophon. 
All in all, the pattern of Greek authors’ usage of the word didaskalos suggests a strong 
societal belief in the potential power of the teacher - both inside and outside of the 
schoolroom - to improve or harm the polis.
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A NOTE TO THE READER
Unless otherwise marked, all translations of Greek text are my own.
For author and work abbreviations, I follow the list in the Oxford Classical Dictionary, 
online edition.
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INTRODUCTION
As modern students, we have very specific expectations about what constitutes great 
teaching, and these expectations are deeply ingrained in us from childhood: we expect 
our teachers to be inspiring, compassionate, dynamic, and thorough. We can all tell the 
difference between a good teacher and a great one because as a society, we have 
established standards for great teaching and we know that our teachers have been 
systematically and uniformly trained to meet those standards. As a result, we expect 
that our teachers will all do their jobs equally effectively and as faithful representatives 
of our educational system. From time to time, we may have an especially memorable 
teacher, but on the whole, the specific educational practitioners are inseparable, and to 
a certain extent, indistinguishable from their institutional context.   
In Ancient Greece, on the other hand, the situation could not have been more different. 
Whereas modern education has been established as an institution, no such institution 
existed in antiquity prior to the Hellenistic period. Hence, for philosophers, historians, 
and poets from Homer to Aristotle, individual, private teachers were at the center of 
Greek education. What’s more, bad teachers were just as interesting for these writers 
as good teachers, and the unconventional or controversial teacher could be a polarizing 
figure. And yet, to date, no modern scholar has acknowledged the importance of the 
didaskalos in ancient Greek education. To understand why, we need to look deeper into 
the history of scholarship on Classical education.     
1
1. Ancient Education Too Broadly and Too Narrowly Conceived
1.1 Beck and Marrou
There have been relatively few comprehensive treatments of education in Classical 
Greece, especially in the latter half of the 20th century. As Frederick Beck notes in the 
introduction to his 1964 work, Greek Education 450-350 BC (7), generally speaking, 
education scholars lack either the training or the interest to deal with Classical texts in 
detail and Classicists tend not to care about issues of educational philosophy. Beck 
himself is, of course, an exception to this trend, as is Henri-Irénée Marrou, whose 
groundbreaking monograph A History of Education in Antiquity (1956) is still valuable for 
the study of ancient education.1 Indeed, after the temporally and thematically limited 
treatments of ancient education from the late 19th and early 20th centuries,2 these two 
scholars’ studies were viewed as extraordinarily thorough.3 
2
1 There has been a recent update and re-reading of Marrou (Que reste-t-il de l’éducation classique? 
Relire << le Marrou >> Histoire de l’éducation dans l’Antiquité, eds. Jean-Marie Pailler and Pascal Payen) 
published by the University of Mirail Press in 2004 which details both the strengths and weaknesses of 
Marrou’s approach in each chapter. Rather than treat the entire work at present, I will cite and comment 
on various sections at the appropriate places below.
2 There were two general trends in ancient education scholarship during this period: The first was to treat 
all ancient education as a synchronic phenomenon and to discuss the education systems of Greece, 
Rome, and Egypt simultaneously and without distinguishing between them. For example, see Lorenz 
Grasberger (1881) Erziehung und Unterricht in Klassischen Alterthum. The second (and more common) 
trend was to treat Greek and Roman education as completely separate and unrelated systems. For 
example, see Paul Girard (1891) L’éducation athénienne, Kenneth Freeman (1912) Schools of Hellas, 
Emile Jullien (1885) Les Professeurs de Littérature dans l’ancienne Rome, Aubrey Gwynn (1926) Roman 
Education from Cicero to Quintilian, and Werner Jaeger (1939) Paideia. The first approach has 
(fortunately) been abandoned, while the second has become the default method for studying ancient 
education. In fact, it is the second approach that I will employ in this study. Although Beck himself may 
appear to use the second method - after all, his major study on the subject is titled Greek Education 
450-350 BC - he actually spends a good deal of time connecting Greek education practices with their 
later Roman counterparts. 
3 For a comparison of Marrou’s work with that of his predecessors, see Yun Lee Too “Une << Nouvelle 
Histoire de L’Éducation dans L’Antiquité >>” in Pailler and Payen 2004, 41-3.
 Nevertheless, their works are by no means flawless. Both Beck and Marrou see 
themselves as historians rather than philologists, and as such, they both tend to stray 
from the ancient texts: neither quotes them at any length. Although this method makes 
for a smoother read, it is not without its costs. This type of scholarship often results in 
broad summaries of the texts with very little analysis, argumentation, or comparison 
between them. Their works are what Teresa Morgan (1998, 19) describes as “sweeping 
portraits heavily reliant on a few vivid details to back up a general impression.” On top of 
this, they each have their own scholarly tics: for Beck, this is the tendency toward 
making unsubstantiated generalizations4 and imposing modern educational structures 
on antiquity,5 and for Marrou, over-romanticizing6 and taking an anachronistic view of 
antiquity through the lens of contemporary politics.7
In addition, both of these scholars approach the topic of education in antiquity with 
limiting assumptions about the kinds of evidence that they should consider and the 
3
4 For example, Beck begins his monograph with the claim that 450-350 BC is the “most important period 
in the whole history of education” (7).
5 Beck (1964) organizes the ancient material around modern assumptions about age divisions in schools 
(80-4), the routine of the school day (96-100), holidays from school (109-10), and the primacy of a 
reading-writing-arithmetic curriculum (114-26).
6 See Marrou’s treatment of the pederastic relationship as the ultimate realization of paideia, “a 
relationship on to which the fire of passion threw warm and turbid reflections”, and his description of 
pederasty as “the most beautiful, the perfect, form of education... carried out in the atmosphere of spiritual 
communion that was created by the disciple’s fervent and often passionate attachment to the master to 
whom he had given himself” (1956, 31-3).
7 To cite one example: concerning the Spartan education system, he draws connections between their 
militaristic training and the ideals of the Nazi Third Reich. According to Jean-Marie Pailler and Pascal 
Payen in the Introduction to Que reste-t-il de l’éducation classique? Relire << le Marrou >> Histoire de 
l’éducation dans l’Antiquité (2004, 13), Marrou felt the true historian researches the past in order to better 
understand and deal with the problems of the present. 
conclusions that can be drawn from that evidence. In particular, the type of scholarship 
both Beck and Marrou engage in excludes texts from genres that aren’t traditionally 
thought of as “educational” and privileges material that confirms the default 
understanding of ancient education (i.e. that it dealt exclusively with the training of 
young men in music, gymnastics, literature, and oratory and was entirely distinct from 
adult political activity). Further, they treat education in the fifth and fourth centuries as 
though it was already an institution, and as a result, they have neglected to focus in any 
depth on the specific figure of the teacher.8
1.2 Contemporary Scholarship
In contrast to Beck and Marrou, the current trend in scholarship on ancient education is 
to delve deeply into one sub-topic or to focus on a limited number of authors or texts. To 
list just a few examples: William Harris (1989) has provided a thorough analysis of the 
evidence for and against widespread literacy in the ancient world; Yun Lee Too (1995; 
1998; 2000) has offered a new perspective on the nature of education in the works of 
Isocrates; and Jean Ducat (2006) has investigated the extant accounts of education in 
ancient Sparta. There is nothing inherently wrong with this type of study. In fact, many 
contemporary Classicists - like those listed above - who work on education have done 
exactly this and their contributions have added valuable depth to the field. I would 
argue, however, that something may be lost when one limits oneself to a subject without 
4
8 More on this to come at the end of the following section.
reference to adjacent disciplines:9 it is all too easy to neglect the broader context and to 
ignore patterns that cross genres and subject matter. 
1.3 A Third Approach
From my comments so far, it may seem that there is no kind of scholarship that I find 
satisfactory, but that is not at all the case. If I am equally critical both of general 
summaries and of hyper-specialized analyses, it is because I would like to propose a 
fusion of the two. My goal in the present study is to investigate all ancient Greek 
literature pertaining to education during a given time period (from Homer to 
approximately 320 BCE), but to do so using a lexical lens that helps bring into focus the 
centrality of the teaching dynamic in ancient education. That lens is the didaskalos and 
his sphere of activity (didaskein). Unlike the Sophists, the liberal arts curriculum, or a 
dozen other topics on which modern education scholars have based their studies, the 
didaskalos is found wherever education is being discussed. If you follow him through 
the literature, he will lead you to the most interesting and important passages and he 
will show you the broader patterns in the way the Greeks thought about education.  
Now, it seems, we are better positioned to solve the conundrum with which we began 
this introduction: if the didaskalos is so central to an understanding of ancient Greek 
education, why hasn’t anyone investigated him? The answer is this: no one has yet 
5
9 This most often takes the form of neglecting other contemporary literature from different genres in favor 
of studying a single author. For example, although Yun Lee Too offers insightful and thorough analysis of 
the works of Isocrates, because she does not draw very many connections between his writing and those 
of contemporary authors like Demosthenes, Aristotle, Xenophon, and Plato, in some ways, Isocrates 
appears in her analyses as the lone representative of an educational school of thought, as opposed to 
what he actually was: one member of a larger philosophical movement. 
done a study on the didaskalos because no one has seen him as more than a minor 
subordinate figure in a larger institution. That is to say, while other scholars have treated 
ancient education as if it were entirely contained by the broader concept of school - both 
the institution and the location -, the present study, on the other hand, treats it as 
inextricably linked with the dynamic of teaching, and the person of the teacher, 
specifically. In studying ancient education too generally, scholars like Marrou and Beck 
have underestimated the importance of the didaskalos, while on the other hand, in 
focusing too narrowly on a sub-topic of education, modern scholars like Too, Harris, and 
Ducat (among many others) miss how ubiquitous the didaskalos is in the ancient texts.  
2. Studying Ancient Greek Education Through a Didaskalic Lens
As we saw above, ancient education has generally been treated via a purely thematic or 
single-topic-based approach. Although valuable work has been done using the thematic 
method, there are two potential problems with this type of scholarship: 1) scholars have 
tended to only use material from Greek authors who were already considered 
educational philosophers; and 2) scholars using this method often pay little or no 
attention to the vocabulary being used to describe the educational process.10
 
The present study takes a different approach. That is, I have focused my investigation 
on identifying and analyzing occurrences of key vocabulary items without regard for the 
genre or author of the texts in which they appear. Specifically, this study began as a 
lexical analysis of the word didaskalos, especially as it pertained to non-school-room 
6
10 Juan Antonio López Férez is a notable exception to this trend.
contexts, and the first step in the process was to find and catalog as many instances of 
didaskalic vocabulary as possible. Although I initially only searched for didaskalos and 
didaskein, these items led to other words11 - trephein, paideuein, paideia, physis, 
ethizein, nouthetein - and when we chart their usage and co-occurrences, there emerge 
similarities, oppositions, and subtle distinctions between lexical items that correspond to 
overarching patterns of thought. For example, as we will see in Chapter 1, someone 
who teaches (didaskein) does not necessarily also educate (paideuein) or nurture 
(trephein). Likewise, in Chapter 2 we will learn that although the verbs for teaching 
(didaskein), habituating (ethizein), and admonishing (nouthetein) are often linked in the 
literature, habituation is used as an alternative to teaching, while admonishment can be 
an action undertaken only after teaching has failed. 
While others have been limited in scope by the types of evidence they were willing to 
consider, by seeking out the didaskalos before anything else and assuming that its 
occurrence in any text can potentially provide evidence, I have been able to cut across 
generic boundaries and open hitherto unexplored lines of enquiry. As a result, I have 
discovered that some of the most important texts dealing with the didaskalos are those 
that are not generally considered to be educational, and some figures previously 
assumed to be didaskaloi - Cheiron, the erastês, the Sophist -  are not actually 
7
11 A few words about translation: in the interest of both being consistent and also not repeating myself 
excessively, I often alternate between a Greek word and a designated English equivalent. For didaskalos, 
that is “teacher” (and for didaskein “teach”); for paideia “education” and paideuein “educate”. A 
paidagôgos is a “tutor” or “pedagog”. Physis is “nature”, “natural ability”, or “innate ability.” When a 
broader category of educational figure not tied to a specific Greek word is intended, I use “educator” or 
“instructor”.
described in those terms, while others not traditionally thought of as didaskaloi - in 
particular, Socrates in Aristophanes’ Clouds - are.     
Despite the obvious and overwhelming benefits of this type of investigation, there are 
potential pitfalls. First, it is easy to fall into the trap of assuming in each case a historical 
reality from the textual evidence. My aim, however, is not to piece together a definitive 
account of actual educational practices, but to explore the ideas, philosophies and 
controversies in the air at the time. That is, I’m less interested in what a didaskalos 
actually was than in what contemporary authors thought he could or should be.
Second, it is potentially problematic to ignore a passage’s context - both literary and 
historical. The world of Homeric epic is not the same as the world of Aristophanes, 
hence the mentor relationship will differ accordingly. Similarly, a poet recounting the 
wartime deeds of a small number of aristocratic heroes will have different priorities in 
terms of content than a democratic-era Athenian philosopher. While remaining aware of 
this potential pitfall, I have chosen not to restrict myself generically or chronologically, 
with the only self-imposed limitation being that I do not cross the temporal threshold 
between the Classical and Hellenistic periods (ca. 323 BC). That is, with a few notable 
exceptions - Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, Strabo: all of whom treat the history of the 
Classical period - my study is limited to authors from the mid-fourth century and earlier. 
This means that, although they are rich with educational content, the texts of the 
Second Sophistic and the early Christian era are not discussed here. I conduct my 
investigation in this way in part because the education-related evidence from Greco-
8
Roman Egypt is abundant and of a completely different nature from the evidence of the 
Classical period (i.e. ostraca, inscriptions, and documentary papyri versus literature), 
and in part because there is a great body of thorough and up-to-date contemporary 
scholarship on the educational system in the Hellenistic period (e.g. see especially the 
work of Raffaella Cribiore and Teresa Morgan). Moreover, whereas the scholarship on 
Hellenistic education paints a largely unified portrait of the period, there is significant 
disagreement between scholars about even the most basic details of educational 
practice and philosophy during the Classical period. As Teresa Morgan observes in the 
introduction to her study on Hellenistic education (1998, 8), “we know almost nothing 
about the institutions of education in the Classical period”, and from a certain 
perspective, this is true. We don’t have any examples of student exercises; we can’t see 
how they wrote, how they thought, the mistakes they made; we don’t know where the 
schoolhouses were, what the teachers were paid, and which textual passages they 
taught from. We do not have students’ homework assignments, teachers’ journals, or 
letters from parents to their school-aged children. What we do have is literature, a lot of 
which was (probably) not intended to convey information about education. This is all to 
say that while we have copious and detailed evidence of day-to-day teaching practice 
from the Hellenistic period, the evidence from the Classical period is scarcer and 
considerably more abstract. If we know which texts to read, we can pick out scraps of 
information that hint at the authors’ ideas and philosophies of education and sometimes 
also those of their contemporaries. It is by painstakingly gathering and weaving together 
these seemingly unrelated strands of information, that we see gradually unveiled before 
us the broad tapestry of Greek educational practices with the didaskalos at its center. 
9
3. An Initial Sketch of the Athenian Schoolteacher   
From this investigation emerges a model of an ordinary Athenian schoolteacher. This 
portrait is consistent across the literature and provides a default for comparison over the 
course of this study. By using this model as the standard set of criteria for the 
didaskalos, we can see that some figures we might previously have assumed to be 
teachers are not actually described that way, and likewise, other figures we do not think 
of as teachers prove to be so. In addition, beginning with a standard point of 
comparison allows us to identify and analyze the way that the intellectual and political 
culture in Athens during the Classical period bred interesting variations on the default 
model that had not occurred before or afterwards in the ancient world. 
Hence, the aim of this section is to answer the following questions, thereby providing a 
basic sketch of the Athenian schoolteacher: What are we to assume a teacher in 
Classical Athens did? What was his social standing? Where did he carry out his work?
3.1 Location for Teaching
The final question is the easiest to answer: the didaskalos taught in a designated, 
stationary location which was often referred to as a didaskaleîon. Although we have no 
10
extant references to didaskaleîa in Athens before the fourth century,12 both Herodotus 
and Thucydides provide evidence for the existence of schoolhouses in other city-states 
starting in the early fifth century and it does not seem unreasonable to presume their 
existence in Athens at this time as well. In his account of the events preceding the Battle 
of Lade in 494 BCE, Herodotus describes how the roof fell in on a group of boys 
learning their letters so that of the 120 students there, only one escaped (6.27.5: παισὶ 
γράμματα διδασκομένοισι ἐνέπεσε ἡ στέγη, ὥστε ἀπ' ἑκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι παίδων 
εἷς μοῦνος ἀπέφυγε).13 Similarly, in recounting the Sack of Mycalessus in 413 BCE, 
Thucydides explains that the Thracians were so ruthless that they “even fell upon a 
schoolhouse full of boys, which was the largest in the area and where the boys had just 
entered, and they massacred all of them” (7.29.5: καὶ ἐπιπεσόντες διδασκαλείῳ 
παίδων, ὅπερ μέγιστον ἦν αὐτόθι καὶ ἄρτι ἔτυχον οἱ παῖδες ἐσεληλυθότες, 
κατέκοψαν πάντας). From these two passages, we can assume that there were large 
11
12 According to Beck (1964, 77ff), just because there is no mention of didaskaleîa prior to the 4th century, 
this does not mean there were no schools during the Archaic and early Classical period. He argues that 
Pausanias describes Tyrtaeos as an Athenian schoolteacher, which would mean that there had to be 
schools in Athens as early as 650 BCE. Given that this evidence is sketchy at best, Beck concedes that 
the earliest schools may actually have been established near the end of the 6th century. Since 
Cleisthenes introduced the institution of ostracism in Athens between 507 and 508, and this presupposes 
the widespread knowledge of writing among the majority of the citizenry, Beck assumes that letter schools 
existed at this time in order to teach writing. Harris (1989, 54ff), on the other hand, has expressed some 
misgivings about the use of ostracism to argue for majority literacy (and, by extension, elementary 
education), citing two post-Beck discoveries: 1. During the first decade or so after its start, ostracism 
probably did not require a 6,000 vote quorum, but rather only 200 votes; and 2. Archaeological evidence 
has revealed that there were likely mass-produced voting tiles for ostracisms - of the 191 ostraca we have 
against Themistocles, only fourteen different hands can be distinguished -, which means that voters did 
not have to be literate. He concludes (55) that ostracism “does not prove very much about schools, which 
are not otherwise attested quite as early as Cleisthenes’ time, but it certainly suggests that a number of 
elementary schools existed, and taught writing, by about the turn of the century.” This does not seem far-
fetched, especially considering the evidence from Herodotus and Thucydides for schools during this 
period.
13 Pausanias (6.9.6) describes a similar event: in 496 BCE the athlete Cleomedes, angry because he was 
stripped of his winnings for killing his opponent, stormed into a school in Astypalaea and crushed 60 boys 
by pulling down the pillars supporting the roof.
buildings - capable of holding between 60 and 120 students, if Pausanias and 
Herodotus are to be believed - dedicated to didaskalia in the fifth century in Greece. 
Further, in each of the passages, the schoolhouse is a minor, incidental detail, 
mentioned only obliquely and as part of some larger event. This likely indicates that the 
system of schoolhouses was widespread at the point that these accounts were written: 
schools were so much a part of the Greeks’ daily life that their existence did not merit 
special comment.        
3.2 Curriculum and Methods
As for what and how the didaskalos taught, let us turn to the Douris School Cup (fig. 1 
below), an early 5th century red-figure kylix which depicts a schoolroom scene. 
Figure 1
12
In the center, there is a bearded didaskalos who is directing a youthful male student in 
what looks like some kind of poetry lesson, probably a recitation, while his paidagôgos, 
another bearded man holding a crooked staff, looks on at the far right. The youth is 
dressed in the typical style of the Greek schoolboy: bare-footed and wearing a himation. 
The didaskalos, who is always shown as an older male seated on a thronos, holds a 
scroll inscribed with a line of poetry that the student has presumably memorized and is 
now reciting. To the left, we see another bearded instructor, possibly a hypodidaskalos, 
or teacherʼs aide,14 conducting a music lesson. The two appear to be holding their harps 
in exactly the same way, and we can imagine the teacher demonstrating the proper 
fingering for a particular note and then instructing his student to copy him. Suspended 
behind the figures are spare harps, a flute case, two drinking cups, and a basket for 
holding book-rolls. From this depiction we can draw two major conclusions about the 
curriculum and methods of the didaskalos. First, we can see that a student would have 
learned two subjects from the didaskalos: letters and music. And second, the primary 
teaching methods used in this context were memorization - often followed by recitation 
-, and imitation.15 
The literary sources corroborate this description. Xenophon tells us in his account of the 
Spartan education system (Lac. 2.1.6ff) that boys in the other Greek states (presumably 
13
14 There is no evidence to suggest that more than one didaskalos would have worked at a single school, 
but there is also scant evidence to suggest that there were hypodidaskaloi working alongside didaskaloi 
already in the fifth century. To account for this discrepancy, Beck (1975, 15) has suggested that the 
scenes on this vase are probably not occurring simultaneously but rather represent a montage of the 
types of instruction that would have occurred at different times in the didaskaleîon. Hence, the second 
seated figure on the lefthand side would represent the same didaskalos as the center figure. 
15 See Beck 1975, Chapter 2 for further discussion of the Douris Cup and related vase paintings.
including Athens) are first put under the care of a paidagôgos, and then, when they are 
old enough to understand what is being said to them, they are sent to a didaskalos to 
learn music (musikê), and letters (grammata).16 Likewise, in Plato’s Protagoras 
(325d-327a), the Sophist describes how Greek youths learn both letters and music: first 
they learn letters by tracing over the outlines of the alphabet their teachers make for 
them, then once they are able to read, by memorizing the works of good poets, and they 
learn to play music by memorizing the songs and imitating the movements of their 
teacher. 
The teaching exchange as described by Plato and Xenophon in the passages cited 
above was often described in the literature like a formula with three parts: 1) the innate 
ability of the student: physis; 2) the instruction of the teacher: didaskalia (or didachê); 
and 3) the investment of effort by the student (and sometimes also the teacher), which 
could take the form of epimeleia (attention), askêsis (practice), or empeiria (practical 
application).17 If all three elements were present, an ideal outcome for the educational 
exchange was possible.18 The clearest articulation of this idea comes from Isocrates’ 
Antidosis (187-8):19 
14
16 Both Plato and Xenophon also mention physical education (gymnastics or wrestling) as the third branch 
of the curriculum, but this would have been taught by a separate instructor, the paidotribês, and as such, 
it does not concern our discussion of the didaskalos. 
17 For a complete discussion of the relative importance of these three elements in an educational context, 
see Chapter 3, Section 1. For other ancient examples of the three traditional elements of the educational 
exchange, see Hippocrates Lex 3.2, Plato Protagoras 323e.  
18 There was some debate in antiquity about the degree to which each element could affect the outcome 
of the educational exchange or if all three were truly necessary. For example, see Plato Meno 70a or 
Aristotle Eudamian Ethics 1214a14-19.
19 For a thorough discussion of this passage as it pertains to the nature-versus-nurture debate in antiquity, 
see Chapter 3, Section 1.2.
Λέγομεν γὰρ ὡς δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας διοίσειν ἢ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἢ περὶ τὰς 
πράξεις ἢ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐργασίας πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι καλῶς, 
πρὸς ὅπερ ἂν προῃρημένοι τυγχάνωσιν, ἔπειτα διδαχθῆναι καὶ λαβεῖν τὴν 
ἐπιστήμην, ἥτις ἂν ᾖ περὶ ἑκάστου, τρίτον ἐντριβεῖς γενέσθαι καὶ γυμνασθῆναι 
περὶ τὴν χρείαν καὶ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν αὐτῶν·...Εἶναι δὲ τούτων προσῆκον ἑκατέροις, 
τοῖς τε διδάσκουσιν καὶ τοῖς μανθάνουσιν, ἴδιον μὲν τοῖς μὲν εἰσενέγκασθαι τὴν 
φύσιν οἵαν δεῖ, τοῖς δὲ δύνασθαι παιδεῦσαι τοὺς τοιούτους, κοινὸν δ' ἀμφοτέρων 
τὸ περὶ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν γυμνάσιον·
I say that it’s necessary for those intending to excel in the pursuit of words or deeds or 
any other work first to be naturally gifted in whatever activity they have chosen to 
undertake, second to be taught and acquire knowledge, whatever that entails for each 
pursuit, and third to become practiced and trained concerning the use and practical 
application of their art... And in this, there is a role for both those who teach and those 
who learn: the learner alone provides the necessary innate ability, and the teacher 
alone has the power to educate, but together they undertake the exercise of 
practical application.
According to the tradition to which this passage belongs, both teacher and student must 
participate equally in the educational exchange in order for learning to take place and 
for the student’s nature to be assimilated to the teacher’s. It follows, then, that if any one 
of the elements is missing, the educational dynamic falls apart and learning - in its 
traditional guise - cannot occur. This distinction will become important for our discussion 
of Socrates as a teacher in Chapter 4. For now, it is enough to note that a standard 
educational exchange was generally thought to comprise three elements - physis, 
didaskalia/didachê, and askêsis/epimeleia/empeiria - and that the goal of the exchange 
was assimilation.  
3.3 The Teacher’s Role
According to the literary tradition starting as early as Homer, a teacher was, first and 
foremost, a parental substitute.20 Particularly in the early days of private education, 
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20 For more on the Homeric educators Cheiron, Phoenix, and Mentor as surrogate parents, see Chapter 
1, Section 1.
when teachers were few and far between, a young man might have had to stay away 
from his parents for great lengths of time in order to receive an education, and in the 
absence of the parental influence, the didaskalos stepped in.21 In this surrogate parent-
child relationship, not only did the didaskalos take on the role and responsibilities of the 
parent, but the student actively adopted the role and responsibilities of the child. As 
Aristotle explains in the Rhetoric (1398b26), a young man is bound to obey and honor 
the gods, his parents, and his didaskaloi, in that order. An extreme articulation of this 
dynamic comes from the Hippocratic Oath (4-10): 
ἡγήσασθαι μὲν τὸν διδάξαντά με τὴν τέχνην ταύτην ἴσα γενέτῃσιν ἐμοῖσι, καὶ 
βίου κοινώσασθαι, καὶ χρεῶν χρηΐζοντι μετάδοσιν ποιήσασθαι, καὶ γένος τὸ ἐξ 
ωὐτέου ἀδελφοῖς ἴσον ἐπικρινέειν ἄῤῥεσι, καὶ διδάξειν τὴν τέχνην ταύτην, ἢν 
χρηΐζωσι μανθάνειν, ἄνευ μισθοῦ καὶ ξυγγραφῆς, παραγγελίης τε καὶ ἀκροήσιος 
καὶ τῆς λοιπῆς ἁπάσης μαθήσιος μετάδοσιν ποιήσασθαι υἱοῖσί τε ἐμοῖσι, καὶ τοῖσι 
τοῦ ἐμὲ διδάξαντος
[I swear] to consider my teacher in this art equal to my own parents; and to share 
my livelihood with him; and to share my money with him when he is in need; and to hold 
his family as equal to my own brothers; and to teach them this art - if they want to 
learn - without fee or contract; and to impart to my own sons and the sons of my teacher 
the precepts, lectures, and all the rest of the instructions.
In this passage, the student explicitly swears to treat the didaskalos and his sons as 
though they were his own family, even promising to share his income and livelihood with 
them and to train them alongside his own children. Given that this passage describes 
training in a specialized trade (i.e. medicine), however, we should be careful not to apply  
it too literally to elementary education. Rather, in conjunction with later texts from the 
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21 This practice appears to have been the precursor of the type of training relationship that would later 
come to be called apprenticeship. However, whereas apprenticeship involves training in a specialized skill 
(or technê), the kind of teaching dynamic described above was not limited to technical pursuits. In 
antiquity, this type of relationship seems to have existed primarily because of a shortage of teachers and/
or great distances between where a didaskalos lived and where the student lived. Additionally, there are 
no specific terms in Greek either for an apprentice (or his instructor) or apprenticeship generally.
Classical period, it may be taken as evidence that didaskaloi were thought of in some 
ways as operating in loco parentis.
Another example comes from Plato’s Protagoras, in which the Sophist explains how a 
boy is initially schooled at home by his parents and family servants, and when he 
reaches the proper age, he is sent to school to be taught further by a didaskalos (325d): 
ἐπειδὰν θᾶττον συνιῇ τις τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ τροφὸς καὶ μήτηρ καὶ παιδαγωγὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ 
πατὴρ περὶ τούτου διαμάχονται, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος ἔσται ὁ παῖς, παρ' ἕκαστον καὶ ἔργον 
καὶ λόγον διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον, καὶ τόδε μὲν 
καλόν, τόδε δὲ αἰσχρόν, καὶ τόδε μὲν ὅσιον, τόδε δὲ ἀνόσιον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ 
ποίει... μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα εἰς διδασκάλων πέμποντες πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐντέλλονται ἐπιμελεῖσθαι 
εὐκοσμίας τῶν παίδων ἢ γραμμάτων τε καὶ κιθαρίσεως·
As soon as [a boy] can understand what is said to him, the nurse and the mother and the 
paidagôgos and the father strive hard so that the boy will excel, and for each act and 
word they teach and impress upon him what is just and unjust, what is good and 
shameful, what is holy and unholy, and what he should do and not do... and after this, 
[the parents] send their sons to the didaskaloi and they enjoin on these men to take even 
more care concerning the good behavior of the boys than concerning their letters and 
harp-playing.
 !
It is important to note that Plato uses the same verb here to describe the actions of the 
parents and those of the teacher: didaskein. Both literally and conceptually, teachers 
are expected to take over where the parents leave off. Just as the parents have taught 
their child right from wrong and good from bad, the didaskalos, acting in place of the 
parent, is responsible for continuing the child’s character education. In fact, Protagoras 
implies that over and above the standard curriculum of music and letters, the most 
important thing a didaskalos would have taught was proper behavior (eukosmia).22
3.4 Social Status
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22 This type of character education is subtly different from that which the paigagôgos was responsible for. 
Whereas the paigagôgos is often described as nurturing (trephein) like a parent, the didaskalos only 
teaches.
Given that didaskaloi were expected to act as surrogate parents to a child, one might 
think that the teaching profession would have been held in high esteem in ancient 
Greece, but this was not the case. Teaching was among the lowliest of professional 
pursuits; it was a common insult in Classical antiquity to call someone a teacher or the 
son of a teacher. Indeed, in the Antidosis (25), Isocrates recounts how Lysimachus once 
insulted him by calling him a teacher of men, and Demosthenes used this same insult to 
discredit his political opponent Aeschines (De cor. 258): 
παῖς μὲν ὢν μετὰ πολλῆς τῆς ἐνδείας ἐτράφης, ἅμα τῷ πατρὶ πρὸς τῷ 
διδασκαλείῳ προσεδρεύων, τὸ μέλαν τρίβων καὶ τὰ βάθρα σπογγίζων καὶ τὸ 
παιδαγωγεῖον κορῶν, οἰκέτου τάξιν, οὐκ ἐλευθέρου παιδὸς ἔχων.
As a child, you were raised in abject poverty, helping your father in the chores of the 
schoolhouse: grinding the ink, sponging the benches, and sweeping the classroom. You 
held the position of a household slave, not that of a free-born boy.
Teachers were the ultimate banausoi, i.e. menial workers. Not only did they have to do 
the physical labor that went along with keeping up a classroom - as we see in the 
passage above -, but they also had to deal with a group of rambunctious boys all day 
every day. In the Classical period, the didaskalos did not have to have any special job 
training;23 there was no certification process for teachers, and higher education was 
reserved for the wealthy. Ordinary schoolteachers simply had to be literate and 
passable at playing the harp. Since there was no government-run system of public 
schools in the Classical period, being a didaskalos was equivalent to running a private 
business, like a shoe shop or a bakery, except that instead of selling shoes or cakes, 
the didaskalos sold childcare and knowledge-transfer. Given that the knowledge on offer 
18
23 When we look later at the extension of the term didaskalos to describe a teacher of higher (i.e. 
secondary or post-secondary) education, we will see that this is not entirely accurate. Additionally, when 
didaskalos is applied to the teacher of a specialized skill like medicine, he obviously had some special job  
training. What all of these teachers lacked, however, was any special education training. 
was very basic, and many families already had a nurse or paigagôgos to provide 
childcare, we begin to see why the didaskalos was so poorly regarded.
3.5 Summary
In short, the didaskalos of the Classical period was a low-status day laborer who worked 
in a dedicated schoolhouse (or at least a classroom) and acted as a parental substitute. 
He taught a basic two-part curriculum consisting of music and letters, although it was 
generally understood that in his role as surrogate parent he was also responsible for 
some degree of behavioral training. His lessons were conducted through a combination 
of memorization and imitation, depending upon the subject matter being taught. And 
finally, we can assume that a didaskalos would have taught a class containing more 
than one boy.   !
This somewhat crude sketch will be filled in and given nuance over the following 
chapters. Indeed, these details describe what a teacher did and what a teacher was, but 
they do not explain why the conceptual framework of teaching appealed to the Greek 
mindset in such a deep and metaphorical way. Specifically, the language of teaching 
was extended to nearly every sphere of Athenian public and private life. Moreover, 
because there was not yet an institution for education in the Classical period, the 
process and purpose of teaching, as well as the hypothetical role of the teacher, 
provided controversial and interesting material for Greek writers.24 This study takes as 
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24 Cf. Ober 2001, 179: “The issue of education was particularly salient for Athenian democracy and its 
critics in that it necessarily asks what premises should be common to the members of a political 
community, whose responsibility it should be to teach those common premises, and in what institutional 
framework they should be taught.”
its jumping off point the basic facts of the teaching profession as it was understood in 
antiquity and uses these facts to make sense of the widespread literary debate about 
teaching in the fifth and fourth centuries at Athens. 
4. The Structure of This Study
The current study consists of four chapters and an epilogue. Each chapter explores a 
facet of the literary discourse concerning teaching during the Classical period (with 
some reference to earlier Archaic sources that treat these same issues) by seeking to 
answer a key question about the figure of the didaskalos and his role in Greek society.
 
4.1 Chapter 1 - Tutors, Mentors, and Sages 
What makes the didaskalos distinct as an educational figure? Almost as important as 
knowing who the didaskalos was is knowing who he wasn’t. This chapter uses the 
portrait of the didaskalos that we established above in order 1) to determine which other 
educational figures from the Archaic and Classical periods were thought of as didaskaloi 
and which were not, and 2) to work towards an understanding of the chronological 
development of the teacher in antiquity, and thereby to more clearly delineate the 
independent figure of the didaskalos. Specifically, this part of the study investigates the 
following figures: the legendary educators Cheiron, Phoenix, and Mentor; the 
paidagôgos; the erastês; and the Sophist.
4.2 Chapter 2 - The Process of Education 
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Is teaching - and should it be - a banausic pursuit, a technê, or a philosophical activity? 
In other words, the goal of this chapter is to pinpoint the nature of the educational 
process: Is it a type of menial labor requiring minimal qualifications? Is it the work of a 
skilled craftsman that is carried out via specific steps and mechanisms? Or is it an 
intellectual art to be undertaken by the greatest and most sophisticated minds? This 
investigation is conducted in three parts: first, through a comparison of the education 
systems at Athens and Sparta (as described by Plutarch and Xenophon), including their 
respective philosophies of education, their methodologies, and their curricula; second, 
through an analysis of the intra-Athenian debate between Aristophanes, Plato, Aristotle, 
and Isocrates over the ideal curriculum focusing on the importance of so-called useful 
versus useless subjects; and third, through an exploration of the ways Greek authors 
extended the concept of teaching into other spheres of civic life - i.e. political oratory 
and theater - and ultimately into the realm of metaphor.
4.3 Chapter 3 - The Teacher’s Impact 
To what extent is a teacher able to influence the moral development of a student and to 
what extent should he be held responsible for doing so? Specifically, is a student’s 
nature or the teacher’s influence thought of as a more important factor in the success of 
the teaching relationship, and did these ideas evolve from the Archaic to the Classical 
period? Through a diachronic treatment of the literature, this chapter seeks to identify 
and analyze the possible outcomes of the educational exchange and determine how 
these two factors - nature and teaching - are seen as contributing to the outcome. The 
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key authors whose views we will discuss are Pindar, Theognis, Euripides, Sophocles, 
Thucydides, Isocrates, and Xenophon.
4.4 Chapter 4 - Socrates the Teacher 
How does the literary figure of Socrates personify both sides of the Classical Athenian 
debate over the role and responsibilities of the didaskalos? This chapter seeks to 
answer how the issues discussed in the previous chapters affected the literary accounts 
of the trial and execution of Socrates, and how our newfound understanding of the role 
of the didaskalos changes the way we interpret these accounts. In particular, this 
chapter focuses on the depiction of Socrates as a didaskalos in Aristophanes’ Clouds 
and the way in which Plato and Xenophon responded to this depiction in their later 
defenses of Socrates.
 
4.5 Epilogue
What happened to Classical education after the death of Socrates? The epilogue aims 
to do three things: 1) to sum up the most important points of continuity and difference 
between Classical and Hellenistic education, 2) to trace the fate of the didaskalos and 
his curriculum and methods in the Hellenistic period, and 3) to track the development of 
the  “Socratic movement” from the decades after Socrates’ execution, through the 
philosophical schools of the Hellenistic period, and into modern day pedagogical 
discourse.
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CHAPTER 1
TUTORS, MENTORS, AND SAGES
Although the primary focus of this study will be the role of the didaskalos in Classical 
Athens, in order to understand the importance of this figure we must take a conceptual 
step backward and consider the educational precursors and contemporaries of our 
didaskalos. In particular, it is crucial to distinguish the didaskalos from other figures 
whose roles - to varying extents - seemed to overlap his, specifically the parent, the 
Homeric educators Cheiron, Phoenix, and Mentor, the erastês, and the Sophist. If the 
Introduction sought to answer (albeit cursorily) the question “who was a didaskalos?”, 
then the purpose of this chapter will be to determine who wasn’t a didaskalos.
1. The First Educators
The one-on-one mentoring relationship did not begin with the emergence of the 
professional educator in Classical Athens. Rather, this dynamic had already existed for 
several centuries in Ancient Greece. Before there were schools and professional 
teachers - not to mention the words to describe them - there were the iconic educators 
of the Homeric texts: Cheiron, Phoenix, and Mentor.1 Scholars have been tempted to 
see all three of these figures as interchangeable, fulfilling their respective instructional 
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1 Although there are two different characters in the Odyssey, one named Mentor and one Mentes, there 
has been some conflation of the two and most scholars treat them together, if not as the same person. 
For the purposes of this section, when I refer to Mentor generally, I am also referring to Mentes. When I 
mention a specific passage from the Odyssey, however, I will refer to either Mentor or Mentes as 
appropriate. 
roles in exactly the same way,2 but this is not so. Each of these literary characters 
represents one of three distinct pre-Classical models for an educational relationship 
between an older teacher figure and his younger charge. By laying these three models 
alongside one another, we can begin to describe the boundaries of the specialized 
educational relationships that existed in the pre-Classical period, and in so doing, to 
understand the ways these figures developed into the educators of the fifth century.
1.1 Cheiron
We begin with Cheiron, the noble centaur of Iliad Book 11, educator of heroes, and 
expert in the healing arts. Despite his important role as friend of Peleus and teacher of 
Achilles, however, Cheiron is only mentioned a mere handful of times in the Iliad. At 
16.143 and 19.390 Homer makes brief reference to the ashen spear of Peleus which 
only Achilles is able to wield, and which was a wedding gift from Cheiron:3 μελίην, τὴν 
πατρὶ φίλῳ πόρε Χείρων. (...the ashen spear which Cheiron gave to the dear father [of 
Achilles]). This implies that by the time that the Homeric epics were recorded there 
already existed a tradition of Cheiron as a skilled hunter and fighter, but the two passing 
mentions from the Iliad are the only textual evidence to support this assumption. There 
is a similar dearth of Homeric evidence for Cheiron as a teacher. At Iliad 4.217-19, 
Machaon, son of Asclepius, is summoned to help treat the wound of Menelaos, and we 
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2 Marrou (1956) places Cheiron, Phoenix, and Mentor in one category: “And so at the very beginning of 
Greek civilization we see a clearly defined type of education - that which the young nobleman received 
through the precept and the practice of an older man to whom he had been entrusted for his training” (8). 
See also Beck 1964, 49-50.
3 Later sources are consistent with this account. See Apollodorus Bibliotheca 3.170 and Quintus 
Smyrnaeus Fall of Troy 1.592ff. One account has Cheiron simply cutting the wood, while Athena polished 
the spear and Hephaistos fashioned a head for it (Cypria fragment 5 from the Scholiast on Homer’s Iliad 
17.140).
learn in these lines that Machaon is thought to have inherited his father’s knowledge of 
ἤπια φάρμακα (that is, soothing remedies), which Cheiron had given to him: 
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ ἴδεν ἕλκος ὅθ' ἔμπεσε πικρὸς ὀϊστός, / αἷμ' ἐκμυζήσας ἐπ' ἄρ' ἤπια 
φάρμακα εἰδὼς / πάσσε, τά οἵ ποτε πατρὶ φίλα φρονέων πόρε Χείρων.
But when he saw the wound where the sharp arrow had been embedded, he sucked out 
the blood and he sprinkled the area with soothing medicines which he knew because 
Cheiron had once furnished them to his father with friendly disposition.      
It is of note that the transfer of knowledge in this passage is described in the same 
terms as the transfer of goods or property, that is, with the verb πόρω, “to furnish, offer, 
or give.”4 Cheiron is not referred to as a teacher of Asclepius; he has given him the 
knowledge of medicine in the same way that he gave Peleus the ashen spear, as a gift 
motivated by feelings of deep friendship.
The third and most important (for our purposes) Homeric reference to Cheiron occurs at 
Iliad 11.829-32, where Eurypylos begs Patroclus to tend his wound, assuming that 
Achilles must have taught his companion the medical skill that Cheiron taught him: 
μηροῦ δ' ἔκταμ' ὀϊστόν, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ δ' αἷμα κελαινὸν / νίζ' ὕδατι λιαρῷ, ἐπὶ δ' ἤπια 
φάρμακα πάσσε / ἐσθλά, τά σε προτί φασιν Ἀχιλλῆος δεδιδάχθαι, / ὃν Χείρων 
ἐδίδαξε δικαιότατος Κενταύρων.
But cut the arrow out of my thigh, and wash the dark blood away from it with warm water, 
and sprinkle effective and soothing medicines upon it which they say you were taught by  
Achilles, he whom Cheiron, the most just of the Centaurs, taught.
This, then, is our first glimpse of the tradition that names Cheiron as the teacher of 
Achilles. For the first time, in this passage, Cheiron’s method of imparting knowledge to 
Achilles is described by the verb didaskein, and his subject of instruction is the 
specialized application of the healing arts. It is worth mentioning that the speaker in this 
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4 This point may be weakened somewhat by the fact that πόρε Χείρων is a convenient line-end formula 
that fits easily into the dactylic hexameter. 
passage is Eurypylos, and it is he who uses didaskein to describe the instructional 
relationship between both Cheiron and Achilles and Achilles and Patroclus. Homer’s 
narrator uses different language to explain this kind of knowledge transfer,5 reserving 
forms of didaskein and its root verb daêmenai for divine and semi-divine teachers,6 but 
his human character Eurypylos has no other framework with which to conceptualize 
these educational relationships.7 Hence, according to the passage above, Cheiron and 
Achilles are both described as teachers of medicine, despite only one of them being so 
in terms of narrator-text. Regardless of this distinction, however, based on Homer’s 
casual use of the language of teaching here without any further elaboration, I agree with 
Beck’s conclusion that there must already have been some kind of pre-existing tradition 
of teachers and men of specialist knowledge providing individual instruction to selected 
students at that time (1964, 51). Cheiron is simply the best-known literary exemplar of 
this category of individuals. 
If Cheiron in Homer is a teacher, then in Hesiod he is a surrogate parent, a figure 
somewhere between a foster father and a nurse.8 In each of the three passages in 
which he is mentioned in the Hesiodic corpus, the wise centaur takes on the 
responsibility for nurturing and bringing up his respective charges the way a trophos 
would, an act which is signaled by the verb trephein. As Beck (1964) has rightly noted: 
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5 See discussion above on Iliad  4.217-19.
6 In the handful of cases in the reduplicated aorist in which daêmenai is used transitively to denote a 
teaching relationship, the “teacher” is always a god and the “student” a mortal needing to acquire a 
specific skill from the deity (see Od. 20.72, 5.233, and 23.160). The focus of such passages is on the 
acquisition of a divine technē by a given mortal and not on the process of education itself.
7 Cf. Il. 8.442 for Phoenix’ use of didaskein to describe his teaching role.
8 For Cheiron as a trophos, see Mathé 1995, 49-50.
In these references the verb τρέφω “rear” is used of his relationship to his pupil, not 
διδάσκω “teach”. This implies that Chiron was responsible for the whole development of 
his pupil, moral, physical, and intellectual, and not merely or solely for the imparting of 
specific aspects of knowledge. (49)
According to Hesiod, Cheiron reared Medeius, Jason, and Achilles. At Theogony 1001 
he is described as raising Medeius, the son of Jason, in the mountains. Similarly, in a 
fragment preserved by the scholiast on Pindar’s Nemean 3 (Hes. fr. 40), we learn that 
he raised Jason in the Pelian glade (Ἰήσονα..., ὃν Χείρων ἔθρεψ' ἐνὶ Πηλίωι 
ὑλήεντι), and in another fragment from the Catalogue of Women, Cheiron is in charge 
of tending to (komizein) the personal development of the young Achilles. The verb 
komizein here is virtually synonymous with trephein, and most importantly, it also 
denotes the kind of nurturing relationship a boy might have with his parent, or at least 
with a parental substitute.9 Indeed, aside from acting the part of the nurse, the Cheiron 
of the Hesiodic corpus seems to be a stand-in for a missing parent:10 according to most 
versions Alcimede (Jason’s mother), Medea, and Thetis were all absent from the lives of 
their young sons when they were handed over to Cheiron for tutelage. This represents 
an important extension of Cheiron’s character from a simple teacher of medicine in the 
Iliad to an all-out caretaker who reared his charges through their entire childhood, 
teaching them everything they needed to know to survive and thrive in the world. 
Although Hesiod does not mention his special subject of medicine, he does add another 
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9 For a complete discussion and analysis of the language of nourishing in Greek, see Moussy 1969. For 
the various uses of trephein, see Demont 1978. 
S Komizein was also frequently the verb used in later Greek literature to describe the act of 
entrusting a child to Cheiron.
10 According to some scholars, Cheiron is specifically a divine stand-in for a missing divine parent. If for 
whatever reason a divine (or semi-divine) mother could not raise her child, she would send him to study 
with the immortal, half-human Cheiron in order to get in touch with his divinity. See Mathé 1995, 52ff. 
important element to the Cheiron myth: a location for instruction, i.e. in the Pelian 
glade.11 
It is also at the time of Hesiod that Cheiron’s educational role splits into two distinct 
categories. The first is that of the parent/teacher/nurse described above; the second is 
that of the oracular sage who dispenses pithy advice and pearls of wisdom. It is this 
second role that gave rise to the pseudo-Hesiodic Ὑποθῆκαι Χείρονος, or Precepts of 
Cheiron, one of the earliest extant examples of the genre of advice poetry. What 
remains of this text, a small collection of fragmentary one-liners and gnomic statements, 
appears to be the beginning of the persistent later tradition ascribing to Cheiron “virtual 
omniscience and a practical monopoly of the art of teaching” (Beck 1964, 73). Both of 
these strands of the tradition continue in the Odes of Pindar and beyond, sometimes 
operating simultaneously. In Pythian 6, for example, the poet recounts some of the 
precepts which Cheiron handed down to Achilles when he was under the centaur’s 
tutelage (21-7):
τά ποτ' ἐν οὔρεσι φαντὶ μεγαλοσθενεῖ / Φιλύρας υἱὸν ὀρφανιζομένῳ / Πηλεΐδᾳ 
παραινεῖν· μάλιστα μὲν Κρονίδαν, / βαρύοπα στεροπᾶν κεραυνῶν τε πρύτανιν, / 
θεῶν σέβεσθαι· ταύτας δὲ μή ποτε τιμᾶς / ἀμείρειν γονέων βίον πεπρωμένον. 
The things which they say once the son of Philyra advised the powerful, orphaned12 son 
of Peleus in the mountains: first of all, of the gods, to worship the deep-voiced son of 
Kronus, the ruler of thunder and lightning. And also to never deprive one’s parents of 
honor during their allotted lifetime. 
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11 For more on the importance of Cheiron having a set location for instruction, see Beck 1964, 73. 
12 The use of orphanizomai here requires some explanation, given that both Peleus and Thetis were still 
alive in the context of the passage. We have to assume that the implication of the verb is not that 
Achilles’s parents are dead, but that they are absent from his life in any meaningful way, and for this 
reason there is a parental role available to be filled by Cheiron.
What initially seems like a simple mention of Cheiron as the teacher of Achilles is 
revealed to also be a reference to the tradition in which Cheiron is a master of gnomic 
statements on life. The verb παραινεῖν “to advise” situates this passage in the same 
category as the Precepts of Cheiron, that is, the genre of advice poetry. As such, 
Cheiron’s wisdom is of use not just to Achilles but also to Pindar’s entire audience: we 
all could benefit from a little reminder about how to behave toward the gods and our 
parents. Cheiron’s sphere of influence is so great in Pindar’s Odes, in fact, that in 
Pythian 9, Apollo himself, the god of prophecy, seeks Cheiron’s advice on his intention 
to rape the maiden Cyrene (29ff): 
αὐτίκα δ' ἐκ μεγάρων Χίρωνα προσήνεπε φωνᾷ· / ‘σεμνὸν ἄντρον, Φιλλυρίδα 
προλιπὼν θυμὸν γυναικὸς καὶ μεγάλαν δύνασιν / θαύμασον.../ τίς νιν ἀνθρώπων 
τέκεν; / ὁσία κλυτὰν χέρα οἱ προσενεγκεῖν ἦρα καὶ ἐκ λεχέων κεῖραι μελιαδέα 
ποίαν;
Immediately Apollo summoned Cheiron from his halls and addressed him: “Son of 
Philyra, leave behind your hallowed cave and marvel at the spirit and great power of this 
woman...What mortal bore her?...Is it sanctioned for me to lay my glorious hand upon 
her and to crop the honey-sweet meadow of her bed?”   
No better indication of Cheiron’s perceived omniscience can be found than an example 
of a god asking the centaur whether it is allowed that he pursue a particular mortal 
woman.13 
Let us now set aside the evidence for Cheiron as a sage, and consider how Cheiron is 
treated elsewhere in Pindar’s Odes. Although the two strands of the Cheiron tradition at 
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13 Pindar is certainly playing with the tradition and his readers’ expectations here, but this does not mean 
that this passage should be discounted. On the contrary, in order for him to be able to manipulate the 
tradition in this way, there had to already exist a cultural notion of Cheiron as the omniscient sage. That 
being said, we should be careful to remember that Cheiron is a naturally paradoxical figure: the immortal 
who dies, the centaur who represents the height of civilization, the prophet to whom the god of prophecy 
turns for help.
times are intertwined in the poems of Pindar (and Hesiod), as time goes on, the strands 
diverge widely, and the tradition of Cheiron as teacher/parent will ultimately prove much 
more applicable to the present enquiry concerning the teachers of the fifth century. 
In the rest of the Pindaric corpus there is a blending of the Homeric tradition of Cheiron 
as teacher and the Hesiodic tradition of Cheiron as parent. In Pythian 3, Cheiron is 
described as having reared (5: trephein) Asclepius and having taught him (45: 
didaskein) how to heal painful afflictions for mankind. The dual function of Cheiron as 
teacher and parent is evidenced again in Pythian 4 when Jason addresses Pelias 
(102-4): 
Φαμὶ διδασκαλίαν Χίρωνος οἴσειν. ἀντρόθε γὰρ νέομαι / πὰρ Χαρικˈλοῦς καὶ 
Φιλύρας, ἵνα Κενταύρου με κοῦραι θρέψαν ἁγˈναί. / εἴκοσι δ' ἐκτελέσαις 
ἐνιαυτοὺς οὔτε ἔργον / οὔτ' ἔπος ἐντράπελον κείνοισιν εἰπὼν ἱκόμαν οἴκαδε  
“I say that I will bring the teaching of Cheiron, for I come from his cave, from the side of 
Chariclo and Philyra, where the holy daughters of the Centaur raised me. And having 
spent twenty years there and not having done or said anything shameful in their 
presence, I have come home.” 
This passage is interesting for several reasons. First, in it Jason describes what he has 
learned from Cheiron as διδασκαλία, “teaching”, which implies that Cheiron taught him 
at least one specific discipline (perhaps hunting or warfare?). Second, here Jason offers 
a rare window into his life in the cave of Cheiron; we see that he was raised by the 
centaur, together with Cheiron’s mother Philyra, his wife Chariclo, and their daughters 
for the bulk of his young life, and that he was taught by them the correct way to behave 
in the outside world. 
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The most detailed Pindaric account of Cheiron as teacher/parent occurs in Nemean 3 
(43-9 and 53-60):
ξανθὸς δ' Ἀχιλεὺς τὰ μὲν μένων Φιλύρας ἐν δόμοις, 
παῖς ἐὼν ἄθυρε μεγάλα ἔργα· χερσὶ θαμινά 
βραχυσίδαρον ἄκοντα πάλλων ἴσα τ' ἀνέμοις,! ! ! ! 45 
ἐν μάχᾳ λεόντεσσιν ἀγροτέροις ἔπρασσεν φόνον, 
κάπˈρους τ' ἔναιρε· σώματα δὲ παρὰ Κρονίδαν 
Κένταυρον ἀσθμαίνοντα κόμιζεν, 
ἑξέτης τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλον δ' ἔπειτ' ἂν χρόνον·... 
βαθυμῆτα Χίρων τράφε λιθίνῳ 
Ἰάσον' ἔνδον τέγει, καὶ ἔπειτεν Ἀσκλαπιόν, 
τὸν φαρμάκων δίδαξε μαλακόχειρα νόμον·! ! ! ! 55 
νύμφευσε δ' αὖτις ἀγλαόκολπον 
Νηρέος θύγατˈρα, γόνον τέ οἱ φέρτατον 
ἀτίταλλεν ἐν ἀρμένοισι πᾶσι θυμὸν αὔξων, 
ὄφˈρα θαλασσίαις ἀνέμων ῥιπαῖσι πεμφθείς 
ὑπὸ Τροΐαν δορίκτυπον ἀλαλὰν Λυκίων τε προσμένοι καὶ Φρυγῶν! 60 
Δαρδάνων τε. 
And golden-haired Achilles, while staying in the house of Philyra (mother/daughter of 
Cheiron) as a child, accomplished great deeds. Brandishing a short-bladed spear in his 
hands and moving as quickly as the wind, he brought death in battle to savage lions, and 
he slew boars, and he brought their panting bodies back to the Centaur son of Kronus, 
for the first time when he was six years old, and then afterwards for the remainder of his 
time there... 
Deep-thinking Cheiron raised Jason under his stone roof, and then later Asclepius, 
whom he taught the gentle-handed law of remedies. And he arranged marriage for the 
glorious-bosomed daughter of Nereus, and he nurtured her incomparable son (Achilles), 
fostering his spirit with all fitting things so that when he was sent to Troy by the blasts of 
the sea-winds he might stand his ground against the spear-shaking battle-cry of the 
Lykians and the Phrygians and the Dardanians. 
This passage offers the only definitive piece of pre-Classical evidence for Cheiron as a 
teacher of hunting and warfare,14 a theme which will come to dominate the Cheiron 
tradition in later texts. In the first six lines, we see Cheiron implicitly encouraging 
Achilles to treat wild animals like the foes he will one day face in battle, and indeed, this 
lesson is given real-life application a few lines later when Achilles is sent to Troy and he 
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14 Although it can be argued that the Homeric reference to the spear Cheiron gave to Peleus is, in fact, a 
veiled reference to his having taught Peleus to hunt.
must exhibit the same courage and ruthlessness that he showed with the lions and the 
boars in the woods surrounding Cheiron’s cave. The centaur himself has provided all of 
the appropriate training for Achilles to be a skilled fighter (58ff). Just before, at lines 
54-55, Pindar mentions that Cheiron also taught (didaskein) Asclepius the law of 
remedies, continuing the tradition begun with Homer. So in this one passage, then, 
Cheiron is said to teach hunting, warfare, and medicine, while also raising (trephein) 
both Jason and Asclepius and nurturing (atitallein) Achilles. Rearing and teaching go 
hand-in-hand in Cheiron’s care, and he teaches morality and comportment just as much 
as medicine and other skilled pursuits. The use of the verb atitallein in line 58 
underscores this point. While this verb is an hapax legomenon in Pindar, in pre-Pindaric 
archaic poetry (i.e. Homer, Hesiod, and the Homeric Hymns) atitallein nearly always 
occurs in conjunction with trephein (or komeô/komizô) and is used to describe the 
relationship between a child and a non-biological parental figure, usually when the 
child’s mother is deceased, absent, or unable to care for her offspring.15 For example, in 
Hesiod’s Theogony 479-80, Rheia gives up the baby Zeus to Gaia to take care of so he 
will be protected from the wrath of Kronus: τὸν μέν οἱ ἐδέξατο Γαῖα πελώρη / Κρήτῃ 
ἐν εὐρείῃ τρεφέμεν ἀτιταλλέμεναί τε. (And vast Gaia received him (Zeus) in wide 
Crete to raise and nourish.) Similarly, in the Homeric Hymn to Dionysus (3-5), the baby 
god is given to the nymphs of Nysa to raise (trephein) and nurture (atitallein) since his 
mother, Semele, had been burned to death. The combination of these verbs points to a 
holistic care-taking relationship, the purpose of which is to provide not only simple 
sustenance (food, shelter, etc), but also wisdom and important life skills. Pindar’s 
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15 See Hom. Hymn to Aph. 115; Hesiod fr. 165.6; Iliad 14.202 and 303, 16.191, 24.60; Odyssey 18.323, 
19.354.
singular use of atitallein (58) along with trephein (53) and didaskein (54) in the passage 
above from Nemean 3 emphasizes Cheiron’s role as a surrogate parent -  particularly 
for boys whose mothers are absent - as well as an educator.
After Pindar, Cheiron’s literary and iconographic legacy takes on a life of its own. 
Beginning as early as Xenophon and continuing into the Roman period, the wise 
centaur quickly acquires an impossibly large number of students and subjects of 
instruction. In On Hunting 1-2, Xenophon recounts how Apollo and Artemis gave hunting 
as a gift to Cheiron, who taught this and many other noble things to his students, 21 in 
all, including not only the heroes mentioned in the earlier poetic tradition, but also 
Cephalus, Nestor, Theseus, Hippolytus, Telamon, Odysseus, Diomedes, Aeneas, and 
both Castor and Pollux. To this number Apollodorus (Bibl. 3.30) adds Actaeon, and one 
third-century bronze statue even includes Hercules among them.16 By the Roman 
period, Cheiron is not only the teacher of all students, but the teacher of all subjects. 
Statius’ Achilleis 2.96ff lists hunting, warfare, wilderness survival, music, wrestling, 
medicine, and the precepts of divine justice among the subjects Cheiron taught to 
Achilles, while a well-known fresco from Herculaneum shows Cheiron teaching Achilles 
to play the lyre, and one of the reliefs of the Tensa Capitolina shows Cheiron instructing 
Achilles on how to throw the javelin.17 In Homer, Cheiron had one student - Achilles - , 
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16 London, BM 1242. See LIMC on “Cheiron” p. 246.
17 For these specific works of art, see Marrou 1956, 360, n. 11. For many iconographical examples that 
match up to the text of the Achilleis, see LIMC on “Cheiron” pp. 242-5.
and one subject - medicine - ,18 but by the latter half of the fifth century he had become 
the teacher of all noble subjects to all extraordinary men, or at least to all men a 
respectable upper class person might want to claim descent from. I would suggest that 
this expansion of Cheiron’s sphere is the result of poets recognizing a clear correlation 
between Cheiron’s educational role and that of the Classical didaskalos. Cheiron was a 
teacher before a name for this profession existed in Greek, and later writers 
acknowledged this and assimilated his role to that of the didaskalos, the existing model 
closest to what he did. In other words, Cheiron is a proto-didaskalos, the functional 
predecessor of the didaskalos, and as such, he exhibits a number of characteristics 
(although not all) that will come to be associated with the didaskalos of the Classical 
period.
According to Beck (1964, 72-3), there are three aspects which define the public school 
system at Athens from 450-350 BC: 
1. “The education provided was cultural, not technical, directed towards 
character training and citizenship, not towards craftsmanship and personal 
profit.” This means that trades like tanning, carpentry, and metal-working 
would not be taught in schools. 
2. “The teacher was a professional taking more than one pupil and offering 
instruction to all who could afford it. In this sense he is to be opposed to the 
private tutor.”
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18 As mentioned above, it is possible that Cheiron’s gift of a spear to Peleus hints at his participation in the 
sphere of hunting and warfare as well, but there is no other evidence for his teaching of these subjects in 
Homer.
3. “The instruction offered was given in some definite building or locality.” This 
place was separate from the student’s home; the very necessity of travel to 
the schoolhouse is a defining characteristic of the educational system at this 
time.
To this list, I would add that the duration of instruction was traditionally on the order of 
years, but not a lifetime. This distinction will become important later when we compare 
the didaskalos with the paidagôgos. 
How does Cheiron fit into this Classical paradigm? First of all, in Cheiron is combined 
both technical and cultural instruction. He specialized in medicine (although it is 
debatable whether he taught this as a craft to practice or simply for its usefulness as a 
survival skill),19 but he also sought to make his students whole people and functional 
citizens. This aspect of his teaching is brought to the fore in Statius’ Achilleis with the 
increased number of non-technical subjects Cheiron teaches. 
Second, although Cheiron was, by definition, a private tutor who only worked with one 
student at a time, he did have more than one student in total (at the very least he taught 
Asclepius and Achilles, and probably Jason), and this aspect is also exaggerated in the 
later authors who list all the heroes as students of Cheiron. He certainly can’t be said to 
ever have taught a whole class of boys at one time like the didaskalos, but given his 
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19 Although medicine is likely exceptional as technai go, given that it was clearly not considered to be a 
low-class pursuit in the Homeric corpus, nevertheless, by the Classical period it was being equated - at 
least by some - with such banausic professions as cooking, captaining a ship, farming, and cobbling. For 
example, see Plato Republic 332c, Hippocrates On Ancient Medicine. For this reason, I follow Beck 
(1964, 143) in placing instruction in medicine in the category of technical education. For the status of 
medicine in Archaic Greek poetry, especially Homer, see Kudlien 1968, 310ff. 
immortality he doesn’t quite fit the traditional model of a private tutor20  who could only 
have worked with one or two boys in his lifetime either. Despite his immortality, however, 
Cheiron was a temporary figure in a boy’s life. The longest duration of stay we know of 
is Jason’s: he lived with the centaur for twenty years. Unlike household slaves and 
nurses, Cheiron did not continue to see a boy after he reached the age of maturity. In 
this way, his function is much closer to that of a professional teacher than anything else.
Finally, starting with Hesiod, Cheiron’s instruction did take place in a definite location 
outside of the home of his student where a boy would be sent or brought: a cave in the 
Pelian glade. Although the student lived in the cave with Cheiron, as opposed to making 
the journey daily, this is most likely a function of the relative isolation of Cheiron’s cave 
from centers of civilization. Because of this difference, however, Cheiron had to function 
as a parental substitute and nurse for the boy, since he would not have been able to 
return home for his day-to-day care. Setting aside his working with only one student at a 
time, this role of substitute nurturer - marked by the use of the verb trephein - is the 
biggest difference between Cheiron and the Classical figure of the didaskalos.21  
1.2 Phoenix and the paidagôgos
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20 I.e. the paidagôgos. For further discussion see below, Section 1.2 
21 As we saw in the Introduction, the didaskalos also acted as a surrogate parent, but his role did not 
extend to the kind of nurture and rearing that Cheiron is described as performing for his students. 
S Although the relationship between Cheiron and Achilles looks very much like the type of 
relationship a modern reader might call “apprenticeship”, there is no evidence for the specific language or 
concept of apprenticeship in ancient Greek literature. It is my contention that the primary reason why a 
student would live for a period of time with his teacher was because of the logistical difficulty presented by 
a long commute to the house of the teacher. While modern “apprenticeship” is, by definition, training in a 
skilled trade, the equivalent ancient relationships - like that between Cheiron and Achilles - were not 
necessarily about technical training alone.
If Cheiron is a proto-didaskalos, then Phoenix must represent a different model of 
education. At Republic 390e4, Plato refers to Phoenix as Achilles’ paidagôgos, a Greek 
term which is most often translated as “tutor.” However, this figure did not exist in the 
literature of the archaic period, so we must look at later evidence for an explanation of 
Plato’s anachronism. The paidagôgos first appears in literature in Herodotus Book Eight 
(Ch. 75.1-7). In this passage, Themistocles undertakes a calculated deception in order 
to bring about the Battle of Salamis:  
Ἐνθαῦτα Θεμιστοκλέης ὡς ἑσσοῦτο τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων, λαθὼν 
ἐξέρχεται ἐκ τοῦ συνεδρίου, ἐξελθὼν δὲ πέμπει ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον τὸ Μήδων 
ἄνδρα πλοίῳ, ἐντειλάμενος τὰ λέγειν χρεόν, τῷ οὔνομα μὲν ἦν Σίκιννος, οἰκέτης 
δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγὸς ἦν τῶν Θεμιστοκλέος παίδων· τὸν δὴ ὕστερον τούτων τῶν 
πρηγμάτων [ὁ] Θεμιστοκλέης Θεσπιέα τε ἐποίησε, ὡς ἐπεδέκοντο οἱ Θεσπιέες 
πολιήτας, καὶ χρήμασι ὄλβιον.
Then Themistocles, since he had been defeated in the vote by the Peloponnesians, left 
the assembly in secret, and having gone out he sent a man by boat to the encampment 
of the Medes, enjoining on him what he should say. The name of this man was Sicinnus, 
and he was the household slave and paidagôgos of the children of Themistocles. Later 
on, Themistocles made him a Thespian when the Thespians were accepting new 
citizens, and he made him rich with money.   
The success of Themistocles’ plan in this scene depends upon the actions of the 
paidagôgos Sicinnus.22 It is worth noting that Themistocles did not entrust anyone else 
with the important mission of bringing the false message to Xerxes. Sicinnus is clearly a 
trusted member of his household, a point which is doubly determined in the Histories by 
the use of both “household slave” and paidagôgos to describe him. As Beck has rightly 
observed (1964, 105), oiketês often describes a servant who is seen as a member of 
the family and is frequently used in opposition to a lowly slave, or doûlos. Not only is 
Sicinnus trusted with the care of Themistocles’ children, he also shares an intimacy with 
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22 This does not mean, of course, that in actual fact, Themistocles used the word paidagôgos to describe 
Sicinnus, but rather, by the time Herodotus was writing about this figure, paidagôgos seemed to be the 
best word to describe him. 
the family that belies his social status. Given this, it comes as no surprise that 
Themistocles ultimately rewards Sicinnus with citizenship and wealth befitting a person 
held in high esteem. 
Evidence of this intimacy and esteem can also be found in the tragedians. In Euripides’ 
Electra (285-87), Electra counts her father’s elderly paidagôgos among the number of 
those dear to her (ἐμῶν φίλων), recalling the way he once saved Orestes from death. 
Similarly, in the Ion (725ff), Creusa addresses her father’s aged paidagôgos as φίλος 
(dear) and εὔνους (kindly) and assures him that she will take care of him as if he were 
her own father, to which he responds in kind by calling her θύγατερ, “daughter.” The 
motif of paidagôgos as parent will prove important later in our discussion of Phoenix and 
Achilles. The most developed example of this theme comes from the opening scene of 
Sophocles’ Electra (1-75). The play begins with the paidagôgos giving Orestes a sort of 
mini-lesson on the topography of his homeland as they pass through it, at the end of 
which he recalls the way the two of them had been forced to flee after the murder of 
Agamemnon when Orestes was still very young (11-14): 
ὅθεν σε πατρὸς ἐκ φόνων ἐγώ ποτε / πρὸς σῆς ὁμαίμου καὶ κασιγνήτης λαβὼν / 
ἤνεγκα κἀξέσωσα κἀξεθρεψάμην / τοσόνδ' ἐς ἥβης πατρὶ τιμωρὸν φόνου. 
Long ago I took you away from the murder of your father on behalf of your blood kin and 
sister and I saved you and raised you to adolescence to avenge your father’s death.        
The paidagôgos in this scene first treats Orestes like his student, pointing out all of the 
sites along their route, but he explains his relationship to Orestes in terms of rearing to 
manhood (katatrephein) like a parent. Then, acting in the role of advisor, he goes on to 
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lay out the plan of action against Clytemnestra and Aegisthus for his youthful charge, to 
which Orestes responds gratefully (23-4 and 29-31):  
Ὦ φίλτατ' ἀνδρῶν προσπόλων, ὥς μοι σαφῆ / σημεῖα φαίνεις ἐσθλὸς εἰς ἡμᾶς 
γεγώς·... / Τοιγὰρ τὰ μὲν δόξαντα δηλώσω, σὺ δέ, / ὀξεῖαν ἀκοὴν τοῖς ἐμοῖς 
λόγοις διδούς, / εἰ μή τι καιροῦ τυγχάνω, μεθάρμοσον.
Oh dearest attendant, how clearly you have shown yourself to be loyal to our 
family...Therefore I will explain my idea, and you, give a sharp ear to my words and 
correct me if I miss the mark in some way. 
In this brief passage Orestes demonstrates neatly the multiplicity of the roles 
encompassed by the figure of the paidagôgos at this time. In the first two lines, he 
addresses his companion as “dearest”, and “loyal”, but hints at a status disparity with 
the word prospolos, which is most often used to denote a member of the servant class. 
In almost the same breath, however, Orestes shows a student’s respect for the 
paidagôgos by seeking his advice and offering to defer to his judgment concerning their 
conspiracy. Like Themistocles’ paidagôgos, the paidagôgos in this play is trusted with 
delivering a very important message on which subsequent events depend. In the 
Electra, in fact, the paidagôgos is responsible for coordinating and executing the plot to 
take vengeance on Clytemnestra and Aegisthus; he comes up with all of the lies to be 
told and manipulates everyone beautifully, giving Orestes very specific instructions 
about how he should carry out the plan (660-770; 1326-70). In addition, he even 
intervenes to rebuke Orestes and Electra for making too much noise in their reunion 
scene, and in this way, he also enacts the usual role of the paidagôgos as disciplinarian. 
It must be pointed out, however, that the paidagôgos does not teach (didaskein) per se 
in the Electra or in any of the other extant literature, nor does he instruct in any 
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particular subject. His specialty seems to be in moral and behavioral advice; he is a 
guide and a governor, not a teacher.  
 
One of the tragedians’ most important additions to the paidagôgos tradition is his age. 
The paidagôgos in Sophocles and Euripides is always elderly; he is described as a 
presbus23 or a gerôn24 who takes care of a child. By the end of the fifth century, this 
system was already established to the point that Euripides could make a pun in the 
Bacchae wherein Cadmus offers to act as a paidagôgos for his blind friend Teiresias, 
even though they are both elderly (193): {Κα.} γέρων γέροντα παιδαγωγήσω σ' ἐγώ; 
(I myself, being an old man, will be your paidagôgos, although you are also elderly).
Less than fifty years later, the paidagôgos had become intimately linked with the day-to-
day life of the family and was frequently mentioned in conjunction with parents, nurse, 
and didaskalos as one of the key formative figures in the life of a young boy.25 At the 
same time, he was no longer thought of as a dear friend, although he was still treated 
with great respect considering his slave status. In Plato’s Lysis (208c), Socrates 
questions the boy Lysis about the authority figures in his life, and we learn the basic 
Classical function of the paidagôgos:  
ΣΩΚ: Ἀλλ' ἄρχει τίς σου; ΛΥΣ: Ὅδε, παιδαγωγός. 
ΣΩΚ: Μῶν δοῦλος ὤν; ΛΥΣ: Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ἡμέτερός γε. 
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23 See Euripides Medea 53, Ion 725. It is possible that these terms denote some degree of honorific in 
addition to, or even instead of, actual years of life. 
24 See Euripides Electra 287, Sophocles Electra 73.
25 See Plato Republic 373c, Protagoras 325c; Xenophon Constitution of the Lacedaimonians 2.1.6; and 
later Plutarch Aemilius Paullus 33.6.3 and Alexander 5.7.2. 
ΣΩΚ: Ἦ δεινόν ἐλεύθερον ὄντα ὑπὸ δούλου ἄρχεσθαι. τί δὲ ποιῶν αὖ οὗτος ὁ 
παιδαγωγός σου ἄρχει; ΛΥΣ: Ἄγων δήπου εἰς διδασκάλου. 
ΣΩΚ: Μῶν μὴ καὶ οὗτοί σου ἄρχουσιν, οἱ διδάσκαλοι; ΛΥΣ: Πάντως δήπου. 
ΣΩΚ: Παμπόλλους ἄρα σοι δεσπότας καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑκὼν ὁ πατὴρ ἐφίστησιν.
SOC: But does someone rule over you? LYS: This man here, my paidagôgos. SOC: He 
isn’t a slave, is he? LYS: Sure he is, but he is our slave. SOC: It is remarkable that a free 
person is ruled by a slave. How does this paidagôgos rule you? LYS: He brings me to 
my teacher’s place. SOC: Don’t they also rule over you, your teachers? LYS: By all 
means. SOC: Well then, your father intentionally sets up all kinds of rulers and authority 
figures for you. 
It is clear from this passage that by Plato’s time, the paidagôgos was little more than an 
escort. He was a slave assigned to stay with one boy throughout his youth (and 
sometimes beyond),26 to work as a parental substitute in conjunction with the trophos, 
and to act as the intermediary between the safe spaces of the home and the 
schoolhouse. He protected his boy from the advances of an erastês,27 attended classes 
with him,28 carried his books,29 disciplined him when necessary,30 and taught him 
comportment and good behavior.31 As a live-in care-taker, the paidagôgos would have 
dealt with all aspects of a boy’s raising, from infancy through young adulthood. 
 Now we can return to Phoenix, the anachronistically-labeled paidagôgos who makes 
only one significant appearance in the Iliad. In Book 9, when the embassy is sent to 
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26 See Plutarch’s Life of Demosthenes 5 for the paidagôgos as an escort for the adult statesman when 
traveling to and from the assembly.
27 See Plato Symposium 183c.
28 See discussion of the Douris Cup at Introduction Section 3.2   
29 See Iulius Pollux X.59.
30 See Plato Protagoras 325c. For the comedic literary afterlife of the paidagôgos as failed disciplinarian 
see Plautus Bacchides 420-45.
31 See Plutarch An virtus doceri possit 2. 
Achilles to beg him to return to the fight, Phoenix presents his case as surrogate parent 
and caretaker of the youth: 
πῶς ἂν ἔπειτ' ἀπὸ σεῖο φίλον τέκος αὖθι λιποίμην
οἶος; σοὶ δέ μ' ἔπεμπε γέρων ἱππηλάτα Πηλεὺς
ἤματι τῷ ὅτε σ' ἐκ Φθίης Ἀγαμέμνονι πέμπε
νήπιον οὔ πω εἰδόθ' ὁμοιΐου πολέμοιο! ! ! ! 440! !
οὐδ' ἀγορέων, ἵνα τ' ἄνδρες ἀριπρεπέες τελέθουσι.
τοὔνεκά με προέηκε διδασκέμεναι τάδε πάντα,
μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων.
ὡς ἂν ἔπειτ' ἀπὸ σεῖο φίλον τέκος οὐκ ἐθέλοιμι
λείπεσθε
How then could I remain here alone, apart from you, dear child? 
Peleus, the aged horseman, sent me with you 
on that day when he sent you from Phthia to Agamemnon 
as a mere child who knew nothing of joining battle 
nor of assemblies, where men become outstanding. 
For this reason he sent me along to teach you all of these things, 
to become a capable speaker and a man of action. 
Therefore I would not be willing to be left behind apart from you, dear child.    
Here we see Phoenix acting as both parent and teacher to the youthful Achilles. He 
addresses his charge as “dear child” and expresses great distress at the prospect of 
ever being separated from his adopted son, but in the same breath he recalls how 
Achilles’ actual father Peleus had sent him along with the boy in order to teach him 
proper conduct. Although the verb Phoenix uses for his instructional relationship with 
Achilles is didaskein, the “subjects” he teaches him are oral communication and proper 
behavior - the domain of the private tutor or later paidagôgos.32 The juxtaposition of 
muthôn and ergôn in line 443 also hints at the later literary use of the combination of 
“word” and “deed” to describe a well-rounded, properly-educated person. In this way, 
Phoenix, like Cheiron, is a general educator of sorts, blurring the boundaries of the 
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32 I qualify the topics Phoenix teaches in this way in order to make clear that I do not believe Homer was 
actually arguing for a developed curriculum of any kind that was taught by the noble paidagôgos at this 
time. Instead, oral communication describes the broad skill of being able to express one’s opinion in a 
group discussion, and proper behavior describes all of the interpersonal actions a Homeric hero might 
need to take part in, including battlefield etiquette, hunting, sports, etc.
paidagôgos and the didaskalos. In fact, it seems likely that Beck’s observation on this 
phenomenon is accurate: 
In early times the Classical functions of paidagôgos and teacher, that is, of moral training 
and of technical, including literary, instruction, were combined in the one person. In fact, 
since in those early aristocratic days there was little technical and literary instruction, the 
paedagogic function would predominate. (1964, 107)
This is certainly what we see in the speech Phoenix gives to try to convince Achilles to 
stay. He begins by reminding his charge of the ways he took care of him as a child 
(9.485-95):
καί σε τοσοῦτον ἔθηκα θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ,!! ! 485! !
ἐκ θυμοῦ φιλέων, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐθέλεσκες ἅμ' ἄλλῳ
οὔτ' ἐς δαῖτ' ἰέναι οὔτ' ἐν μεγάροισι πάσασθαι,
πρίν γ' ὅτε δή σ' ἐπ' ἐμοῖσιν ἐγὼ γούνεσσι καθίσσας
ὄψου τ' ἄσαιμι προταμὼν καὶ οἶνον ἐπισχών.
πολλάκι μοι κατέδευσας ἐπὶ στήθεσσι χιτῶνα! ! ! 490! !
οἴνου ἀποβλύζων ἐν νηπιέῃ ἀλεγεινῇ.
ὣς ἐπὶ σοὶ μάλα πολλὰ πάθον καὶ πολλὰ μόγησα,
τὰ φρονέων ὅ μοι οὔ τι θεοὶ γόνον ἐξετέλειον
ἐξ ἐμεῦ· ἀλλὰ σὲ παῖδα θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ
ποιεύμην
And I made you what you are, godlike Achilles,
loving you from my heart, since you would not go to
feast with anyone else nor would you eat in the halls
until I had sat you down on my knees and had cut up 
your food and given you all you wanted, and held your wine for you.
Often you soaked the chest of my robe, spitting up your wine 
in the troublesomeness of your childhood.
So I have suffered many things because of you and I have endured much trouble,
thinking about how the gods would not bring about any offspring for me.
But I made you my child, godlike Achilles.
   ! ! ! ! ! ! S S S ! !
Aside from demonstrating the deep, paternal love Phoenix has for his young charge, 
this speech is clearly intended to remind Achilles of his familial obligations to his aged 
tutor and to engender enough guilt to nudge him in the right direction. In case this is not 
effective, Phoenix goes on to recount a thinly-veiled allegorical tale whose outcome 
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parallels the worst possible outcome of Achilles’ current situation.33 Like a paidagôgos 
whose job it is to guide his charge toward the most prudent course of action, Phoenix 
presents Achilles with an instructional parable in the hopes that the lesson of another’s 
experience might make clear to the young man his own folly (Il. 9.529-605). To this 
lesson, however, Achilles responds with impatience and anger, addressing his ἄττα 
γεραιὲ διοτρεφὲς (aged, illustrious, father) like the paidagôgos whose advice he 
believes he has outgrown.  
So what makes Phoenix more of a proto-paidagôgos than a proto-didaskalos? How is 
he so different from the model represented by Cheiron?34 While Cheiron and Phoenix 
both serve as teachers and parental substitutes selected by the boy’s parents, their 
similarities end there. Phoenix, like the paidagôgos with whom he shares so many 
characteristics, stays with the boy to whom he is attached, only serving as tutor to one 
boy in his lifetime. In contrast, Cheiron has many students over the course of his life,35 
and they come to him, stay for a limited time, and then return to their lives apart from 
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33 For discussion of the method of teaching by example, see Chapter 2, Section 1.3
34 At this point, it is worth addressing the controversial and much-discussed question of why Homer 
included both Cheiron and Phoenix as teachers of Achilles in the Iliad. In this, I follow the argument of 
Mackie (1997) that goes as follows: Homer included two different teachers for Achilles in order to account 
for his extraordinary nature. He couldn’t very well have a centaur be the primary teacher of behavior and 
morals for an aristocratic hero, so he gave the role of community instructor to Phoenix. This meant that 
Phoenix taught Achilles all of the standard things that every prince needs to know to participate in 
community life (i.e. interactions in the army). However, Achilles is far too unusual to just have an ordinary 
education, so to account for his less ordinary qualities, including his training in medicine and 
marksmanship, Homer provided the figure of Cheiron. This seems to me a tidy and reasonable solution to 
the problem of the presence of both Cheiron and Phoenix in the Iliad, while not discounting either of their 
roles. I would simply add to this argument that if we view Cheiron and Phoenix as acting in different 
educational capacities (i.e. as proto-didaskalos and proto-paidagôgos, respectively), the issue of both 
their continued - and potentially conflicting - presences in the Iliad is minimized even further.
35 If we are to take as fact the list of Cheiron’s students, then there would inevitably have been some 
overlap between their tenures with the centaur. However, for our purposes, it is only important to note that 
Cheiron is never described as leading a class or as teaching more than one student at a time.
the centaur. While Cheiron does provide a complete education in the way a paidagôgos 
would have, he also has specialties that a general educator would not have (medicine, 
music, hunting). Phoenix, on the other hand, is almost solely a behavioral coach with no 
specific areas of specialization.36       
1.3 Mentor 
When placed alongside the figures of Cheiron and Phoenix, Mentor does not appear to 
fit into either of these two models, despite some scholarly arguments to the contrary.37 
Mentor is an older adult male who advises Odysseus’ son, Telemachus, in the Odyssey, 
and that role earned him immortality as the namesake of the English word for an older 
adviser to a younger person, i.e. a mentor. The word “mentor” is thought to have been 
brought into English in the mid 1700’s via the French political novel Les Aventures de 
Télémaque by Mothe-Fénelon, in which there was great emphasis on the role of Mentor 
as a counselor. Following the novel’s translation into English in 1700, the word “mentor” 
began appearing in English literature of all genres, and until the late 1800’s it was 
always capitalized, presumably because it came from the character of Mentor.38 As the 
derivative noun implies, Mentor does indeed act as a counselor to a young man in the 
Odyssey, but that educational relationship does not take the same form as those we 
have discussed above. 
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36 It is certain that agonistic skill and military conduct would not have been considered specialized 
subjects in the heroic age, but rather more general areas of knowledge necessary for success as an 
aristocrat.
37 See Marrou 1956, 8; Beck 1964, 49-50. 
38 See “mentor, n.” in Oxford English Dictionary, online version. June 2011.
Mentor’s role is complicated by the fact that Athena impersonates him throughout the 
Odyssey in order to intervene in Telemachus’ life.39 That the goddess chooses Mentor 
as the individual to impersonate is most relevant, since this indicates a recognition on 
her part that Mentor, as a trusted friend of Odysseus and counselor to Telemachus, is 
the most appropriate person to dispense the sort of advice she wishes to give. Athena’s 
approach here stands in contrast, of course, to the way she intervenes with Achilles in 
the first book of the Iliad (188-214), when she appears as herself and grabs him by the 
hair in order to prevent him from attacking Agamemnon. This implies that Achilles needs 
a different kind of instruction than Telemachus, a fact which underscores the differences 
between the respective educations offered by Mentor, Cheiron, and Phoenix.   
While Cheiron shares his most salient features with the didaskalos and Phoenix with the 
paidagôgos, Mentor seems to represent a third category. However, these three figures 
do share one important characteristic: like Phoenix and Cheiron, Mentor does act as a 
stand-in for a missing parent. At Odyssey 1.307-8, Telemachus compares the kindly 
advice Mentes has given him to the way a father would treat his own son, and at 2.225ff 
Mentor is described as the person to whom Odysseus had entrusted the care of his 
home during his absence: 
Μέντωρ, ὅς ῥ' Ὀδυσῆος ἀμύμονος ἦεν ἑταῖρος, / καί οἱ ἰὼν ἐν νηυσὶν ἐπέτρεπεν 
οἶκον ἅπαντα, / πείθεσθαί τε γέροντι καὶ ἔμπεδα πάντα φυλάσσειν·
And Mentor stood up, who was the companion of blameless Odysseus, and when he 
went away on the ships, Mentor was the one to whom he entrusted his whole household, 
so that they might obey the old man and keep everything safe.  
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39 In fact, Mentor’s sole existence for us in the Odyssey is as a disguise for Athena. We never meet the 
“real” Mentor/Mentes.
For all intents and purposes, Mentor is Odysseus’ designated representative for the 
duration of the war, and that means not only overseeing the day-to-day workings of the 
estate, but also acting as a surrogate father to his son.
Other than this one similarity, however, Mentor represents an entirely different 
educational model than either Phoenix or Cheiron. Unlike the other two models, Mentor 
does not live with his young charge,40 and there is no set locale where his interactions 
with Telemachus occur. In fact, the most important conversation between Mentor and 
Telemachus (in Book 2) takes place in a neutral location, outside of the Ithaca assembly  
building, while a similar conversation between Mentes and Telemachus (in Book 1) 
takes place outside the banquet hall at the house of Odysseus. 
The most important difference between Mentor and the other archaic educators is his 
mode and subject of instruction. Mentor does not teach; he gives advice, and only on a 
very limited and specific set of topics. His tenure with Telemachus is designed to be 
short, since his literary purpose is to help resolve a specific problem in the story, after 
which time he is no longer needed. Mentes is only in Ithaca for a day, but that is time 
enough to help Telemachus sort out his confusion around the fate of his father and how 
to deal with the uncontrollable suitors at his house (Book 1.269-71):
σὲ δὲ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα, / ὅππως κε μνηστῆρας ἀπώσεαι ἐκ μεγάροιο. / εἰ δ' ἄγε 
νῦν ξυνίει καὶ ἐμῶν ἐμπάζεο μύθων·
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40 In fact, Mentes is the leader of the Taphians, and has only just arrived on ship from far away, allegedly 
to check in on Odysseus, but we know that he is actually the disguised Athena, come to encourage and 
advise Telemachus. See Odyssey 1.105ff.
And I urge you to think about how you might get the suitors out of your house. So come 
now, listen up and take heed of my words. 
He goes on to advise Telemachus first to call an assembly of all the statesmen in Ithaca 
in order to force the suitors to go home, and second, to fit out a ship to go looking for his 
father. Then he leaves. In similar fashion, after the assembly in Book 2, when 
Telemachus seems to be disheartened from the harassment of the suitors and in need 
of a pep talk, Mentor offers the youth some practical advice (281-95):
τῶ νῦν μνηστήρων μὲν ἔα βουλήν τε νόον τε
ἀφραδέων, ἐπεὶ οὔ τι νοήμονες οὐδὲ δίκαιοι·
οὐδέ τι ἴσασιν θάνατον καὶ κῆρα μέλαιναν,
ὡς δή σφιν σχεδόν ἐστιν ἐπ' ἤματι πάντας ὀλέσθαι.
σοὶ δ' ὁδὸς οὐκέτι δηρὸν ἀπέσσεται ἣν σὺ μενοινᾷς·
τοῖος γάρ τοι ἑταῖρος ἐγὼ πατρώϊός εἰμι,
ὅς τοι νῆα θοὴν στελέω καὶ ἅμ' ἕψομαι αὐτός.
ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν πρὸς δώματ' ἰὼν μνηστῆρσιν ὁμίλει,
ὅπλισσόν τ' ἤϊα καὶ ἄγγεσιν ἄρσον ἅπαντα,
οἶνον ἐν ἀμφιφορεῦσι καὶ ἄλφιτα, μυελὸν ἀνδρῶν,  
δέρμασιν ἐν πυκινοῖσιν· ἐγὼ δ' ἀνὰ δῆμον ἑταίρους
αἶψ' ἐθελοντῆρας συλλέξομαι. εἰσὶ δὲ νῆες
πολλαὶ ἐν ἀμφιάλῳ Ἰθάκῃ, νέαι ἠδὲ παλαιαί·
τάων μέν τοι ἐγὼν ἐπιόψομαι ἥ τις ἀρίστη,
ὦκα δ' ἐφοπλίσσαντες ἐνήσομεν εὐρέϊ πόντῳ. 
Now, leave alone the plot and intention of these senseless suitors, since they are not 
thoughtful or just. And they do not know that death and black doom are near them so 
that they will all die on one day. And that journey for which you are eagerly desiring is no 
longer far off, for I will be the same sort of companion to you that I was to your father, 
and I will make ready a fast ship and I myself will accompany you on the journey. But 
you should go home now and join the company of the suitors, and prepare the 
provisions and pack everything into containers, the wine in two-handled jars and the 
barley, the marrow of men, in leather vessels. And straightaway I will gather a group of 
volunteers from the area to be companions on the voyage. Further, there are many ships 
in seagirt Ithaca, both old and new, and I will look over these to find which one is best, 
and once we have made it ready we will swiftly set sail on the wide sea.
Counseling Telemachus to stop worrying about the situation with the suitors, Mentor 
urges him instead to focus his energies on finding out what happened to Odysseus. To 
that end, he offers to do all of the planning: he will find a crew, select a ship and fit it out, 
and go along himself on the voyage. All Telemachus has to do is gather the very specific 
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list of supplies Mentor provides him. This, then, is Mentor’s main educational function in 
the Odyssey; he steps into the story briefly to take charge when Telemachus is 
overwhelmed and unable to make decisions on his own.
Although there is no named category in Greek for the type of educator that Mentor is, 
we can see later literary examples that indicate a continuity of this model from the 
Odyssey through to the Classical period. The one-to-one counseling relationship that 
Mentor shares with Telemachus seems to have a later parallel in the relationship of the 
sixth-century elegiac poet Theognis to his youthful friend Cyrnus, and this relationship, 
in turn, has later parallels in the relationship of the poet to his addressee in the genres 
of wisdom literature and didactic poetry. It is tempting, on the basis of this connection, to 
retroject the erotic elements of Theognis’ Elegies onto Mentor’s relationship with 
Telemachus, assuming this interaction to be one of the first literary examples of the 
institution of pederasty. However, this assumption has no textual basis, and in fact, as 
will be discussed at length in the next section, the assumption that Theognis’ 
pedagogical relationship with Cyrnus was in any way erotic is equally problematic.
1.4 Three Different Models for Educators
By way of summation, I offer this graphic representation of the way Cheiron, Phoenix, 
and Mentor each embody a different archaic educational model. Through an 
examination of the characteristics of these figures in the literature, an evolutionary tree 
emerges which connects each of them to a respective later educational paradigm. The 
vertical axis of this chart represents the chronological development of these three 
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teaching figures from the archaic period to the fifth century and beyond into the Roman 
period, while the horizontal axis depicts the way each of these figures acts as a different 
kind of surrogate for the parent based on tenure and methodology.   
Figure 2
The table below lays out the specific differences between the educational figures of 
Cheiron, Phoenix, and Mentor systematically.
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Table 1
Cheiron Phoenix Mentor
Tenure with 
“student”
Medium (a number 
of years)
Long (life-long) Short (during a 
particular event)
Subject matter general education 
and medicine
general education, 
behavior, ethics
advice on specific 
situation
Locational 
relationship to 
“student”
“student” came to 
him and stayed 
there for duration of 
instruction
lived in the same 
household as the 
“student” and 
followed him to war 
lived apart from 
“student” and they 
met in a neutral 
location
Number of 
“students”
probably one at a 
time; several in 
total
one total one at a time 
(possibly only one 
ever)
Educational role surrogate parent 
due to location; 
proto-didaskalos
surrogate parent; 
nurse; proto-
paidagôgos
surrogate parent; 
counselor
2. Pedagogical Pederasty?
As we determined in the previous section, of the three iconic literary educators from the 
archaic period, Cheiron is the one who shares the most characteristics with the 
didaskalos. Be that as it may, it seems unlikely that Cheiron is the only pre-Classical 
embodiment of this figure. The question to be addressed in the following section is this: 
was the erastês a didaskalos? Or to put it another way, did the older partner in a 
pederastic relationship represent a stage in the development of the teacher figure in 
ancient Greece? If we were to look exclusively at the evidence presented by Plato and 
Xenophon, the answer would unquestionably be “yes”. However, there is no evidence of 
educational pederasty prior to the fourth century, and it was not until the advent of the 
idealized Platonic love extolled by Pausanias in Plato’s Symposium and Socrates in 
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Xenophon’s work of the same name that Greek literature began to associate 
educational relationships with eros and vice versa. It is mainly Plato’s description of this 
new type of relationship that has led scholars to make broad, poorly-supported 
statements about the nature of Greek education throughout the ages, like Dover’s 
generalization that “the philosophical paiderastia which is fundamental to Plato’s 
expositions in Phaedrus and Symposium is essentially an exaltation, however starved of 
bodily pleasure, of a consistent Greek tendency to regard homosexual eros as a 
compound of an educational with a genital relationship” (1978, 202). A mere two 
decades earlier, Marrou had boldly concluded on the basis of the same scant evidence 
that “Παιδεία found its realization in παιδεραστεία... Throughout Greek history the 
relationship between master and pupil was to remain that between a lover and his 
beloved...a relationship on to which the fire of passion threw warm and turbid 
reflections” (1956, 56-7).41 This view of the educational system in Classical Athens is 
characteristic of a certain type of romanticizing scholarship based on the projection of a 
faultless heroic ideal onto all aspects of antiquity. There is no textual (or material) 
evidence to support the assertion that Greek education at any point involved a 
passionate relationship between teacher and student, let alone that this was the case 
for the entire course of Greek history.
2.1 Reinterpreting Plato and Xenophon
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41 Hubbard (2003) has also declared his allegiance to this viewpoint, using this very passage from Marrou 
to defend his theory that the athletic trainer was also an erastês. Hubbard’s argument will be discussed in 
more detail below.
The texts we have, however, do provide some cause for confusion. Hence, I would 
argue that the evidence presented by Plato and Xenophon in this connection is 
misleading and ultimately inaccurate for determining whether pederastic relationships 
were by nature educational and vice versa. In fact, far from describing historical reality, 
Plato and Xenophon are trying to re-envision erotic relationships, especially in the 
context of the symposium, in more idealized terms. Just as the gymnasium had an ideal 
purpose - cultivating a healthy body and mind through athletic competition - which was 
corrupted by the reality of older men ogling attractive adolescent boys,42 in the same 
way the symposium had an ideal purpose - the exchange of philosophical eros - which 
was corrupted by the reality of drunken debauchery. In other words, in order to restore 
the institution of the symposium to a place of honor, these Greek writers had to reinvent 
it in terms of an exchange of wisdom and inspiration rather than alcohol and bodily 
fluids.43 The homoerotic interactions that took place in this context (for which vase 
paintings provide ample evidence) were no longer about unbridled lust but rather about 
the transfer of philosophical eros from one party to another. For example, in Xenophon’s 
Symposium (8.12-28) Socrates reminds the assembled friends at length that spiritual 
love is far superior to carnal and should be the basis of all homoerotic relationships, and 
furthermore it is this kind of philosophical eros that Achilles felt for Cheiron and Phoenix, 
his tutors (8.12.5-13.2 and 8.23.1-5):
βούλομαι αὐτῷ μαρτυρῆσαι ὡς καὶ πολὺ κρείττων ἐστὶν ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ὁ τοῦ 
σώματος ἔρως. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἄνευ φιλίας συνουσία οὐδεμία ἀξιόλογος πάντες 
ἐπιστάμεθα...
 ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀνελεύθερος ἡ συνουσία τῷ τὸ σῶμα μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ τὴν ψυχὴν 
ἀγαπῶντι, νῦν τοῦτο δηλώσω. ὁ μὲν γὰρ παιδεύων λέγειν τε ἃ δεῖ καὶ πράττειν 
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42 See below, Section 2.3 for more detailed discussion of pederasty in the gymnasium.
43 Plato executes a similar reinvention of the gymnasium in the Lysis. See below for discussion.
δικαίως ἂν ὥσπερ Χείρων καὶ Φοῖνιξ ὑπ' Ἀχιλλέως τιμῷτο, ὁ δὲ τοῦ σώματος 
ὀρεγόμενος εἰκότως ἂν ὥσπερ πτωχὸς περιέποιτο.
I wish to bear witness to him that the love of the soul is far better than the love of the 
body. For we all understand that no sunousia is worth mentioning without friendship... 
And now I will show that sunousia is servile when one loves the body rather than the 
soul. For the man who can instruct how to say what is necessary and how to act justly 
may be honored just as Cheiron and Phoenix were honored by Achilles, but the man 
who seeks after the body may be rightly treated like a beggar.
Here we see the literary beginning of the conflation of the ideal educational relationship 
with the ideal pederastic relationship; nowhere before this has there been any hint of 
eroticism in Achilles’ relationships with his teachers, nor has there been any mention of 
teaching in the context of pederasty. However, in order to legitimize the homoerotic 
relationships that he claims are utterly ubiquitous in Athens (Xen. Symp. 8.1-3), 
Xenophon’s Socrates makes these relationships essential to the health of the city by 
casting them as educational. Similarly, in Plato’s Phaedrus (253b5-c2), Socrates 
describes the way the lover in a pederastic relationship teaches the beloved in order to 
make his conduct and nature more like the gods, and he admits that in this process 
some physical intimacy is necessary for true inspiration or exchange of wisdom to occur 
(255b3-d3), but he is quick to qualify this with the warning that if the lover allows his lust 
to overcome him and he engages in homoerotic contact that oversteps the bounds of 
friendship, they two will never reach the height of philosophy and virtue that is the goal 
of such relationships (255e5-256d12). Physicality is explicitly made secondary to 
philosophy, a view which is taken further in the speech of Pausanias from Plato’s 
Symposium. Here Plato’s mouthpiece describes the ideal pederastic relationship, 
insisting that the only circumstances in which it is acceptable for a beloved to gratify his 
lover physically are when the two have come together with the understanding that the 
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lover will make the beloved wiser in some way and the beloved will repay him for this 
accordingly (Symp. 184d4-e5):
ὅταν γὰρ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ ἔλθωσιν ἐραστής τε καὶ παιδικά, νόμον ἔχων ἑκάτερος, ὁ 
μὲν χαρισαμένοις παιδικοῖς ὑπηρετῶν ὁτιοῦν δικαίως ἂν ὑπηρετεῖν, ὁ δὲ τῷ 
ποιοῦντι αὐτὸν σοφόν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν δικαίως αὖ ὁτιοῦν ἂν ὑπουργῶν 
<ὑπουργεῖν>, καὶ ὁ μὲν δυνάμενος εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν 
συμβάλλεσθαι, ὁ δὲ δεόμενος εἰς παίδευσιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν κτᾶσθαι, τότε 
δὴ τούτων συνιόντων εἰς ταὐτὸν τῶν νόμων μοναχοῦ ἐνταῦθα συμπίπτει τὸ 
καλὸν εἶναι παιδικὰ ἐραστῇ χαρίσασθαι, ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ.
For whenever the lover and his beloved come together, each one holding fast to his own 
rule, the one that he is justified in doing any service to the beloved who has gratified him, 
and the other that he is justified in doing anything for the one who is making him wise 
and good; the former having the power to add to the intelligence and other virtue of his 
beloved, and the latter needing to acquire paideusis and other sophia, then when these 
two principles come together in one place, only at that time can it happen that a beloved 
can honorably gratify his lover, and at no other time and place.
 Hence, according to Plato, just like Xenophon, the true purpose of the pederastic 
relationship is the exchange of philosophical eros; pederasty is defensible and even 
honorable when it is primarily about education rather than sex. 
At this point it is important to note that the pederastic educational exchange (idealized 
or not) described by both Plato and Xenophon is written about not in terms of 
didaskalia, but rather in terms of paideia and sophia. This vocabulary indicates that the 
perceived nature of the pederastic relationship was like the nature of the relationship a 
boy would have with his paidagôgos; there was a formal and semantic distinction 
between education (paideia) and teaching (didaskalia).44 According to Plato and 
Xenophon a lover could help his beloved to acquire wisdom and virtue and would 
undoubtedly shape his character, but he did not teach him a concrete set of facts or a 
body of knowledge, per se. This task was left to the private instructor (like Cheiron), and 
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44 For the differences and similarities between a paidagôgos and a didaskalos, see the preceding section.
later to the didaskalos. Be that as it may and despite the prevailing belief in the modern 
scholarship, it must be emphasized that there is no pre-Platonic textual support for 
paideia (or education of any kind) in the context of pederastic relationships. Based on 
the evidence we do have, in actual fact pederasty and paideia/didaskalia, although both 
dealing to some degree with the formation and socialization of young men, were two 
distinct cultural institutions in ancient Greece.
2.2 Pederasty and Education in Theognis
The earliest textual evidence (setting aside vase paintings)45 for pederasty and 
homoerotic desire in Greece is from the sixth century and consists primarily of the 
second book of the Elegies of Theognis,46 in one of the most famous passages of which 
he extolls the virtues of loving boys and compares his passion to Zeus’ love for 
Ganymede (1345-50): 
Παιδοφιλεῖν δέ τι τερπνόν, ἐπεί ποτε καὶ Γανυμήδους / ἤρατο καὶ Κρονίδης, 
ἀθανάτων βασιλεύς, / ἁρπάξας δ' ἐς Ὄλυμπον ἀνήγαγε καί μιν ἔθηκεν / δαίμονα, 
παιδείης ἄνθος ἔχοντ' ἐρατόν. / οὕτω μὴ θαύμαζε, Σιμωνίδη, οὕνεκα κἀγώ / 
ἐξεφάνην καλοῦ παιδὸς ἔρωτι δαμείς.  
There is some pleasure in pederasty, for once even the son of Cronus, / king of the 
immortals, fell in love with Ganymede, / and after he seized him, carried him to Olympus 
and made him / a divinity, preserving the lovely flower of his boyhood. / So don’t be 
amazed, Simonides, that I / also have been revealed as having been tamed by the love 
of a beautiful boy.
The explicit homoerotic content of this poem and many others of the Elegies47 is 
indisputable, and this combined with the fact that Book One of the Elegies comprises a 
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45 For just a handful of examples, see ABV 102 no. 99, ABV 315, Boston 08.292, Oxford 1967.304.
46 For much more complete discussion of the homoerotic content of Theognis’ poetry, see Dover 1978, 
57-9.
47 See Elegies 1235-8, 1249-52, 1263-6, 1267-70, 1287-94, 1299-1304, 1329-34, 1335ff, et al. 
collection of advice poems written to a young man named Cyrnus has led some 
scholars to conclude that herein lies the origin of Plato’s educational pederasty.48 
After all, Theognis himself (that is, his poetic persona) begins the Elegies by stating his 
intention to advise Cyrnus (and later others)49 in a variety of matters, both personal and 
political (27-8): 
Σοὶ δ' ἐγὼ εὖ φρονέων ὑποθήσομαι, οἷά περ αὐτός, / Κύρν', ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν παῖς 
ἔτ' ἐὼν ἔμαθον· 
And I, since I feel kindly toward you, will advise you in the same way that I, / Cyrnus, 
when I was still a boy, learned from noble men.
However, the vocabulary item Theognis uses to describe the transfer of information is 
neither paideuein nor didaskein, but rather hypothêsesthai,50 the verb characteristic of 
advice poetry (also called wisdom literature) of the same stripe as the pseudo-Hesiodic 
Ὑποθῆκαι Χείρωνος, Hesiod’s Works and Days, and the Old Testament books 
Ecclesiastes, Wisdom, and the Song of Songs.51 This must have been a well-thought-
out decision on the poet’s part, since specific teaching terminology (and presumably the 
attendant concept of knowledge transfer) already existed at the time Theognis was 
writing. In fact, others are said to teach (didaskein) in the Elegies, including Poverty, 
who teaches lies, deceit and many bad things (388-91 and 649-52), and a wise man at 
a dinner party from whom a young man might learn all kinds of skills (563-6). Theognis 
wholeheartedly ascribes the role of teaching to those entities whose practice it is to 
pass on some essential truth or body of knowledge to their “students” while he himself 
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48 For example, see Kurke 1990, 94-5.
49 For Theognis’ declaration that he will advise all men, see 1007-8. 
50 Elegies 27, 1007, 1049.
51 For a more extensive discussion of the genre of advice poetry in the archaic period, see Kurke 1990, 
89-91.
claims only to offer advice concerning his own experiences and beliefs. He does not 
view himself as a teacher, but rather as a counselor. The bulk of his advice is dedicated 
to helping his reader(s) avoid the same pitfalls that he has endured; in particular, he 
offers principles on which to determine the character and trustworthiness of a friend, 
warnings against disrespecting the gods and the fates, and strategies for avoiding 
poverty, as well as a number of pithy one-liners about things like obeying one’s parents 
(131-2), drinking wine in moderation (211-12), and treating one’s servants and 
neighbors well (301-2). 
This sort of advice is a collection of life lessons that a father might share with his son52 
or an uncle with his nephew, and it is clearly a piece of wisdom literature,53 as opposed 
to some kind of educational treatise.54 The character of the named addressee (in 
Theognis’ case, most often Cyrnus),55 far from disqualifying the text from inclusion in 
this body of literature, may well have been a trope of the genre, like Hesiod’s use of his 
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52 At 1049-54 Theognis declares that he will give good advice of the sort which a father gives to his son: 
Σοὶ δ' ἐγὼ οἷά τε παιδὶ πατὴρ ὑποθήσομαι αὐτός ἐσθλά
53 According to many textual critics, much of the Theognidean corpus is actually a collection of 
anonymous extracts from prior wisdom literature. See Martin Litchfield West " Theognis (1)" The Oxford 
Classical Dictionary, online edition. For a discussion of archaic Greek wisdom literature and its Near 
Eastern antecedents, see Adrados 2009, 45-55.
54 For this part of my argument, paideia and didaskalia are categorized together under the heading of 
“education” as opposed to hypothêkê, “advice”.
55 For other addressees: 453-6 and 595-98 are addressed simply to “man”, 753-56 are addressed to 
“dear friend”, and many other poems are not addressed to anyone, and yet use a first or second person 
verb. 903-30 are addressed to Democles in advice about being careful with money. 1211-16 are 
addressed to the woman Argyris, asking her not to mock the speaker’s parents. 1059-62 are addressed to 
Timagoras concerning how to tell the true disposition of a person. 1085-86 are addressed to Demonax, 
an apparently irritatingly indecisive person. 467-96 (although debated to be written by Euenus), 667-82 
and 1341-50 are all addressed to Simonides, 503-08 to Onomacritus, 511-22 to Clearistus, 825-30 to 
Scythes (the latter three in the context of the Symposium). He also frequently invokes various deities and 
abstracts (Artemis, Apollo, the Muses, Zeus, Castor and Pollux, Wealth, Poverty, wine, etc). On occasion 
he even addresses his own heart (1029ff, for example).
brother Perses or Lucretius’ (admittedly much later) address to his associate Memmius. 
It only seems natural that advice intended to influence a reader’s beliefs and behaviors 
on a personal level be addressed to a specific (if hypothetical) person; the named 
addressee becomes a stand-in for the reader himself.
So, it is apparent that the Elegies are not didaskalic poems. Nor could one argue that 
the advice poems of the first book are pederastic or even erotic. Theognis routinely 
addresses Cyrnus simply as “friend” rather than “beloved” or “darling”56 and none of the 
poems which address Cyrnus contain any erotic material whatsoever. In fact, 1225-6 
provides evidence against an erotic relationship between the poet and his addressee. In 
this short poem, Theognis raves to Cyrnus about the sweetness of having a good wife, 
asking his friend to attest to the truth of this statement: 
οὐδέν, Κύρν᾽, ἀγαθῆς γλυκερώτερόν ἐστι γυναικός· / μάρτυς ἐγώ, σὺ δ᾽ἐμοὶ γίνου 
ἀληθοσύνης.
Nothing, Cyrnus, is sweeter than a good wife; / I will testify to this fact, and you can be a 
witness to the truth of it.
There is no other literary example of an erastês writing to his beloved about how 
wonderful his wife is. This is undoubtedly because (with very few exceptions) pederastic 
relationships were undertaken by unmarried men, and generally these interactions 
ceased after the marriage of one or both parties.57 Besides the lack of erotic language in 
any of the poems addressed to Cyrnus, Theognis’ mention of his wife is the most 
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56 See 38, 99, 181, etc.
57 See Dover 1978, 171: “In general the pursuit of eromenoi was characteristic of the years before 
marriage.” See also Blundell 1995, 103: “Since the majority of men in Athens probably married at about 
the age of thirty, homosexual activity may therefore have been confined by and large to unmarried men, 
although we do hear about a few homosexual relationships which were maintained after marriage.”
definitive piece of evidence we could hope for against his taking part in a homosexual/
pederastic relationship with his addressee. 
Pederasty and advice do not mix in the Theognidean corpus, let alone pederasty and 
teaching. Indeed, none of the poems which might be argued to be “advice poems” 
contain any explicit or implicit eroticism, and as for the explicitly erotic poems in Book 
Two, these are mostly addressed to an unnamed pais - never to Cyrnus -, and they are 
very definitely not advice poems. Given the mere coincidence of advice and pederasty 
in the poems of Theognis, scholars have been too quick to use this as a basis on which 
to argue for a correlation in the Elegies - and in Greek literature more generally - 
between the relationship of lover to beloved and teacher to student.  
2.3 Gymnasium Literature
One other category of texts has been brought to bear as evidence in this discussion, a 
set of works that I will refer to as gymnasium literature. These texts, including an 
inscribed Hellenistic decree from Verroia, several of the plays of Aristophanes, and at 
least two Platonic dialogues, are relevant to this issue because they describe the 
intersection between pederastic practice and the educational institution of the 
gymnasium in Athens. More specifically, each of these texts addresses the pervasive 
(and not unjustified) Greek concern with and recognition of the potential for homoerotic 
encounters at the gym. Across a hundred-year-span of literature (and certainly after the 
texts mentioned here as well), it remained evident to Greek writers just as it has to 
modern scholars that where young men in peak physical condition wrestle naked, there 
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will be sexual predators. The gymnasium had its seedy underbelly just as the 
symposium did; despite the philosophical rationalizations of Plato and others, pederasty 
and athletics were understood to be unfortunately but unavoidably linked. As Hubbard 
(2003, 4) has rightly observed: “The private wrestling school (palaestra) is certainly 
identified as the prime arena of pederastic courtship in a range of texts from a variety of 
genres in both the fifth and fourth centuries. Numerous Greek vases depict scenes of 
clothed men or youths admiring, crowning, or presenting gifts to naked athletes”. This is 
clearly borne out in Plato’s Lysis (203-7), a dialogue set in the gymnasium and 
describing a scene where an erastês, Hippothales, is desperately in love with the boy 
Lysis and seeks advice from Socrates and others on how to approach him. Socrates, of 
course, obliges and demonstrates for Hippothales a purely philosophical conversation 
with Lysis concerning the nature of friendship and the role of parents and educators in 
society. The image of the gymnasium where erastai and would-be erastai hover around 
the edges of the ring watching their youthful beloveds is common in ancient texts, but 
while Plato tries to frame the scene as purely noble, Aristophanes offers a somewhat 
more likely (albeit comedically exaggerated) picture.58 At Clouds 973-85, the Better 
Argument describes the traditional Athenian education system, focusing on the ways the 
boys in the past had to guard against unwanted sexual advances from spectators at the 
trainer’s place - even going to the extreme of smudging out the marks of their genitals in 
the sand after wrestling practice: 
ἐν παιδοτρίβου δὲ καθίζοντας τὸν μηρὸν ἔδει προβαλέσθαι 
τοὺς παῖδας, ὅπως τοῖς ἔξωθεν μηδὲν δείξειαν ἀπηνές·
εἶτ' αὖ πάλιν αὖθις ἀνιστάμενον συμψῆσαι καὶ προνοεῖσθαι
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58 For a further Aristophanic exaggeration of pederasty connected with the gymnasium, see Birds 137-42. 
For more examples from Aristophanes and other comic poets, see Dover 1978, 135-52.
εἴδωλον τοῖσιν ἐρασταῖσιν τῆς ἥβης μὴ καταλείπειν.
ἠλείψατο δ' ἂν τοὐμφαλοῦ οὐδεὶς παῖς ὑπένερθεν τότ' ἄν, ὥστε
τοῖς αἰδοίοισι δρόσος καὶ χνοῦς ὥσπερ μήλοισιν ἐπήνθει.
οὐδ' ἂν μαλακὴν φυρασάμενος τὴν φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν ἐραστὴν
αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν προαγωγεύων τοῖν ὀφθαλμοῖν ἐβάδιζεν.
At the trainer’s the boys had to cross their thighs when sitting, so they wouldn’t reveal 
anything that would torment the onlookers; and when they stood up again, they had to 
smooth the sand and take care not to leave behind an image of their pubescence for 
their lovers (erastai) to find. And in those days, no boy would oil himself below the navel, 
and so his privates bloomed with dewy down like apricots. Nor would he liquefy his voice 
to a simper for his lover (erastês) and walk around pimping for himself with his eyes.59 
The setting Aristophanes presents in the Clouds is one in which pederasty is just an 
expected (if sometimes distasteful) aspect of gymnasium culture; every boy had an 
erastês, and the gymnasium was the place where the two could interact publicly. 
Pederasty was simply the natural byproduct of the older system of education described 
by the Better Argument. However, although these types of erotic encounters were 
envisioned as taking place in an educational setting (i.e. the gymnasium), it is important 
to note that there is no mention in the Clouds of an erotic relationship between teacher 
and student, nor is the erotic encounter between older male and younger boy described 
in specifically educational terms. Aristophanes presents a stage in the development of 
education that includes pederasty, and one can see why other scholars have linked the 
two institutions. But despite pederastic courtship and gymnastic education having taken 
place in the same physical space, there is no clear evidence from archaic or even 
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59 Translation by Jeffrey Henderson
Classical times for a pederastic relationship between a teacher (or trainer)60 and a 
student at the gymnasium. 
2.4 Aeschines’ Against Timarchus
One final text must be mentioned in this connection because it is often wrongly cited61 
as evidence that teachers were frequently sexually involved with their students, or at 
least wanted to be. In Aeschines’ speech Against Timarchus the speaker begins by 
enumerating and explaining the laws of Athens in order to ultimately show how 
Timarchus violated all of them. In this process, he explicates the existing laws 
concerning the operating hours of educational institutions, namely the didaskaleion and 
the palaestra (sections 9-12). More specifically, these laws dictate that educational 
centers may not be opened before sunrise or remain open after sunset, and that a 
certain number of paides must go to school together, and finally, that during school 
hours no person except the teacher (or his immediate kin) who is older than the paides 
may enter the didaskaleion. Aeschines takes these things primarily as regulations 
against teachers taking advantage of their students (9.1-4):  
Ὁ γὰρ νομοθέτης πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς διδασκάλοις, οἷς ἐξ ἀνάγκης 
παρακατατιθέμεθα τοὺς ἡμετέρους αὐτῶν παῖδας, οἷς ἐστιν ὁ μὲν βίος ἀπὸ τοῦ 
σωφρονεῖν, ἡ δ' ἀπορία ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὅμως ἀπιστῶν φαίνεται
63
60 Hubbard (2003, 7-16) cites a number of Attic red-figure vases as evidence for trainer-student 
pederasty, arguing that these scenes between a trainer and a youth parallel traditional pederastic 
courtship scenes in composition and visual motifs. His argument, although thorough, is not compelling 
from an art historical standpoint, as it is often unclear in the vases he cites if the older figure is in fact a 
trainer. Furthermore, none of the so-called pederastic trainer-student vases depict any physical contact 
between the parties, an element which is present in most of the classic pederastic vase scenes. Hubbard 
himself agrees in his conclusion (16) that none of the evidence he cites, either textual or iconographic is 
by itself definitive. 
61 See Hubbard 2003,  5.
First of all, concerning teachers, to whom we necessarily entrust our children, and 
whose livelihoods are dependent upon their self-discipline, and for whom poverty would 
result from behaving contrary to this, nevertheless the lawmaker is apparently distrustful.
However, as Aeschines states, didaskaloi (and paidotribai) were trusted authority figures 
who exercised a tremendous amount of power and responsibility over the youth of the 
city. Since their livelihoods depended upon their outstanding moral character, it follows 
that instances of inappropriate relations between a teacher and his student would be 
almost unheard of. Hence, it seems much more likely that these laws were intended not 
to prevent educational authority figures from corrupting their charges, but rather to 
prevent any other sexual predators from having access to the youths. Since the laws 
limit the people other than the didaskalos who may enter the school with the paides, this 
would imply that it is other men who are the risk, not the teacher. Similarly, by limiting 
the operating hours of schools to the daylight hours and requiring the boys to travel in 
groups, the lawmakers were probably trying to protect the boys from traveling alone 
through the dark streets where they could more easily be accosted by older men. This 
interpretation is further supported by the stated requirement that the chorêgos be over 
forty, so that he will have reached an age when he can most easily exercise self-control 
around the paides (section 11), and the subsequent warning that if the gymnasiarchos 
allows anyone to enter the gymnasium who is outside of the age limits, he will be 
subjected to the punishments befitting one who has seduced a freeborn person (section 
12). These laws indicate a real societal concern in Classical Athens about older males 
preying on youths at the gymnasium, a concern which continued into the Hellenistic 
period. According to an early Hellenistic decree tablet found at Verroia in Macedonia, 
the gymnasiarchos must be over the age of thirty (presumably for the same reason as 
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above), nor can he allow any person to enter or disrobe in the gymnasium who has 
prostituted himself (hêtaireukôs).62 This concern, however, does not indicate an 
understanding even in the Hellenistic period that education (particularly physical 
education) and eroticism belong together; rather, it indicates a recognition that the latter 
is often an unfortunate side-effect of the former and one that must be guarded against. 
2.5 Was the Erastês a Didaskalos?
Now, at last, we can return to the question with which we began this section. After a 
careful examination of the evidence, it is clear that a non-sexual one-on-one mentoring 
relationship - a sunousia of sorts - between an older male and a youth represents a 
specific stage in the development of the teacher figure in ancient Greece, beginning 
with the relationship between Mentor and Telemachus in the Odyssey. By the time of 
Plato’s Symposium and the works of his contemporaries (especially Xenophon), this 
sunousia was being described as overtly and explicitly erotic as well as educational, but 
as we have seen above, there is no other evidence to support this characterization. 
So, if the erastês-eromenos relationship provides the wrong framework for these 
interactions, what is the right framework? According to Robb, this type of relationship 
was in origin a benign relationship between an older adult mentor figure and a younger 
adolescent associate, often along the lines of the relationship a boy might have to his 
65
62 For a translation of the Verroia tablet, see Miller 2004, 137-42. For the Greek text of the inscription see 
"Beroia. Gymnasiarchical law, middle of 2nd cent. B.C. (SEG 27-261)." Supplementum Epigraphicum 
Graecum. Current editors: A. Chaniotis; T. Corsten; R.S. Stroud; R.A. Tybout. Brill, 2011. Brill Online.
uncle or a trusted friend of his father. I believe he has pinpointed the essence of these 
relationships in his 1994 monograph Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece (203):  
Fundamentally, Greek sunousia was familial, tribal, and civic, not sexual. The essential 
male virtues are transmitted across generations by constant association of younger men 
with older, the guiding elders of the group, its Mentors and Nestors; this is what Greeks 
in the fifth century understood to be the purpose behind sunousia. 
Pederasty could - and did - exist as a separate institution based on erotic exchange and 
intended as a sort of cultural initiation, and although there was inevitably some overlap 
between the values and customs transferred to the youthful recipient in each type of 
relationship, the ancient literature points to a pre-existing and entirely distinct system of 
mentorship based on non-sexual bonds of kinship and guest-friendship.63
3. The Sophists as Educators
No treatment of categories of ancient educators would be complete without addressing 
the Sophists. Whether they are described as maligned philosophers, practically-
omniscient sages, charlatans, superstar teachers, or whipping boys for their 
contemporaries (including Socrates), the Sophists loom large not only in the modern 
scholarly debate over education in Athens during the Classical period, but also in the 
ancient texts from this era. However, despite their ubiquity in philosophical and historical 
accounts from the fifth and fourth centuries, there has been a considerable amount of 
ink spilled over the questions of who these Sophists really were, what profession they 
practiced, and in what ways (if any) they represented a new category of educator, 
distinct from their predecessors. The following section will attempt to answer these 
questions in order to determine whether the Sophist was a didaskalos. 
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63 On which, see discussion above on Mentor at Section 1.3.
3.1 The Development of the Word “Sophist”
In order to make sense of the Sophists, we must first understand the development of 
the term “sophist”, especially prior to the the fourth century. According to Diogenes 
Laertius in the Prologue to Lives of the Philosophers (1.12), in the past, any wise man 
was called a sophist (sophistês),64 including the poets of old: 
οἱ δὲ σοφοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ἐκαλοῦντο· καὶ οὐ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ σοφισταί, 
καθὰ καὶ Κρατῖνος ἐν Ἀρχιλόχοις τοὺς περὶ Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡσίοδον ἐπαινῶν οὕτως 
καλεῖ.
And, in fact, wise men were called sophists. And not only they, but the poets, too, and for 
this reason Cratinus, when praising Homer and Hesiod in the Archilochoi calls them 
sophists.
This is evidently also the case in Herodotus’ Histories, where Solon (1.29.1), 
Pythagoras (4.95.2), and Melampus and his followers (2.49.1) are all referred to as 
sophistai, and in the works of Herodotus’ contemporary, Diogenes of Apollonia, where 
he labels the Ionian natural philosophers as sophists (Tell 2010, 25). Indeed, as Kerferd 
has rightly observed (1981, 24): 
The term sophistês is applied to many early “wise men” - to poets, including Homer and 
Hesiod, to musicians and rhapsodes, to diviners and seers, to the Seven Sages and 
other early wise men, to Presocratic philosophers, and to figures such as Prometheus 
with a suggestion of mysterious powers. There is nothing derogatory in these 
applications.
By the final decades of the fifth century, the situation could not have been more 
different. Not only does the label of “sophist” come to be treated as tantamount to a dirty  
word, but the variety of its usage seen in earlier authors is greatly reduced in the 
literature of the Classical period. However, although much less, variety of usage was not 
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64 See also Photius Lexicon 528 and Clement of Alexandria Stromata 1.3.24 for wise men as sophists.
nonexistent. In Aristophanes’ Clouds, in particular, the word sophistês seems to have 
two different meanings, one as a general wise man,65 and another as a specific type of 
sophistic educator.66 For this reason, Guthrie has speculated that Aristophanes 
represents a transitional author in the development of the term sophistês, and that by 
applying it to a specific set of people and then satirizing this group so harshly, he may 
have been partly responsible for the word’s semantic shift (1971b, 33). Outside of 
Aristophanes, however, the usage of the term narrows even further, to the point where 
Plato lists as sophists only Hippias, Gorgias, Prodicus, and Protagoras, and Isocrates 
names Empedocles, Ion, Alcmaeon, Parmenides, Melissus, and Gorgias. Tell has 
recently argued - contrary to popular scholarly opinion - that the discrepancy between 
these two sets of names means that there was no defined group of Sophists 
representing a distinct category of educator in late fifth and early fourth century Athens. 
Rather, he sees the Sophists as individuals continuing the wisdom tradition of the Seven 
Sages (2010, 6-7). I would argue, however, that these two theories are not mutually 
exclusive, that is, the Sophists could easily have functioned in two separate capacities 
simultaneously, one as wise men and the other as teachers. Furthermore, as we will 
soon discover, there is another reason for the discrepancy between the lists of Sophists 
according to Plato and Isocrates. 
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such usage in the Platonic dialogues, and I would argue that it is an intentional move on Plato’s part to 
put this word in the mouth of a Sophist whose goal is to legitimize his own profession by connecting it 
lexically with past educational models.
66 This ambiguity and the use of sophistês in the Clouds will be treated in much greater detail in Chapter 
4, Section 2.1 below.
No matter the cause, it is clear that by the time of Plato and Isocrates, the semantic 
category demarcated by the word “sophist” had narrowed considerably from its earlier 
use. A Sophist was not simply any man who possessed sophia, but a man who 
exhibited certain other defining characteristics in his educational methodology and self-
presentation. As such, it did not matter which men were labeled as Sophists, only that 
they all shared the distinctive traits that defined the practice of “sophistry,” and hence, 
they could all be referred to by category - as Sophists - and a reader or audience was 
guaranteed to understand what was meant. For this reason, as Romilly has noted, 
although they do refer to certain individuals as Sophists, “neither Plato nor Aristotle nor 
Isocrates nor Xenophon ever attacks those major Sophists whom we have mentioned 
by name. But all do criticize the “Sophists” in general or the “Sophists of today”” (1992, 
27). While Tell (2010) sees this use of the term as “vague and unspecific” (51), the 
opposite is true. Within the sphere of contemporary literature that dealt with education, 
the word sophistês could be used by so many different authors in such different types of 
texts precisely because it had a very specific connotation for an Athenian reader. A 
Sophist was a charismatic, itinerant polymath who competed with other Sophists in 
speeches and debates, proudly called himself a Sophist, taught disputation, and 
promised to make his students wise or virtuous for a fee. Plato and Isocrates place 
different people into this category because they have widely divergent agendas for their 
respective texts. Since Isocrates believes education should be concrete and practical, 
consisting of realistic lessons and specifically aimed at producing skilled teachers and 
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orators,67 he scoffs at the Sophists’ extravagant promises and vague claims.68 For this 
reason, he emphasizes the number of natural philosophers and sages among the 
Sophists, highlighting his implicit claims that the lessons these men impart cannot be as 
practical as those Isocrates himself provides. Likewise, Plato’s educational theory is 
based on the belief that virtue can’t be taught, so he lists as Sophists men who claim to 
teach exactly that. For each of these authors (and their contemporaries), the Sophists 
serve as a foil for their respective intellectual positions. That is to say, for Plato and 
Isocrates, the Sophists represent a category of people onto whom a number of 
unattractive qualities can be projected and subsequently criticized.69 
That the Sophists became the whipping boys for the authors of the fifth and fourth 
centuries may have been due in part to their novelty. According to Marrou, they were 
“the first teachers of advanced education, appearing at a time when Greece had known 
nothing but sports-trainers, foremen, and in the academic field, humble 
schoolmasters” (1956, 49).70 On the arrival of the Sophists in Athens and the way they 
overturned the existing status quo in which private educational interactions were free 
and athletics had pride of place over intellectualism, Romilly writes: 
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67 See Too 1995, 64-71; Marrou 1956, 80ff.
68 See Against the Sophists 291-293.
69 This means that the list of the defining qualities of the Sophists that follows is inevitably colored and 
shaped by Plato’s and Isocrates’ political and intellectual agendas. Hence, it is not our goal to recover the 
historical reality of the Sophists’ practices so much as to understand the ways they were portrayed and 
viewed (especially as these portrayals differed from those of Socrates) in contemporary and later 
literature.
70 Cf. Teresa Morgan 1998, 17: “Young men of intellectual inclinations attached themselves to a Sophist, 
perhaps more than one, as fancy and fashion took them, and none of the disciplines they were taught 
constituted a normal or necessary part of the education of a free man in the way that mousikê and 
gymnastikê did.” 
Suddently, these ambulant teachers appeared upon the scene, offering, or rather selling, 
an education. They taught how to speak, how to reason, how to make decisions... And 
they purveyed this knowledge to young people who had already gone through a 
traditional education... The Sophists gave them arms to win the kind of success that did 
not depend on strength or courage, but on the deployment of their intelligence. (1992, 
33)
The consensus of these two scholars is that the Sophist as a category of educator per 
se (and not simply as a synonym for a wise man) did not exist prior to the Classical 
period. As with any paradigm shift, however, the new thing is inevitably compared with 
the old, not necessarily favorably. According to Isocrates in the Antidosis (sections 235 
and 313), the name of “sophist” which is now associated with dishonor, wasn’t always a 
bad thing: 
Σόλων μὲν τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφιστῶν ἐκλήθη καὶ ταύτην ἔσχε τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν νῦν 
ἀτιμαζομένην καὶ κρινομένην παρ' ὑμῖν...
Οὔκουν ἐπί γε τῶν προγόνων οὕτως εἶχεν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν καλουμένους σοφιστὰς 
ἐθαύμαζον καὶ τοὺς συνόντας αὐτοῖς ἐζήλουν.
And Solon was called one of the seven sophists and he had that title which has now 
been dishonored and is on trial here before you... 
But it wasn’t like this in the time of our ancestors, for they admired the so-called sophists 
and envied those who associated with them.
The contrast here between the earlier, admirable figure of the wise man and the 
contemporary, base figure of the Sophist emphasizes the newness of the category; 
determining the exact ways in which this figure was novel has been a favorite task of 
scholars, both ancient and modern. Defining the category of the Sophist is, in fact, the 
focus of Plato’s Sophist, in which the Stranger and Theaetetus attempt to quantify and 
pinpoint the origin of the Sophists’ newness via deductive logic, eventually narrowing 
their definition to a short list of guises in which the Sophist commonly appears (231c9-
e2, 233 b1-2, and 235 a1-2):
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{ΞΕ.} Πρῶτον δὴ στάντες οἷον ἐξαναπνεύσωμεν, καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς 
διαλογισώμεθα ἅμα ἀναπαυόμενοι, φέρε, ὁπόσα ἡμῖν ὁ σοφιστὴς πέφανται. δοκῶ 
μὲν γάρ, τὸ πρῶτον ηὑρέθη νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμμισθος θηρευτής. {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ναί. 
{ΞΕ.} Τὸ δέ γε δεύτερον ἔμπορός τις περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα. {ΘΕΑΙ.} Πάνυ 
γε... {ΞΕ.} τῆς γὰρ ἀγωνιστικῆς περὶ λόγους ἦν τις ἀθλητής, τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην 
ἀφωρισμένος...
...δυνατοὶ τοῖς νέοις δόξαν παρασκευάζειν ὡς εἰσὶ πάντα πάντων αὐτοὶ 
σοφώτατοι...
περὶ δ' οὖν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ τόδε μοι λέγε· πότερον ἤδη τοῦτο σαφές, ὅτι τῶν 
γοήτων ἐστί τις·
STR: First, let’s stop and take a breath, and while we are resting, let’s go through for 
ourselves all the forms in which the Sophist has appeared to us. For I think, first of all, 
that he has been found as a wage-earning hunter of the young and the wealthy. THE: 
Sure. STR: Then second, he is a trafficker in the lessons of the soul. THE: Absolutely... 
STR: Further, he is a competitor in the contest of words, appropriating for himself the art 
of disputation...
...and they are able to manipulate young men into thinking that they are the wisest of all 
men in every respect...
And so, concerning the Sophist, tell me this: first, is it not now clear that he is one of the 
sorcerers?
    
3.2 What Makes a Sophist a Sophist?
From these passages we can begin to narrow down the qualities that make a Sophist a 
Sophist:
1. The Sophist is a professional, that is, he is paid for his associations with young 
men. He is described as a hunter, which implies that he actively seeks out - 
indeed, some would say preys upon - associates, and while he is said to rub 
elbows with young men, it seems safe to assume these are not boys, since the 
word pais is conspicuously absent and the word neos is commonly used for 
youths in adolescence or later. By stressing that the Sophist seeks out wealthy 
young men, Plato is implying that Sophists are greedy, or at the very least, are 
driven by desire for profit. 
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2. The Sophist is itinerant in his trade. The word emporos means a wayfarer or 
traveller, and by extension, a traveling merchant or trader who sells his goods 
wherever he can. In the case of the Sophist, the goods are mathêmata, lessons, 
but instead of lessons of the sort that a boy would learn at school, the Sophist 
sells the less tangible and more complex lessons for the soul. Hence, we learn 
here that the Sophist is a traveling educational salesman who specializes in 
lessons for more advanced students.
3. The Sophist is an expert in disputation. It is unclear from these passages 
whether this means that the Sophist himself engages in competitive 
argumentation (presumably against other Sophists), or whether disputation is 
simply the subject about which he teaches his youthful associates. I would 
argue that both of these are true.
4. The Sophist is thought to be a manipulator and (probably facetiously) a sorcerer. 
He is able to persuade young men that he is the wisest person in every subject, 
which implies that the Sophist a) is very charismatic, b) wants to come across as 
a polymath, and c) probably makes extravagant promises about his abilities as 
an educator in order to attract students. 
   In short, the qualities that define the distinct and novel category of the Sophist are 
polymathy, charisma, mastery of disputation, itinerancy, the promise of results, and 
professionalism in the field of advanced education. It must be noted here that very few 
of these qualities taken individually are unique to the Sophists. Hence, although none of 
them is a sufficient condition (logically-speaking) of Sophistry, each of these traits is 
necessary to our understanding of the Sophist, and taken altogether they define and 
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delimit the semantic and conceptual category. Given this list, our next task is to make a 
brief survey of these traits and relate them to the educational tradition of which the 
Sophists are indisputably a part. 
3.2.1 Polymathy
One of the more remarkable qualities of the Sophists is their seeming ability to teach 
almost any subject. As Marrou has said, “The perfect Sophist...had to be able to speak 
and hold his own on any subject whatsoever: this meant his competence had to be 
universal, his knowledge had to extend over every kind of specialized study” (1956, 
54-5). In the passage above from the Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger emphasizes the way 
the Sophists marketed themselves as the wisest of men in every respect, and according 
to Jacqueline de Romilly, “They knew everything and taught everything, even the 
sciences” (1992, 35). In Plato’s Hippias Major, Socrates questions Hippias on the 
subjects that he taught to the Spartans when he traveled there, and during the 
conversation we learn that Hippias is capable of teaching a wide variety of things 
including astronomy, geometry, critical thinking, poetry, musical theory, and mythology, 
as well as advanced mnemonics (285cff). In the Hippias Minor, this list is expanded to 
include the skilled crafts of metalworking, weaving, and cobbling, and the literary arts of 
epic, tragedy, and dithyramb (368bff). Gorgias is said to have been an expert in rhetoric, 
but there is also some evidence that he was interested in theoretical astronomy (DK 82 
B31 and 82 A17). Protagoras, too, is said to have been qualified in a number of different 
subjects. According to Diogenes Laertius (9.55), he wrote treatises on topics as diverse 
as wrestling, mathematics, politics, ambition, virtue, history, and justice, as well as a few 
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tracts of general advice, one of which is simply titled A Book of Precepts. Further, in 
Plato’s Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger lists a number of subjects about which Protagoras 
and many others (presumably the other Sophists) are able to teach, including things 
divine that are mostly unseen, the coming into existence and the being of all things, 
laws and all matters of politics, and each and every technê (232b11-e2). 
The most important byproduct of this polymathy is that the Sophists were treated as all-
knowing sages and consultants on major political decisions. According to Hippias in the 
Hippias Major, his services were employed most frequently in the role of envoy from 
one state to another, since he was seen as articulate and wise (281a1ff):
Οὐ γὰρ σχολή, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἡ γὰρ Ἦλις ὅταν τι δέηται διαπράξασθαι πρός τινα 
τῶν πόλεων, ἀεὶ ἐπὶ πρῶτον ἐμὲ ἔρχεται τῶν πολιτῶν αἱρουμένη πρεσβευτήν, 
ἡγουμένη δικαστὴν καὶ ἄγγελον ἱκανώτατον εἶναι τῶν λόγων οἳ ἂν παρὰ τῶν 
πόλεων ἑκάστων λέγωνται. πολλάκις μὲν οὖν καὶ εἰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπρέσβευσα·  
I don’t have any free time, Socrates. For whenever Elis needs any business conducted 
with one of the city-states, she always comes to me first of all the citizens and chooses 
me as envoy, considering me to be best-suited judge and messenger of the words that 
are spoken by each of the city-states. So I have often traveled as an envoy to the other 
city-states.
A little later in the dialogue, Socrates confirms this claim of Hippias’ and goes on to 
describe the ways that Gorgias and Prodicus also have taken part in the public political 
life of their respective cities (282b-c):
Γοργίας τε γὰρ οὗτος ὁ Λεοντῖνος σοφιστὴς δεῦρο ἀφίκετο δημοσίᾳ οἴκοθεν 
πρεσβεύων, ὡς ἱκανώτατος ὢν Λεοντίνων τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν, καὶ ἔν τε τῷ δήμῳ 
ἔδοξεν ἄριστα εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενος καὶ συνὼν τοῖς νέοις... εἰ δὲ 
βούλει, ὁ ἡμέτερος ἑταῖρος Πρόδικος οὗτος πολλάκις μὲν καὶ ἄλλοτε δημοσίᾳ 
ἀφίκετο, ἀτὰρ τὰ τελευταῖα ἔναγχος ἀφικόμενος δημοσίᾳ ἐκ Κέω λέγων τ' ἐν τῇ 
βουλῇ πάνυ ηὐδοκίμησεν καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιδείξεις ποιούμενος καὶ τοῖς νέοις συνὼν...
For this man, Gorgias, the sophist from Leontini, came here from home in the public 
capacity of envoy, since he was the most qualified of the citizens of Leontini to act on 
behalf of the common interest, and he was said to have spoken eloquently in the public 
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assembly, and in his private capacity he gave demonstrative speeches and associated 
with the young... but if you like, take our companion Prodicus, who often has come at 
other times in a public capacity, but the most recent time he has just now come in a 
public capacity from Ceos and he gained a lot of renown by speaking in the assembly 
and in his private capacity he gave demonstrative speeches and associated with the 
young...  
This, then, is the primary way in which the Sophists continued the intellectual legacy of 
the Seven Sages, and the way in which they took part in the genre of wisdom literature 
extending back to Hesiod and Theognis, that is, by acting as public consultants and 
envoys. It is worth noting, however, that their wisdom serves them in both the public and 
private spheres; Socrates makes a point of mentioning that both Hippias and Gorgias 
not only acted publicly as envoys, but they also associated privately with young men 
and taught them through epideixeis. In this way, the Sophists’ teaching is bound up in 
both the wisdom tradition and the tradition of one-on-one education. Their polymathy 
serves them in both capacities, as sages and as teachers.
3.2.2 Charisma
Without a doubt, the Sophists as a group were unusually charismatic. According to Tell, 
“Empedocles, Protagoras, Hippias, and Thrasymachus all figure in contexts where they 
are said to have enchanted or made their audience possessed... This Orphic power of 
attraction is intrinsically linked to their connection with Delphi, and consequently, to its 
divine protector as the ultimate authority and guarantor of their sophia” (2010, 124). Tell 
calls this power, “philosophical magnetism”, but based on the textual evidence and the 
implication of his statement about Delphi, the Sophists’ power comes across more as 
magical than intellectual. As we learned above in Plato’s Sophist, the Sophists were 
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described - albeit mockingly - as having some share of mystical power that enabled 
them to ensnare young men and convince them to pay money for lessons. In other parts 
of the dialogue, the Sophists are variously described as conjurers (235a9), wonder-
workers (235b7), imitators of reality (235a2), and ones who are capable of bewitching 
the young through their ears with words (234c3-4). In fact, in the Protagoras, Socrates 
uses this trope against Protagoras, mocking the Sophist by claiming that he feels 
himself to be under Protagoras’ spell,71 and he even jokingly compares Protagoras to 
Orpheus, describing his band of followers in the same terms as one might describe the 
followers of Dionysus (315a7-b2):
τούτων δὲ οἳ ὄπισθεν ἠκολούθουν ἐπακούοντες τῶν λεγομένων τὸ μὲν πολὺ 
ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο – οὓς ἄγει ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν πόλεων ὁ Πρωταγόρας, δι' ὧν 
διεξέρχεται, κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ ὥσπερ Ὀρφεύς, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἕπονται 
κεκηλημένοι –  ἦσαν δέ τινες καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῷ χορῷ.
Of these, the ones who followed behind listening to the speech seemed for the most part 
to be foreigners - those whom Protagoras brought from their respective cities through 
which he travels, enchanting them with his voice like Orpheus, and they, bewitched, 
follow the sound of his voice - but there were also some local youths in the chorus of 
students.
The group of students following Protagoras around the courtyard has - like the coterie of 
Dionysus - accompanied him from far away, drawn by the sound of his voice, and they 
appear to Socrates now in the manner of a chorus. The implication is, of course, that 
these young men had no choice; they were held spellbound by the Sophist, whose 
mystical power - not his skill as an educator - is the real cause of his students’ loyalty. 
This quality of potentially-magical charisma certainly set the Sophists apart as 
educators. Contemporary didaskaloi were never described as inescapably compelling or 
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71 328d: Πρωταγόρας μὲν τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα ἐπιδειξάμενος ἀπεπαύσατο τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐπὶ 
μὲν πολὺν χρόνον κεκηλημένος ἔτι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔβλεπον ὡς ἐροῦντά τι, ἐπιθυμῶν ἀκούειν·
even charming; having a connection to Orphic (or Delphic) powers would put the 
Sophists much more in line with the seers of old like Calchas and Tiresias and the 
natural philosophers like Democritus and Empedocles, than with modern 
schoolteachers.  
3.2.3 Mastery of Disputation
The Sophists were experts in agonistic oratory, both as teachers and practitioners. In 
Plato’s Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus conclude exactly this, namely that 
the Sophist is both a disputer and a teacher of disputation (232b7-8): 
{ΞΕ.} Ἀντιλογικὸν αὐτὸν ἔφαμεν εἶναί που. {ΘΕΑΙ.} Ναί. {ΞΕ.} Τί δ'; οὐ καὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων αὐτοῦ τούτου διδάσκαλον γίγνεσθαι; {ΘΕΑΙ.} Τί μήν;   
STR: So we said that [the Sophist] is given to disputation. THE: Yes, we did. STR: Well 
then, didn’t we also say that he is a didaskalos of this art for others? THE: Certainly.
As teachers of disputation, the Sophists are seen, by Plato at least, as akin to 
didaskaloi. As practitioners, they are described as skilled in the art of contradiction (Pl. 
Soph. 268c9), and they were said to have given public speeches (epideixeis) which 
often turned into debates72 or competitions with other Sophists (antilogikoi),73 
presumably both in order to attract potential students and also to win glory. Most 
famously, these speeches took place at the Panhellenic games; there is evidence for 
Zeno and Parmenides presenting at the Panathenaea (Pl. Prm. 127b), for Hippias 
giving speeches and answering audience questions at Olympia (Pl. Hp. mi. 363c-d), 
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72 See Hippocrates On the Nature of Man 1
73 For example, Protagoras is said to have written works entitled Overthrowing Arguments (DK 80 B1) and 
Contradictory Arguments (DK 80 B5), and Antiphon is said to have engaged in opposing argumentation 
(antilogoumenos) (DK 87 B98).
and for Gorgias appearing at the festivals at Delphi, Olympia, and Athens.74 According 
to Hippias in Plato’s Hippias Minor, he would offer to speak on one of a number of 
prepared topics and to answer subsequent audience questions. At this time, another 
Sophist could make an opposing speech, but Hippias expresses confidence that he 
would always win these sorts of encounters (363c7-364a9):
{ΙΠ.} Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὰ ποιοίην, ὦ Εὔδικε, εἰ Ὀλυμπίαζε μὲν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων 
πανήγυριν, ὅταν τὰ Ὀλύμπια ᾖ, ἀεὶ ἐπανιὼν οἴκοθεν ἐξ Ἤλιδος εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν 
παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν καὶ λέγοντα ὅτι ἄν τις βούληται ὧν ἄν μοι εἰς ἐπίδειξιν 
παρεσκευασμένον ᾖ, καὶ ἀποκρινόμενον τῷ βουλομένῳ ὅτι ἄν τις ἐρωτᾷ, νῦν δὲ 
τὴν Σωκράτους ἐρώτησιν φύγοιμι... ἐξ οὗ γὰρ ἦργμαι Ὀλυμπίασιν ἀγωνίζεσθαι, 
οὐδενὶ πώποτε κρείττονι εἰς οὐδὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἐνέτυχον.
HIPP: It would be pretty strange, Eudicus, if I should, on the one hand, always go up to 
the festival of the Greeks at Olympia to the sacred precinct there from my home at Elis 
and present myself whenever the Olympics are being held both speaking on whatever 
subject anyone chooses of those things I have prepared for epideixis and answering 
whatever questions anyone wishes to ask, were, on the other hand, now to avoid the 
questions of Socrates... for from that time when I began to compete at Olympia, I have 
never encountered anyone who is better than I am in anything.
 
This competitive spirit and extreme confidence are hallmarks of the Sophists as a 
group, and not just Hippias. According to a fragment of Gorgias preserved by Clement 
of Alexandria, Sophistic speech competitions require daring and skill, and the winner is 
the ablest of those who are called to compete (Strom. 1.11.51.3 = DK 82 B8):
καὶ «τὸ ἀγώνισμα» ἡμῶν κατὰ τὸν Λεοντῖνον Γοργίαν »διττῶν [δὲ] ἀρετῶν δεῖται, 
τόλμης καὶ σοφίας· τόλμης μὲν τὸ κίνδυνον ὑπομεῖναι, σοφίας δὲ τὸ αἴνιγμα 
γνῶναι. ὁ γάρ τοι λόγος καθάπερ τὸ κήρυγμα» τὸ Ὀλυμπίασι «καλεῖ μὲν τὸν 
βουλόμενον. στεφανοῖ δὲ τὸν δυνάμενον.»
According to Gorgias of Leontini, “A contest such as we have requires two kinds of 
excellence, daring and skill; daring is needed to withstand danger, and skill to 
understand how to trip the opponent {?}. For surely speech, like the summons at the 
Olympic games, calls him who will, but crowns him who can.75
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74 Philostratus Lives of the Sophists 1.9, and Plutarch Advice to Bride and Groom 43p (DK 82 B8a)
75 Translation by Rosamond Kent Sprague
In similar fashion, Protagoras boasts that he has competed in many speech contests 
(Pl. Prt. 335a5: ἀγῶνα λόγων) but that his methods are far superior to those of the 
other Sophists. 
Given that their public speeches are one of the Sophists’ means of attracting 
prospective students, it seems only natural that they would offer disputation and 
competitive speechmaking as a major part of their curriculum. As a teacher of this kind, 
Hippias promises that he can teach Socrates how to answer any question in a way that 
cannot be debated (Hp. mai. 287b):  
{ΙΠ.} καὶ γάρ, ὃ νυνδὴ εἶπον, οὐ μέγα ἐστὶ τὸ ἐρώτημα, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ τούτου 
χαλεπώτερα ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι ἐγώ σε διδάξαιμι, ὥστε μηδένα ἀνθρώπων δύνασθαί 
σε ἐξελέγχειν. 
HIPP: So, as I just said, this question is not a big deal, but I could teach you how to 
answer much more difficult questions than this in such a way that no man would be able 
to refute you.
This is, of course, the ultimate aim of a Sophistic education: to be capable of articulating 
policy positions compellingly in the context of democratic debate. The language used 
here is that of traditional schoolroom education; the Sophist is called a didaskalos by 
the Eleatic Stranger,76 and Hippias describes his own method with the verb didaskein. 
This implies that at least some of the Sophists viewed themselves (and were sometimes 
viewed by others) as belonging in part to the same category of educator as the humble 
didaskalos. Each of these figures has a given body of knowledge he needs to transmit, 
and as Isocrates scoffs in Against the Sophists (10.2ff), the Sophists “undertake to pass 
on an understanding of disputation as simply as they would teach the letters of the 
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76 See above on Plato’s Sophist
alphabet”.77 It is important to note, however, that while a didaskalos would have taught 
the alphabet and other basic lessons,78 the Sophists began their instruction at the 
secondary or post-secondary level.79 Although Kerferd is correct in stating that there 
was no such thing as a standard sophistic curriculum (1981, 37), the Sophists were 
linked instead by their methodology. They all taught about and through disputation, and 
they treated their subjects as a discrete body of knowledge which could be transmitted 
to their students through traditional educational interactions.     
3.2.4 Itinerancy
A life of near-constant travel was one of the perks of being a Sophist in the fifth and 
fourth centuries.80 This is another way in which the Sophists were distinct from other 
educational figures of their time. Whereas a didaskalos was a stationary figure with a 
specified place of employment (the didaskaleîon) where his students would come to 
receive his services, the Sophist had no headquarters. He traveled from place to place, 
presumably only staying as long as he had work or a place to stay. It is likely that while 
the Sophist was in each city, he would stay at the home of a friend, and young men 
would come there to call upon him.81 Naturally, as a result, a Sophist’s teaching 
engagement in any city was temporary. This meant that when a Sophist left town, the 
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77 See also Plato Protagoras 312b-c for comparisons of Sophists with schoolteachers.
78 Here begins the tradition of the didaskalos as dim-witted drill master who only engages students in 
mental acrobatics of limited value, as he appears in the Hellenistic period. See Cribiore 2001, 55-6.
79 See Kerferd 1981, 37 and Romilly1992, 33; Protagoras 328 a-b
80 For textual evidence of the itinerancy of the Sophists, see Plato Protagoras 309d3 and 310e5, Hippias 
Major 281a1, and Gorgias 447b.
81 See the beginning of the Protagoras when Hippocrates and Socrates call upon Protagoras at the home 
of Callias.
young men who studied under him either had to find a new teacher, or (more rarely) 
accompany their instructor on his travels, as seen above in the Protagoras. 
The system of Sophistic travel is summed up elegantly in the Apology (19eff):
ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἷός τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους 
ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντῖνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἱππίας ὁ Ἠλεῖος. τούτων 
γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἷός τ' ἐστὶν ἰὼν εἰς ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους – 
οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα συνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται – τούτους 
πείθουσι τὰς ἐκείνων συνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφίσιν συνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας 
καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι.
Then this seems to me to be a good thing, that is, if anyone is able to educate men the 
way Gorgias of Leontini and Prodicus of Ceos and Hippias of Elis can. For each of these 
men, gentlemen of the jury, is able to go to any of the cities and persuade the young 
men there - who can associate with whomever they wish of their fellow citizens for free - 
to abandon those relationships and pay money to associate with them instead, and 
what’s more, to be grateful to do so.
Under this model, the Sophists traveled for the sake of business, and this set them 
apart from the tradition of travel by wise men before them; they each had a limited 
number of stock lessons prepared, and once they had dispensed their prepared lectures 
and received as many fees as possible in a given place, it was time to leave. In the 
Hippias Major (282e), Hippias talks of earning an immense sum of money in a brief 
period of time when he traveled to Sicily and made 150 minas there, with over 20 minas 
coming from one very small town called Inycus. Despite the likely exaggeration of the 
monetary figures involved, the point is that the Sophists made many lucrative but brief 
trips all over the Greek-speaking world. Although constant travel was also characteristic 
of the earlier sages, while Solon and company traveled to learn more about the world 
and to foster guest-friendships in foreign lands, the Sophists traveled to practice their 
profession and to increase their wealth.82 In this respect, they are an entirely unique 
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category, and fundamentally different from both the sages and the didaskaloi. It is likely 
that, in this respect, the Sophists are the precursors of the later Hellenistic kathêgêtai, 
itinerant private teachers who traveled in search of better employ and who only taught 
advanced students.83          
3.2.5 Professionalism: Title, Pay, and Promised Results
Three different qualities fall under the heading of professionalism as it relates to the 
Sophists, but these qualities are intricately connected and must be treated together. 
First, Sophistry was a self-conscious profession, i.e. the Sophists had a title that they 
used to describe themselves: sophistês. This is perhaps the most basic distinction 
between earlier sophoi and the later sophistai; men like Protagoras, Hippias, and 
Gorgias were proud to call themselves Sophists. According to Xenophon in On Hunting, 
the Sophists choose to go by this name even though (in Xenophon’s view) it is an insult 
among intelligent folk (13.8):  
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρκεῖ ἑκάστῳ σοφιστὴν κληθῆναι,ὅ ἐστιν ὄνειδος παρά γε εὖ φρονοῦσι.
But it is enough for each of them to be called “Sophist”, which is a term of reproach 
among sensible people.
He elaborates on this view in the Memorabilia, where he insults anyone who offers 
wisdom for a fee, in the manner of a prostitute, claiming that whoever does this is called 
a Sophist.84 This animosity is surely what Protagoras is referencing when he explains to 
Socrates why he has agreed to go by the name of Sophist (Pl. Prt. 317b): 
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84 Memorabilia 1.6.13.7: τήν τε γὰρ ὥραν ἐὰν μέν τις ἀργυρίου πωλῇ τῷ βουλομένῳ, πόρνον αὐτὸν 
ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ἐὰν δέ τις, ὃν ἂν γνῷ καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐραστὴν ὄντα, τοῦτον φίλον ἑαυτῷ 
ποιῆται, σώφρονα νομίζομεν· καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ 
πωλοῦντας σοφιστὰς [ὥσπερ πόρνους] ἀποκαλοῦσιν
καὶ ὁμολογῶ τε σοφιστὴς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, καὶ εὐλάβειαν ταύτην 
οἶμαι βελτίω ἐκείνης εἶναι, τὸ ὁμολογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξαρνον εἶναι·
And I agree that I am a Sophist and I educate men, and I think that this precaution, 
namely agreeing, is better than denying it.
Indeed, the self-proclamation of sophistry seems to be an integral part of what makes a 
Sophist. Later in the same dialogue, Socrates facetiously praises Protagoras for being 
open about his profession (Prt. 348e10-349a3):
σὺ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶ καὶ ἄλλους οἷός τ' εἶ ποιεῖν ἀγαθούς, καὶ οὕτω 
πεπίστευκας σαυτῷ, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων ταύτην τὴν τέχνην ἀποκρυπτομένων σύ γ' 
ἀναφανδὸν σεαυτὸν ὑποκηρυξάμενος εἰς πάντας τοὺς Ἕλληνας, σοφιστὴν 
ἐπονομάσας σεαυτόν, ἀπέφηνας παιδεύσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς διδάσκαλον, πρῶτος 
τούτου μισθὸν ἀξιώσας ἄρνυσθαι.
But you are yourself good and are able to make others good, and you are so confident in 
your ability that while others conceal this art, you have had yourself publicly proclaimed 
to all the Greeks by the name of Sophist, calling yourself a didaskalos of culture and 
virtue, and you are the first to demand payment for this.
 Three things about this passage are worth noting. First, Protagoras and the other 
Sophists boldly proclaim themselves as such in comparison to other educators who are 
unwilling to operate under the title of Sophist.85 Socrates links this self-proclamation 
directly to Protagoras’ confidence in his educational skills; we will return to this issue 
shortly when we discuss the promises of the Sophists. Second, again we see the 
Sophist being placed in the same category as the didaskalos with respect to the subject 
matter of culture and virtue. Third, and most important for our current discussion, 
Socrates reveals that Protagoras is the first to demand payment for teaching wisdom, a 
practice which sets the Sophists apart as educators. They were professional teachers 
and related in this way to the didaskalos as opposed to the sage. Some modern 
scholars have argued that the Sophists as paid teachers is a trope invented by Plato in 
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85 For Hippias describing himself and his colleagues as Sophists, see Plato Hippias Major 282e.
an attempt to invalidate their intellectual program and undermine their educational 
method,86 and given the widespread contemporary antagonism against the Sophists, 
and in particular Plato’s disdain for them as a group, this is a logical conclusion to make. 
However, at the very least, regardless of whether the Sophists actually took fees, the 
belief that they did was not confined to Plato.   
The final aspect of the professionalism of the Sophists was their practice of promising 
particular results for those who engaged their services. As Romilly points out in her 
discussion of the ways the Sophists were unusual as educators, “there was no limit to 
their promises, no end to their claims” (1992, 35). In the Protagoras, the title character 
tells Hippocrates that he promises his students constant improvement with the ultimate 
result being that he will make them good citizens (318a, 319a):
Ὦ νεανίσκε, ἔσται τοίνυν σοι, ἐὰν ἐμοὶ συνῇς, ᾗ ἂν ἡμέρᾳ ἐμοὶ συγγένῃ, ἀπιέναι
οἴκαδε βελτίονι γεγονότι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα· καὶ ἑκάστης ἡμέρας 
ἀεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιδιδόναι...  Ἆρα, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἕπομαί σου τῷ λόγῳ; δοκεῖς γάρ 
μοι λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας. 
Αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ἐπάγγελμα ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.
[Protagoras said,] “Young man, this will be the benefit to you if you associate with me, 
that on the very day you first attend, you will go home a better person, and on every 
subsequent day it will be the same. Every day will bring constant improvement”... “Well 
then”, I (Socrates) said, “Am I following what you are saying? For you seem to be talking 
about the political art and promising to make men good citizens.” “That is exactly the 
promise I am making, Socrates”, he said.
This attitude is not limited to Protagoras, either. In the Gorgias, the title character 
promises to make his students rhetoricians like himself (449b), and in the Hippias Major, 
Hippias claims that his wisdom makes men better with respect to virtue (283c). This is a 
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new development in ancient education; a person receiving lessons from a sage or a 
didaskalos might have certain expectations about the outcome of his instruction, but 
these educators never made specific professions or guarantees about results. The 
didaskalos undoubtedly realized that too many things are left to chance in an 
educational relationship and each student is different from one another. However, the 
Sophists did not acknowledge this subtlety, and for this reason, they were often 
maligned as being overly cocky and for treating the teacher-student relationship like a 
formula into which one simply plugged preset values in order to produce a perfectly 
educated person.87 As Romilly notes, “The Sophists’ most revolutionary innovation was, 
precisely, that, faced with nature, they set up teaching to counteract it and considered 
that virtue could be learned by attending their classes” (1992, 45). In the Protagoras 
(357e), for example, Socrates pokes fun at Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias for 
professing to cure ignorance, while in the Cynegeticus (13.1) Xenophon complains that 
the Sophists promise to lead men to virtue but do just the opposite. It is Isocrates (Antid. 
147.9), though, who is most offended by what he considers the extravagant promises 
(καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν ὑπισχνουμένους) of the Sophists. His work Against the Sophists (1) 
opens with a denouncement of those educators who give teaching a bad name by 
promising results they cannot produce:
Εἰ πάντες ἤθελον οἱ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειροῦντες ἀληθῆ λέγειν καὶ μὴ μείζους 
ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ὧν ἔμελλον ἐπιτελεῖν, οὐκ ἂν κακῶς ἤκουον ὑπὸ τῶν 
ἰδιωτῶν· νῦν δ' οἱ τολμῶντες λίαν ἀπερισκέπτως ἀλαζονεύεσθαι πεποιήκασιν ὥστε 
δοκεῖν ἄμεινον βουλεύεσθαι τοὺς ῥᾳθυμεῖν αἱρουμένους τῶν περὶ τὴν 
φιλοσοφίαν διατριβόντων.
If all those practicing the profession of education were willing to speak the truth instead 
of promising greater things than they can possibly provide, they would not be thought of 
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so badly by the public. But as it is now, those who have the audacity to brag 
thoughtlessly have brought it about that it seems like a better idea to choose idleness 
than the pursuit of philosophy.
  
Isocrates’ greatest concern in this passage is that the Sophists give all teachers a bad 
name, and his denouncement is designed to put distance between their indefensible 
practices and his own educational methods. He recognizes - as the Sophists do not - 
that people are repelled by excessive confidence. As Romilly has observed, “In the case 
of many Athenians, who were certainly attracted but also alarmed by the Sophists’ 
teaching, amazed yet at the same time inhibited by their own experience of daily life, it 
was this overweening assurance that provoked their antagonism” (1992, 51).      
3.3 The Sophists as Didaskaloi?
As educators in fifth and fourth century Athens, the Sophists represented an important 
nexus of and point of divergence from several pre-existing instructional models. While 
they shared their polymathy and their itinerancy with the sages, they used their 
knowledge of many subjects for private gain as much as to benefit the public, and the 
motivation for their travel was monetary as opposed to intellectual. On the other hand, 
this type of travel combined with their focus on post-secondary education connects 
them with the later Hellenistic figure of the kathêgêtês, since the Sophists appear to 
have been the first paid teachers for advanced students. Their seemingly-divine 
charisma can be traced back to the mystics and seers of old, but their practice of 
agonistic speech appears to have originated with them, although it did persist in 
rhetorical education well after their time. 
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The most significant comparison to be made is, of course, between the Sophist and the 
didaskalos. It is undeniable that these two figures shared a common paid profession -  
education - by which they earned their respective livings. They even seem sometimes to 
have shared a methodology, as evidenced by the occasional use of the verb didaskein 
to describe the teaching of both Sophists and didaskaloi and by at least one reference 
implying that the Sophists treated disputation like the lessons of a schoolteacher. 
However, this is where their similarities end. While the didaskalos was the ancient 
equivalent of an elementary school teacher, the Sophist taught at a level closer to that 
of a college professor; and where the didaskalos gave instruction straightforwardly with 
no guarantee about results, the Sophist claimed he could teach any student wisdom 
and virtue regardless of character or age.88 
What distinguished the Sophists most as a new category of educator, though, was their 
self-awareness of their role. They practiced a type of education that was conscious of its 
own potential by identifying themselves as outstanding teachers and professing to 
produce results via intellectual instruction. Romilly has summed this quality up neatly:
[The Sophists’] totally novel ambitions marked an absolutely new point of departure in 
our history: an advance was made over ground that has never been lost since. As we 
have seen, the idea of an intellectual education from which each and every adult could 
benefit, an education designed to improve their aptitudes in every domain, thanks to 
intellectual techniques and human knowledge, was completely new. (1992, 55)
Although related to and undoubtedly exercising influence upon many other types of 
educators, including our didaskalos, the Sophists clearly represent an entirely distinct 
category of teacher in the Classical period. To sum up with the words of Marrou, “It is no 
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exaggeration to say that in the field of Greek education the Sophists accomplished a 
veritable revolution” (1956, 59).     
4. Didaskaloi and Non-Didaskaloi
In the preceding sections, we established that although there were a number of 
educational predecessors and contemporaries who shared certain characteristics with 
him, the didaskalos was a distinct figure in the landscape of Classical Greek education. 
He fulfilled some but not all of the same functions as the parent, the paidagôgos, and 
the mentor. Unlike the erastês, his role did not include any erotic element, nor did he 
make any promises about the results of his instruction the way the Sophists did. While 
all of the other figures (except the proto-didaskalos, Cheiron) followed their “students” 
around and interacted with them in whatever place was convenient, the didaskalos had 
his own center of operations. And, most importantly - as we will see illustrated in the 
next chapter - his methods differed dramatically from those of the other educators we 
discussed above. Keeping all of this in mind, let us turn now to a detailed investigation 
of the process of Athenian education as it was conducted by the didaskalos. 
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CHAPTER 2
THE PROCESS OF EDUCATION
So far we have distinguished between the didaskalos and other figures whose roles 
might be interpreted as instructional, namely the parent, the paidagôgos, the Mentor, 
the erastês, and the Sophist. However, in the process, we have come to know the 
didaskalos and his methods only as they differ from the other figures under 
consideration. That is, we have learned who the didaskalos was by determining who he 
wasn’t, and for this reason, till now our enquiry has inevitably focused on the traits of the 
non-didaskaloi. 
The goal of this chapter, then, is to refocus our investigation on the didaskalos and the 
mechanism, process, and purpose of his instruction. Specifically, now that we 
understand the “who,” we must seek to understand the “what,” the “why,” and the “how” 
of Athenian education. We have to ask ourselves how our Classical Greek authors 
define the relationship between a didaskalos and his student and what precisely they 
think his day-to-day work consists in. But most importantly, we need to interrogate the 
assumptions implicit in the texts in order to understand why the Athenians chose to 
structure their education system the way they did (and not, by extension, the way any 
other city did). To this end, I will use the same technique favored by ancient authors like 
Thucydides, Xenophon, and Plato for the purpose of analyzing their city’s institutions: a 
comparison of Athens and Sparta.  
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1. Athens versus Sparta
Before we commence with the comparison, however, a word about methodology. At this 
point, one might rightly ask: why Sparta? Why not compare Athens with Crete or Corinth 
or even Persia (as Xenophon did in his Cyropaedia)? For my part, I take a page from 
Isocrates’ Panathenaicus. In this text, the elderly orator lays out the praise of his city in 
the form of a comparison of Athens with Sparta, which he prefaces with the following 
rationale (39-40): 
I think that for those wishing to accurately and justly praise any given city-state, it is 
necessary not to simply praise the one city they have chosen, but just as we examine 
purple and gold and test them by placing them side by side with items of similar 
appearance and of the same estimated value, in the same way with city-states, one 
should not compare small ones with large ones, nor ones which usually dominate with 
ones which are usually subjugated, nor ones which need aid with ones which are able to 
provide it, but rather ones which have similar powers, and have engaged in the same 
deeds and enjoyed a similar freedom of action. For this is how one may best arrive at 
the truth.
While Isocrates claims that his program aims at uncovering the historical truth about 
Athens and Sparta, my goal is much less ambitious. I seek, in laying the educational 
systems of these two cities side-by-side, not to uncover the reality of their systems, but 
to tease out how Athenian authors distinguished the two.1 Hence, my comparison is not 
meant to be a thorough examination of the nuts and bolts of Spartan and Athenian 
education as much as of the difference in the attitudes towards education of these two 
cities. By measuring Athenian institutions alongside those of their greatest political rival 
and by identifying the ways Athenians believed themselves to be different and even 
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1 For a similar approach to Athenian and Spartan education but with a focus on Spartan education see 
Ducat 2006, Chapter 2. 
unique, we can begin to grasp far more clearly the fundamental character of their 
education. 
1.1 The Basics of Spartan Education
While we already made a survey of the basic format of Athenian education in the 
Introduction, we have not yet given Spartan education the same treatment. Fortunately 
for our purposes, among the minor works of Xenophon there is a short, informative 
treatise on the Constitution of the Spartans (Lacedaimonion Politeia, hereafter referred 
to as Lac.), in which several chapters are dedicated to summarizing their educational 
system and the ways it differs from that of the other Greek states (Lac. 2.1-2):   
τῶν μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων οἱ φάσκοντες κάλλιστα τοὺς υἱεῖς παιδεύειν, 
ἐπειδὰν τάχιστα αὐτοῖς οἱ παῖδες τὰ λεγόμενα ξυνιῶσιν, εὐθὺς μὲν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς 
παιδαγωγοὺς θεράποντας ἐφιστᾶσιν, εὐθὺς δὲ πέμπουσιν εἰς διδασκάλων 
μαθησομένους καὶ γράμματα καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ τὰ ἐν παλαίστρᾳ. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις 
τῶν παίδων πόδας μὲν ὑποδήμασιν ἁπαλύνουσι, σώματα δὲ ἱματίων μεταβολαῖς 
διαθρύπτουσι· σίτου γε μὴν αὐτοῖς γαστέρα μέτρον νομίζουσιν. 
ὁ δὲ Λυκοῦργος, ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον παιδαγωγοὺς δούλους ἐφιστάναι, 
ἄνδρα ἐπέστησε κρατεῖν αὐτῶν ἐξ ὧνπερ αἱ μέγισται ἀρχαὶ καθίστανται, ὃς δὴ καὶ 
παιδονόμος καλεῖται, τοῦτον δὲ κύριον ἐποίησε καὶ ἁθροίζειν τοὺς παῖδας καὶ 
ἐπισκοποῦντα, εἴ τις ῥᾳδιουργοίη, ἰσχυρῶς κολάζειν. ἔδωκε δ' αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν 
ἡβώντων μαστιγοφόρους, ὅπως τιμωροῖεν ὁπότε δέοι, ὥστε πολλὴν μὲν αἰδῶ, 
πολλὴν δὲ πειθὼ ἐκεῖ συμπαρεῖναι.
Those of the other Greeks professing to give their sons the best education place them 
under the care of a paidagôgos as soon as the boys understand what is said to them, 
and they send them to a didaskalos to learn letters and music and wrestling. And in 
addition, they soften the boys’ feet with sandals, and they pamper their bodies with 
changes of clothing and it is customary to allow them as much food as will fit in their 
stomachs.
But Lycurgus, on the other hand, instead of allowing each citizen to appoint a slave to 
act as paidagôgos, set up to rule the boys a man chosen from the class from which the 
highest offices are filled, and he is called the paidonomos, and Lycurgus gave him the 
power to gather the boys together and to inspect them, and, if any one of them should 
misbehave, the paidonomos has the power to punish the offender violently. And 
Lycurgus also gave him a staff of young men to be whip-bearers (mastigophoroi), in 
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order to chastise the boys when necessary, with the result that respect and obedience 
go hand in hand in Sparta.
The passage begins with the information we already know: Athenian boys are placed by 
their parents under the authority of a paidagôgos and a didaskalos in order to learn the 
standard curriculum of letters, music, and gymnastics. For their Spartan counterparts, 
on the other hand, the situation is much different. There are no kindly slave tutors or 
schoolmasters here. Instead, the boys are taken from home young - Plutarch tells us 
they were probably around the age of 7 (Lyc. 16.4) -2 and subjected to group training 
and discipline by an all-powerful paidonomos and his band of whip-bearing lackeys. In 
the chapters that follow (Lac. 2.3-9), Xenophon tells us that (as we might have guessed) 
in contrast with the Athenian system wherein boys are allowed comfortable and 
seasonally-appropriate clothing and satisfying meal portions, in Sparta the boys wear no 
shoes, possess a single cloak for all seasons, and are given less food than they need. 
Purportedly the smaller portions both teach Spartan boys to endure the discomfort of 
hunger and encourage them to resort to theft in order to survive, with the goal being that 
they become more resourceful and skilled fighting men.3 However, if they are caught in 
the act of stealing food, they are beaten severely, not for the theft itself, but for carrying 
it out sloppily.
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3 Lac. 2.7: ταῦτα οὖν δὴ πάντα δῆλον ὅτι μηχανικωτέρους τῶν ἐπιτηδείων βουλόμενος τοὺς 
παῖδας ποιεῖν καὶ πολεμικωτέρουςοὕτως ἐπαίδευσεν.
When an Athenian boy becomes a young man (meirakion), Xenophon tells us that he is 
released from his paidagôgos and didaskalos and is free to live as an adult under his 
own authority. In Sparta, however, Lycurgus imposed on young men at this age a period 
of mandatory community service, and the penalty for shirking this would be exclusion 
from all future civic honors (Lac. 3.1-3).  
The picture of Spartan education that emerges from this text is harsh and unforgiving. 
As Freeman has observed in his 1972 article on the topic, “The objects of the Spartan 
education were not intellectual acuteness and the accumulation of knowledge, but 
discipline, endurance, and victory in war. Discipline was taught by the perpetual 
presence of authority, and by very severe punishments” (22). Even the word 
paidonomos emphasizes the authoritarian nature of the system; whereas the Athenian 
paidagôgos guides and accompanies a boy, the Spartan paidonomos lays down the law 
upon him. Spartan education expert Jean Ducat is right to note that the paidonomos 
with his coterie of mastigophoroi “symbolized the authoritarian and repressive face of 
education” (2006, 160). Regardless of its apparent strictness, however, as Xenophon 
points out above, the system seemed to be effective, since its natural byproducts were 
respect and obedience. 
1.2 Philosophy of Education: Nature or Nurture? 
It is worth pausing for a moment here to consider what it was about being a Spartan that 
resulted in such a different philosophy of education from that of an Athenian. I would 
submit that this disparity comes down to a fundamental difference between Spartan and 
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Athenian attitudes toward innate nature and character development in their citizens. In 
particular, the Spartans viewed children as if they were unformed lumps of clay needing 
to be shaped and habituated in order to fit properly into their society. Good qualities 
were not innate but had to be acquired through careful and thorough training; Spartan 
citizens were not born, they were made.4 As Freeman has noted:5 
Education was the most important thing at Sparta. It was both regulated and enforced by  
the State. It was exactly the same for all. The boys were taken away from home and 
brought up in great boarding schools, so that the individualizing tendencies of family life 
and hereditary instincts might be stamped out, and a general type of character, the 
Spartan type, alone be left in all the boys. (1972, 19)
This certainly sounds to a modern ear like a cruel form of cultural brainwashing, but it 
should come as no surprise in light of what Plutarch tells us about Lycurgus’ interest in a 
program of eugenics as a way of controlling the education of his citizens (Lyc. 14.1): 
Τῆς δὲ παιδείας, ἣν μέγιστον ἡγεῖτο τοῦ νομοθέτου καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον εἶναι, 
πόρρωθεν ἀρχόμενος εὐθὺς ἐπεσκόπει τὰ περὶ τοὺς γάμους καὶ τὰς γενέσεις.
Concerning education, which he considered the greatest and most noble task of the 
lawgiver, he began at the source by carefully regulating marriages and births.
This meant that all women of marriageable age had to undergo a strict program of 
physical fitness in order to be completely prepared for the ordeal of childbirth and to 
produce offspring with the greatest likelihood of being healthy and capable of enduring 
hardship. It also meant that there were incentives in place surrounding early marriage 
so that young people of ideal child-bearing age might pair off and produce the best 
possible offspring (Lyc. 14.2-15.2). Already before conception, Lycurgus sought to begin 
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4 This is not to say that the Athenians did not believe education to be valuable or potentially formative, or 
that the Spartans did not recognize the role innate nature plays in the process of education. Rather, it is to 
point out the fundamental dichotomy between the educational philosophies of the two cities: on the whole, 
Spartans placed more value on education than nature, and Athenians placed more value on nature than 
education.
5 See also Marrou 1956, 22: “The whole purpose of Spartan education was to build up character 
according to a clearly defined ideal.”
shaping his future citizens into ideal Spartans; he left no part of their children’s 
educational process in the hands of individual citizens.
For the Athenians, on the other hand, simply living in Athens was believed to turn 
people into citizens whose values lined up with the city’s own. Not only was it thought 
that the city’s philosophical values would inevitably rub off on any person who spent 
time there, but the Greeks even felt that certain places were naturally superior at 
producing men of a particular type,6 and Athens was perfectly suited for producing 
model citizens. In fact, according to Plato (Tim. 24c-d), Athena chose the location for the 
city because she believed it to have the greatest potential to bring forth men just like 
herself. Hence, in his debate with Protagoras over whether virtue is teachable (Pl. Prt. 
319c-d), Socrates points out (perhaps sarcastically) that it must be innate for when the 
Assembly seeks expert advice on matters pertaining to the administration of the city, 
any citizen is equally qualified to serve in this capacity just by virtue of being an 
Athenian. Thucydides takes the point even farther: not only does Athens produce 
innately virtuous citizens, it even acts as an education of sorts which distills their virtue 
into a more concentrated and refined form. As Pericles famously brags in the funeral 
oration in Thucydides Book 2 (Ch. 41), Athens herself is the school of Greece (λέγω 
τήν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι), a sentiment that is echoed and 
expanded upon in Isocrates’ Panegyricus (47-50): 
ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν κατέδειξεν, καὶ λόγους ἐτίμησεν, ὧν πάντες μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, τοῖς 
δ' ἐπισταμένοις φθονοῦσιν, συνειδυῖα μὲν ὅτι τοῦτο μόνον ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν ζῴων 
ἴδιον ἔφυμεν ἔχοντες καὶ διότι τούτῳ πλεονεκτήσαντες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν 
αὐτῶν διηνέγκαμεν... Τοσοῦτον δ' ἀπολέλοιπεν ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ 
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6 On which, see Plato Laws 747d.
λέγειν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, ὥσθ' οἱ ταύτης μαθηταὶ τῶν ἄλλων διδάσκαλοι 
γεγόνασιν, καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὄνομα πεποίηκεν μηκέτι τοῦ γένους, ἀλλὰ τῆς 
διανοίας δοκεῖν εἶναι, καὶ μᾶλλον Ἕλληνας καλεῖσθαι τοὺς τῆς παιδεύσεως τῆς 
ἡμετέρας ἢ τοὺς τῆς κοινῆς φύσεως μετέχοντας. 
Our city introduced [philosophy] to the world, and she honored eloquence, which all men 
desire and envy in those who have it, for she realized that this is the only part of our 
nature that distinguishes us from all other living things and by taking advantage of this 
we have surpassed them in all other respects as well... And so far has our city 
outstripped the rest of mankind in thought and speech that her students have become 
the teachers of others, and she has brought it about that the name “Hellenes” no longer 
denotes a race but rather an intellectual spirit, and those people are called “Hellenes” 
who share our common paideia rather than those who spring from a common stock.
By this token, being Athenian is not a common bloodline, but a state of mind that is 
cultivated and perfected in Athens, and for those living in the city it requires no further 
training. For this reason, Athenians were inherently distrustful of formal education. They 
generally believed that they were good by nature7 and did not need to be taught to be 
citizens, and while they recognized that education could enhance a person’s preexisting 
qualities,8 they also knew that it could just as easily harm them.
Ultimately, this difference between the Athenian and Spartan approaches to character 
formation came to influence every aspect of their respective education systems. What 
they chose to teach their youth, who they made responsible for teaching it, and how it 
was taught were all shaped by these views. As Ducat rightly notes in this connection, 
“each method of education reflected and at the same time conditioned the political and 
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7 As opposed to the Spartans. On which, see Thucydides Book 2, Chapter 39: Spartans are trained from 
an early age to pursue courage by discipline and hard work, while Athenians have an unrestricted mode 
of life and yet do not fare worse in battle for it.  
Plato was a notable exception to this trend. See Laws 7.808d-e for boys as savage before experiencing 
the mellowing influence of education.
8 For a complete discussion of the various possible outcomes of the educational exchange according to 
Greek authors, see Chapter 3, Section 2.
social system of the city in which it functioned” (2006, 40). In the case of Sparta, the 
resulting education took the form of a strict, tradition-based, State-regulated (i.e. public), 
military training program characterized by harsh corporal punishment. Athenian 
education, in contrast, was a private institution distinguished by formative (rather than 
punitive) interactions between students and teachers. Unlike the Spartan system, which 
sought to instill particular qualities in its students, education at Athens aimed to improve 
and foster the preexisting qualities of the citizenry - particularly the well-known Athenian 
tendency toward self-reflection and philosophical enquiry.9 And while Spartan education 
was structured in such a way as to produce blindly obedient citizens, the Athenian 
system endeavored to produce citizens who were obedient by choice.10
So, with an eye to answering the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, the 
following sections will explore in more detail the ways these two cities’ different 
approaches to citizen formation were manifested in their respective education systems. 
In particular, the discussion will center on aspects of the interaction between the 
teacher-figure and his student, especially curriculum and methodology. 
1.3 Methodologies: Emulation, Habituation, and Punishment
In Sparta, the ideal outcome of education was unquestioning obedience to the laws of 
the city. According to Xenophon (Lac. 8.3), the Spartans believed that obedience was 
the greatest good, whether it be in the city, on campaign, or in the household (ἔγνωσαν 
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9 As described by the Corinthians speech in Thucydides Book 1, Chapter 70ff. 
10 See below on Thucydides 1.39; see also Plato’s Laws Books 1 and 2.
τὸ πείθεσθαι μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν στρατιᾷ καὶ ἐν οἴκῳ), and 
they looked down on the Athenians for holding a different view. In his speech in 
Thucydides Book 1 (Ch. 84.3), the Spartan king Archidamus claims that Spartans “are 
educated too crudely to scorn the laws and with too much severity of discipline to 
disobey them” (δὲ ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροψίας παιδευόμενοι καὶ ξὺν 
χαλεπότητι σωφρονέστερον ἢ ὥστε αὐτῶν ἀνηκουστεῖν), while the Athenians are 
so arrogant as to believe themselves above the laws. While Archidamus clearly views 
his city’s education as superior, as Ducat has observed, “the image of Spartan 
education to which this text bears witness is that of a harsh education...which prefers 
integration of the individual into the collective to his own development, and which 
disciplines above all because it scarcely teaches” (2006, 39). In similar fashion, in the 
Laws (634d-e), Plato describes how young men in Sparta are not allowed to either 
question the laws of the city or tolerate any person who does, but they must declare in 
solidarity that all of the laws have been justly enacted by divine decree. Although Plato 
is generally complimentary of the Spartan education system, in this passage he is 
clearly uncomfortable with the idea of a whole city of Spartans blindly pledging 
obedience to the laws, no matter how unreasonable those laws might be. Plutarch 
would later expand upon Plato’s image of the Spartan youths declaring allegiance to the 
laws “in unison and with one mouth and one voice” (634e1: μιᾷ δὲ φωνῇ καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς 
στόματος) in his own description of Spartan education:  
Τὸ δὲ ὅλον εἴθιζε τοὺς πολίτας μὴ βούλεσθαι μηδὲ ἐπίστασθαι κατ' ἰδίαν ζῆν, ἀλλ' 
ὥσπερ τὰς μελίττας τῷ κοινῷ συμφυεῖς ὄντας ἀεὶ καὶ μετ' ἀλλήλων εἱλουμένους 
περὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα.
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In sum, [Lycurgus] accustomed the citizens to have neither the desire nor the ability to 
live for themselves, but, like bees, they were to make themselves always integral parts 
of their community, clustering together around their leader.
This depiction is far from flattering. In Plutarch’s estimation, the Spartans are as 
brainless as worker-bees whose entire existence consists in following their leader’s 
every command. The use of the verb ethizein here is telling;11 Plutarch is making it plain 
that he believes the Spartans only achieve this degree of assimilation and obedience 
through habituation. In other words, they educate their youth by subjecting them to 
endless repetition of the same action until the desired outcome is attained. It is this 
same theory that underlies the educational practice of rote memorization; if you walk a 
specific path over and over for long enough, you will inevitably wear a groove in the 
earth.           
For the Athenians, on the other hand, the habituation method was inherently flawed. 
While Spartan citizens were courageous because they were required to be by their city, 
the Athenians wanted their citizens to possess the courage of personal conviction. In 
fact, the trait for which Archidamus ridicules the Athenians is the very trait which they 
most prized in their citizens: the ability to think for themselves. Instead of simply 
punishing them into obedience, the Athenian education system taught the citizens to 
understand why the laws existed and why it was right to obey them. As Pericles says in 
his praise of the Athenians in the funeral oration (Thuc. 2.39): 
καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἤτοι κρίνομέν γε ἢ ἐνθυμούμεθα ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς 
λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ 
πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ἃ δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν. διαφερόντως γὰρ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν ὥστε 
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11 Isocrates also uses this verb to describe the education of the Spartans. On which, see Panathenaicus 
209.
τολμᾶν τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι· ὃ τοῖς ἄλλοις 
ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει.
And we Athenians decide matters for ourselves or we at least endeavor to thoroughly 
understand them, and we do not consider discussion a hindrance to action, but rather 
not having been taught by discussion when the time comes for action. For we excel 
others in this respect also, that we are most daring in action but also most given to 
reflection on the actions we intend to undertake. For other men, however, boldness 
entails ignorance and reflection brings hesitation.
          
According to Thucydides’ Pericles, then, it is preferable to deliberate freely, and in so 
doing, create the potential for improvement, than to simply obey without question or 
reflection, as he implies the Spartans do. It was as a result of this mentality that the 
Athenians were open to innovation and creativity in their education where the Spartans 
were conservative and rigidly traditional. In the Protagoras (342d), Socrates observes 
that the Spartans do not allow their young men to travel lest they unlearn what they 
have been taught at home. At the same time, as Plutarch notes (Lyc. 27.3-4), Lycurgus 
placed limits on who was allowed to enter the city so that visitors could not become 
teachers of wickedness (διδάσκαλοι κακοῦ) to the youth,12 for with new people come 
new ideas, and he viewed new ideas as more dangerous to the health of the city than a 
plague. Meanwhile, at Athens, Thucydides tells us (2.39), no person is excluded simply 
because he might, by learning about Athenian methods, be able to hurt the city. Rather 
than rely on secrecy and deception or strict discipline for victory, as we are meant to 
understand the Spartans do, the Athenians depend upon the innate courage of their 
souls. 
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12 For Sparta as an intellectually-conservative society, see also the speech of the Corinthians in 
Thucydides 1.70-71.
So if the Athenians did not conduct their education through habituation, what method did 
they use to create free-thinking yet willingly-obedient citizens? One answer is emulation. 
In Plato’s Protagoras (325e-326a) the title character explains the process in this way:
παρατιθέασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα 
καὶ ἐκμανθάνειν ἀναγκάζουσιν, ἐν οἷς πολλαὶ μὲν νουθετήσεις ἔνεισιν πολλαὶ δὲ 
διέξοδοι καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἵνα ὁ παῖς ζηλῶν 
μιμῆται καὶ ὀρέγηται τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι.
[The teachers] place before the boys the works of the good poets to read at their 
benches and they are required to learn by heart these poems, in which there are many 
admonitions and descriptions and praises and eulogies of the great men of the past, in 
order that the boy in envy may imitate them and strive to become the same as they.
 
According to this passage, the Athenian education system took advantage of the 
universal human desire for greatness. It held up before the youth examples of 
praiseworthy men with the implicit promise that if they were to imitate these exemplars, 
they too would become praiseworthy. Indeed, as modern pedagogical expert Bryan 
Warnick has observed (2008, 32), “Human examples function in education as 
representations of a self that is not yet realized. They act as mirrors that reflect not who 
we currently are, but who we could one day be.” For the Athenians, the most readily 
available models for emulation would, of course, have been the heroes of the Homeric 
epics, but given that any effective pedagogy must appeal to an individual’s personal 
circumstances,13 an Athenian didaskalos would inevitably have sought additional 
exemplars closer to home. For this, one possible paradigm he would have offered was 
himself. From tracing the alphabet on a student’s tablet for him to copy over, to 
delivering a practice speech for students to use as a template, Athenian teachers 
encouraged their students to emulate and imitate them. 
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13 See Warnick 2008, 17 on the educational philosophy of John Locke and the need for children to have 
excellent exemplars within their own sphere of knowledge.
In fact, a didaskalos came to be thought of as a person who operated specifically by 
offering himself as a paradigm for others to imitate, and this meant he had to exhibit 
behavior that was worthy of imitation.14 As Xenophon points out in the Memorabilia 
(1.2.17), all didaskaloi show their students how they practice what they teach (πάντας 
δὲ τοὺς διδάσκοντας ὁρῶ αὑτοὺς δεικνύντας τε τοῖς μανθάνουσιν ᾗπερ αὐτοὶ 
ποιοῦσιν ἃ διδάσκουσι). Isocrates is even more specific in his description of this 
process in Against the Sophists (17.5-6):
τὸν δὲ διδάσκαλον τὰ μὲν οὕτως ἀκριβῶς οἷόν τ' εἶναι διελθεῖν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν 
διδακτῶν παραλιπεῖν, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν τοιοῦτον αὑτὸν παράδειγμα παρασχεῖν 
ὥστε τοὺς ἐκτυπωθέντας καὶ μιμήσασθαι δυναμένους εὐθὺς ἀνθηρότερον καὶ 
χαριέστερον τῶν ἄλλων φαίνεσθαι λέγοντας.
         
The didaskalos needs to expound as precisely as possible so that he leaves out nothing 
that is teachable, and as for the rest, he must provide himself as a paradigm with the 
result that those who have been shaped on this model and are capable of imitating him 
will immediately show themselves to be more eloquent and charming speakers than 
other people.
In this passage, the education process has two distinct parts. The first part is the 
transfer of knowledge: the didaskalos hands over whatever factual knowledge he can to 
his students in as precise and straightforward a manner as possible. Not all knowledge 
can simply be handed over in this fashion, however, so the second part of the 
educational interaction consists in the teacher providing himself as a paradigm to be 
imitated. In this way, didaskalia is not synonymous with imitation; rather, teaching and 
imitation are complementary parts of the process of education. The didaskalos teaches 
what he can, but for what is not teachable, he must rely on his students’ desire to imitate 
an outstanding exemplar. In other words, after doing as much lecturing as possible, 
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14 On which, see Marrou 1956, 313: “As the mainspring of all education is imitation, the most important 
thing was a good example.”
Isocrates, the skilled orator, offers himself as an example for his students to imitate so 
that they might turn into skilled orators, too. He does not simply issue directives to his 
students with the expectation of blind obedience. Rather, he gives them an ideal 
template to work within in the hopes that they will become at least identical to and 
possibly even better than their teacher.  
At this point, a few words need to be said concerning the role and responsibility of the 
teacher in each of the cities in question. In Sparta, youths were absorbed into the 
collective; they were trained by the State and when their education was finished they 
became a part of the State. The figure of the individual instructor (the didaskalos) is 
completely absent from discussions of Spartan education because this figure did not 
exist in their society. Although there were undoubtedly authority figures in the Spartan 
education system (i.e. the paidonomos, the eiren, etc), their duties are described in the 
sources as directed toward either military training or disciplinary action. At no point are 
they described as teaching (didaskein). Instead, every Spartan adult could and did take 
part in the education of the youth. Plutarch tells us (Lyc. 17.1, 24.1) that older men 
watched over the boys during their training with the understanding that they were the 
fathers and paidagogoi and governors of all of them, and according to Xenophon (Lac. 
6.1), Lycurgus gave every father authority over other men’s children as well as over his 
own. While in other cities it was the father’s job to make sure that his son one day would 
be fit to discharge his duties as a citizen, in Sparta all the citizens felt themselves 
involved in the education of every boy and personally bound to take an active part in 
this process.
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The situation at Athens could not have been more different. Because an Athenian 
student interacted so closely with his teacher not only in the exchange of information but 
even in the imitation of behavior, the lion’s share of the responsibility for the outcome of 
the interaction naturally fell upon the teacher. As long as students turned out correctly 
and the education system functioned as it was intended, this did not pose a significant 
problem and could even lead to renown for a teacher if his students became 
outstandingly good citizens. For example, in the Antidosis (95), Isocrates tries to 
persuade his imaginary jury that they should praise him for his students’ achievements:  
Ἤν τε γὰρ ὑπολάβητε σύμβουλον εἶναί με καὶ διδάσκαλον τούτων, δικαίως ἂν 
ἔχοιτέ μοι πλείω χάριν ἢ τοῖς δι' ἀρετὴν ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτουμένοις· τούτων μὲν 
γὰρ ἕκαστος αὑτὸν μόνον παρέσχε καλὸν κἀγαθὸν, ἐγὼ δὲ τοσούτους τὸ πλῆθος 
ὅσους ὀλίγῳ πρότερον διῆλθον ὑμῖν.
For if you suppose that I was the counsellor and teacher of these men, you would 
rightfully hold me in greater esteem than the men who dine in the Prytaneum because of 
their excellence. For each of the latter has only provided his own goodness, but I have 
provided all of those many men whom I have just named for you.
This appeal is clearly based on the understanding that the praiseworthy behavior of any 
given citizen can and should be attributed to the positive influence of his teacher. 
Hence, the teacher of many outstanding citizens should, at least according to Isocrates, 
receive the greatest possible reward for his contribution to the city. However, with 
reward comes responsibility, and in the cases when education failed and a boy 
committed some transgression, the Athenians turned to that boy’s teacher to place the 
blame.15 In Plato’s Laws (808e), the Athenian stranger tells his companions that in 
Athens, if a boy does something wrong, any freeman may punish him and his 
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15 For which see a little farther on at Antidosis 104. See also Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1385a5: men should and 
do feel shame for the base actions of those whose didaskaloi they themselves have been.
paidagôgos and his didaskalos for it. Similarly, in Plutarch’s Life of Galba (17.2.6), he 
informs us that in all civilized cities the people have the right to demand punishment for 
the paidagôgoi and didaskaloi of men who become tyrants. Furthermore, it is this very 
societal belief that Socrates is calling on in the Euthyphro when he jokes that he should 
become Euthyphro’s student in order to pass off blame for his own behavior onto his 
“teacher” (5b): 
“καὶ εἰ μέν, ὦ Μέλητε,” φαίην ἄν, “Εὐθύφρονα ὁμολογεῖς σοφὸν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, 
[καὶ] ὀρθῶς νομίζειν καὶ ἐμὲ ἡγοῦ καὶ μὴ δικάζου· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐκείνῳ τῷ διδασκάλῳ 
λάχε δίκην πρότερον ἢ ἐμοί, ὡς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους διαφθείροντι ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸν 
αὑτοῦ πατέρα, ἐμὲ μὲν διδάσκοντι, ἐκεῖνον δὲ νουθετοῦντί τε καὶ κολάζοντι”
I would say to him, “If, Meletus, you agree that Euthyphro is wise in these matters, 
consider me, too, to have the right beliefs and do not bring me to trial. If you do not think 
so, then prosecute that didaskalos of mine, not me, for corrupting the older men, me and 
his own father, by teaching me and by exhorting and punishing him.”16
Even Socrates, who himself was prosecuted (at least in part) for being the didaskalos 
and corruptor of a group of irresponsible young men - as he refers to in this passage 
with the verb diaphtheirein -, recognized that the buck has to stop somewhere. And if 
teachers are given practically unlimited control over the formation of young students into 
proper Athenian citizens, then those teachers must expect some repercussions when 
their efforts do not produce acceptable results.17 
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16 Translation by G.M.A. Grube.
17 For more on educational outcomes as they pertain to teacher responsibility, see Chapter 3, Section 3.
One final thing needs to be discussed in connection with methodologies of education, 
and that is the purpose of punishment in a pedagogical setting.18 Without a doubt, 
punishment (or, as we might call it today, discipline) had its place in the classrooms of 
both Sparta and Athens. Indeed, authority figures in both cities used punishment to deal 
with unwanted behaviors in the youth,19 but they did so with approaches that differed in 
the same way that their respective educational systems differed. Concerning the 
Spartans, Xenophon tells us (Lac. 2.8) that they chastise (timôreîn) any boy who gets 
caught stealing for carrying out the crime badly. The beating the boy receives is not 
meant to stop him from stealing; on the contrary, it is intended as a kind of reprisal for 
getting caught in the act. As Ducat has noted, “stealing was considered as a test in 
Sparta; the blows were a sanction against failure” (2006, 205). By this token, 
punishment at Sparta worked through the understanding that if a boy were to make a 
mistake, he would be punished, and when he did in fact slip up, the punishment was 
harsh enough that the fear of further punishment prevented repeat failures.  
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18 I qualify my discussion of punishment in this way in order to avoid the complex discussion of political 
and civic punishment in antiquity. Hence, this section will not treat capital punishment for crimes against 
the state or the theories behind this type of punishment in Athens or Sparta. For paradigms of punishment 
in the Classical world, see Danielle Allen (2003) World of Prometheus, especially Chapters 2, 3, and 7-9; 
for theories of punishment more generally, see Michel Foucault (1995) Discipline and Punish, especially 
Parts 2 and 3. The discussion here will be limited to the pedagogical use of punishment on youths and the 
differing attitudes toward this practice at Athens and Sparta. 
19 There is some question about whether it would primarily have fallen to the paidagôgos or the 
didaskalos to punish in the Athenian schoolroom. See Beck 1964, 103: “The teacher, though empowered 
to punish, was not expected to have to use this power very often; his function was to teach, not to police. 
Policing was done for him by others.” Indeed, some of the texts do not specify who in the classroom is 
doing the punishing, and it could arguably be either authority figure. However, there are several texts that 
name the didaskalos as disciplinarian specifically. (For these, see discussion below.) This would certainly 
imply that even if he was not always the one carrying out the punishment, the didaskalos did possess that 
power and at least occasionally wielded it.
In addition, as Xenophon explains, for the Spartans, punishment and obedience to 
authority were inextricably linked. At Lac. 4.6, he points out that if any boy refused to 
obey the paidonomos, he was severely penalized (ζημιοῦσι μεγαλείως) in order that 
he realize he should never yield to the sudden impulse to disobey the laws. The use of 
the verb zêmioûn here is telling; rather than kolazein, a verb which Danielle Allen 
argues places the focus on the “idea of how the nature of the wrongdoer is affected by 
the punishment” (2003, 70), Xenophon uses a verb which emphasizes the necessity 
that a penalty be paid by the wrongdoer in retribution for his failure. Hence, Spartan 
punishment was - at least in Xenophon’s estimation - more about retribution than 
reform. That is, the Spartans punished boys to discourage behavior that was 
incompatible with their societal values, instead of punishing to transform the boys into 
individuals whose behavior naturally fit with those values.
In Athens, on the other hand, punishment in an educational context was designed to 
correct and reform, so it was aimed not so much at removing the behavior as improving 
the character.20 As part of the process of educating the youth, punishment was seen as 
a way of teaching people how to be good citizens.21 However, while for the Spartans - 
as we saw in the Xenophon passage at the beginning of this chapter (Lac. 2.2) - 
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20 There is extensive evidence in the form of vase paintings for the use of corporal punishment in the 
Athenian schoolroom (and in other educational contexts, as well). The paidagôgos or didaskalos would 
have beaten a disobedient boy with a sandal (see Leipzig, University T 643, Tübingen 1609, Leningrad 
317), with a narthex or walking stick (see Bari R 150, Berlin (East) F 3043), or simply with his hand (see 
Melbourne 1644/4). The most complete extant schoolroom punishment scene comes from the last of 
these (Melbourne 1644/4), an Attic red-figure cup from approx. 450 BCE, which depicts what appears to 
be a musical contest in which two boys competed on the lyre. The victorious boy is being crowned by the 
goddess Nike, while the loser holds out his hand to his teacher, who has a hand raised and ready to slap 
his pupil’s knuckles. All of the vases mentioned above can be found in Beck 1975, Chapter 6.
21 See Allen 2003, 70, and Foucault 1995, 211: “punishment functions as a technique for making useful 
individuals.”
punishment was a central component of the educational process, for the Athenians, 
punishment was a measure of the last resort. An Athenian teacher would only punish his 
student when teaching and admonishment had failed. The clearest articulation of this 
can be found in Plato’s Apology, when Socrates claims that Meletus has not followed 
the proper protocol by taking him to be punished in court without first teaching 
(didaskein) him about his transgressions:
εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων ἁμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν 
ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐὰν μάθω, 
παύσομαι ὅ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ συγγενέσθαι μέν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ 
ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἷ νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους 
ἀλλ' οὐ μαθήσεως.
If I corrupt the youth unwillingly,22 the law does not require you to bring people to court 
for these kinds of wrongdoings, but to take them aside privately and to teach and 
admonish them. For it is clear that if I learn better, I will stop doing what I am unwillingly 
doing. But you have avoided conversing with me and you were unwilling to teach me, 
but you bring me here, where the law requires you to bring those who need punishment, 
not instruction.
According to this text, punishment is the last of a three-step educational process 
beginning with teaching (didaskein), followed by admonishment (noutheteîn).23 Only if a 
student has still failed to exhibit the appropriate behavior after the first two steps is 
punishment undertaken. In the Apology, the punishment is carried out in the legal 
sphere: Socrates is being taken up on criminal charges. However, in the context of 
elementary education, the punishment would most likely have come in the form of a 
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22 The distinction between a crime that was committed willingly/intentionally (hêkôn) and one that was 
committed unwillingly/unintentionally (akôn) was considered to be essential for the determination of the 
proper punishment. See Plato Laws 859c and following.
23 For the conjunction of teaching and admonishment in education, see also Plato Protagoras 325c, 
Republic 399b, Laws 788a and Plutarch De Recta Ratione Audiendi 39a and 46b. In the Hellenistic period 
and beyond, these two concepts were treated as essentially synonymous, especially in the Scholia (e.g. 
On Aristophanes’ Nubes verse 369c, 929a, 987b, 1442a, 1483c and On Aeschylus Prometheus Vinctus 
verse 264) and in the work of later Christian writers (e.g. New Testament Letter of St. Paul to the 
Colossians 1.28.2; Eusebius Praeparatio evangelica 6.6.12.2; Gregory of Nyssa De Instituto Christiano 
vol. 8, 1, p. 58.10; Joannes Chrysostomus De Sacerdotio 3.6.49; etc). 
beating. In the Protagoras (325d), the Sophist describes how parents and paidagôgoi 
teach (didaskousi) and admonish (nouthetoûsin) the boys from early childhood on by 
demonstrating to them what is right and what is wrong. If a boy readily obeys, fine; but if 
not, they subject him to corporal punishment:
ὥσπερ ξύλον διαστρεφόμενον καὶ καμπτόμενον εὐθύνουσιν ἀπειλαῖς καὶ πληγαῖς.
Just like a piece of bent and twisted wood, they straighten him with threats and blows.
Here we see clear evidence of the reformative goals of Athenian pedagogical 
punishment. A boy who is disobedient is likened to a bent piece of wood: there is a flaw 
in his character which punishment must reform. Just as the proper application of torque 
upon the bent stick will eventually straighten it, so the proper application of threats and 
blows upon the boy will eventually reform him. As was mentioned above, this type of 
punishment was not aimed at the wrongdoing, but rather at the wrong-doer.24 As such, 
its goal was not to exact retribution for past offenses but rather to prevent future ones, 
an opinion which is expressed by the title character a little later on in Plato’s Protagoras 
(324a-b):  
οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας πρὸς τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων καὶ τούτου 
ἕνεκα, ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὅστις μὴ ὥσπερ θηρίον ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται· ὁ δὲ μετὰ 
λόγου ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἕνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται – 
οὐ γὰρ ἂν τό γε πραχθὲν ἀγένητον θείη – ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὖθις 
ἀδικήσῃ μήτε αὐτὸς οὗτος μήτε ἄλλος ὁ τοῦτον ἰδὼν κολασθέντα.
No one punishes a wrong-doer in consideration of the simple fact that he has done 
wrong, unless one is exercising the mindless vindictiveness of a beast. Reasonable 
punishment is not vengeance for a past wrong - for one cannot undo what has been 
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24 However, just because pedagogical punishment in Athens was aimed at reform did not mean it was any 
less brutal than the retributive punishment in Sparta. For example, see Stalley 1983, Chapter 13 on 
punishment in Plato’s Laws. Athenian literature is littered with descriptions of the harshness of the 
teacher’s discipline. To cite just a few examples, in the Anabasis (2.6.12), Xenophon describes the 
relationship between a didaskalos and his students as harsh and severe; in Aristophanes’ Knights 
(1228ff), the sausage-seller recalls how he was taught to behave by the blows of his schoolmaster; and 
again in the Clouds (980ff) the Better Argument explains how the boys would be subjected to a shower of 
blows by their music teacher if they deviated from the traditional mode of singing.
done - but is undertaken with a view to the future, to deter both the wrong-doer and 
whoever sees him being punished from repeating the crime.25
So along with being reformative, Athenian pedagogical punishment was also intended to 
be a deterrent. Punishing a boy who misbehaved would simultaneously turn him away 
from the wrong path and help to transform him into a person who would automatically 
choose the right path in the future.26   
The preceding section has dealt with the methodology, that is, the “how” of teaching in 
Athens and Sparta. Our next move from here is to take stock of the curricula - the 
“what” - of these two education systems.
1.4 Curricula: Military Training versus the Liberal Arts
According to the ancient sources, Spartan education consisted almost exclusively in 
military training. In a fit of anti-Spartan exaggeration in the Panathenaicus, Isocrates 
claims that the Spartans are so backwards that their children do not even learn letters in 
school (209), and Plutarch compares the city to a military encampment (Lyc. 24.1) 
where the boys learn only enough letters as is strictly necessary, and the rest of their 
training is directed toward teaching them to obey commands, endure hardship, and 
conquer in battle (Lyc. 16.6). Indeed, Sparta’s unusual educational ideology concerning 
the learning of letters has led some modern scholars to improbably assert that Spartan 
youths didn’t learn their letters at all and that this is evidence of the intellectual poverty 
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25 Translation by Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell.
26 Stalley (1983, 150) observes that there is, paradoxically, a depersonalizing effect from this kind of 
punishment: “To punish someone as a deterrent is to treat him, not as an end in himself, but as a means 
to some supposed social good. “Curing” or “reforming” the criminal may in practice mean “brainwashing 
him” or remoulding his character to a pattern approved by the authorities.”
of the Spartan system.27 On the contrary, Spartan education did not prize illiteracy, but 
the Spartans simply placed far less emphasis on learning letters than the Athenians did. 
The Spartans believed literature was only worth learning for its usefulness in civic life 
and for continuing the transfer of traditional knowledge from generation to generation.28 
In fact, the famed Sophist Hippias tells Socrates that when he visited Sparta, the 
inhabitants didn’t want to hear about astronomy, geometry, or eristic, but rather about 
history and archaeology, specifically the genealogies of heroes and the founding of 
cities (Pl. Hipp. Maj. 285d). Any field that offered the opportunity for discovery and 
innovation would have held little value for the Spartans; instead, they wanted to 
understand the origins and history of their society. For the Spartans, the subjects we 
refer to as the liberal arts were simply a practical supplement to the standard military 
curriculum that formed the real basis of their education system. 
Unfortunately, our comparison between Athens and Sparta becomes a bit less fruitful at 
this point because Athenian authors universally agreed that in contrast with an almost-
exclusively military training system, a program of instruction in the so-called liberal arts 
was far superior.29 However, whereas in Sparta, education was a static institution with 
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27 For this view, see Freeman 1972, 25: “While the boys’ bodies were developed and trained almost to 
perfection, their minds were almost entirely neglected”; and Marrou 1956, 19: “In its Classical form, 
Spartan education...always had one clear aim - the training of the hoplites, the heavy infantry who had 
been responsible for Sparta’s military superiority...they learned to be soldiers: everything else was 
sacrificed to that. The intellectual side of their education was reduced to a minimum.”
28 See Ducat 2006, 120-2; Plutarch recounts in Lyc. 4.2 and 4.4 how Lycurgus made the poetry of Homer 
and Thales a mandatory part of the curriculum because these works taught boys to follow the time-
honored ways and to be obedient and disciplined.
29 By the liberal arts, I simply mean the non-military, non-technical branches of study, the subjects 
Aristotle claims at Politics 1337a-b (as we will see later) are most suited for a free-born person. Hence, 
under this definition, music, letters, astronomy, arithmetic, drawing, gymnastics, etc would all potentially 
be considered liberal arts, while military strategy, medicine, blacksmithing, etc would not.
no room for dissenting opinions, the Athenian tendency toward debate and 
intellectualism resulted in significant disagreement about precisely which subjects 
constitute the liberal arts and what the ideal school curriculum should look like. So 
instead of comparing the curricula of Athens with that of Sparta, let us now entertain a 
comparison between differing attitudes within Athens herself.  
2. Internal Athenian Curriculum Debate
Public opinion about the curriculum in Athens during the Classical period was divided 
along both practical and philosophical lines.30 Aristotle sums up the situation best at the 
beginning of his discussion on education in Book 8 of the Politics (1337a35-b1):
νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖται περὶ τῶν ἔργων. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσι δεῖν 
μανθάνειν τοὺς νέους οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν ἄριστον, οὐδὲ 
φανερὸν πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος· ἔκ 
τε τῆς ἐμποδὼν παιδείας ταραχώδης ἡ σκέψις καὶ δῆλον οὐδὲν πότερον ἀσκεῖν 
δεῖ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ τὰ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ τὰ περιττά (πάντα γὰρ 
εἴληφε ταῦτα κριτάς τινας)·
For currently there is a dispute about the tasks [of education]. For not everyone assumes 
that it is necessary for the young to learn the same things with an eye to virtue or the 
best life, nor is it apparent whether it is fitting for education to be directed toward the 
mind or the character of the soul. Because of the current state of education, this 
investigation is confusing and it is not clear whether it is necessary to be trained in 
matters that are useful for life, or aimed at virtue, or out of the ordinary (for all of these 
have some advocates). 
 
According to this passage, dissenting opinions are expressed in Athens concerning both 
the goals and content of the school curriculum, and for every possible curricular model 
there is at least one proponent. As it turns out, Aristotle himself is among those who 
have a stake in this debate, along with other noted intellectuals of the period writing in 
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30 For the duration of this section, we will be leaving aside our primary discussion about the didaskalos. 
For whatever reason, in the context of the debate about a theoretical ideal curriculum, all of the authors 
discussed here neglect to mention the person doing the teaching; they focus entirely on the subjects that 
should be taught.
all different genres, including the comic poet, Aristophanes; the orator and teacher of 
rhetoric, Isocrates; and the philosopher - and Aristotle’s own mentor -, Plato.31 
If we were to lay the curricular models presented by these four authors along a 
spectrum from most conservative to most progressive, Aristophanes would sit near the 
conservative end, Plato and Aristotle would fall somewhere in the middle, and Isocrates 
would represent the most progressive. For our purposes, a conservative curriculum is 
defined as one that trains boys exclusively in the traditional, heroic pursuits of music 
and gymnastics, with the primary focus on conditioning the body, and admits little or no 
innovation in terms of content. A progressive curriculum, on the other hand, places the 
training of the intellect above that of the body, and it recognizes the value of 
inventiveness for the health of the state. With these definitions in mind, let us turn to the 
texts.
2.1 Aristophanes
Aristophanes’ Clouds is a uniquely valuable text for the study of Classical Athenian 
education. Not only does it shed light on the issues surrounding Socrates’ role as an 
educator and his consequent indictment,32 but it also rehearses in miniature, in the agôn 
between the Better and the Worse Arguments, the contemporary debate between 
conservative and progressive curriculum models. First, the Better Argument 
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31 These four authors can be assumed to provide a diverse sample of the types of concerns Athenian 
intellectuals had with different curricular models. Hence, they were probably not the only writers who 
addressed educational topics during this time, but they offer remarkably straightforward articulations of 
their respective philosophies. 
32 For a complete discussion of which see Chapter 4, Section 2.
summarizes the ἀρχαία παιδεία that he offers, the curriculum of which is strictly limited 
to the traditional study of music (965) and gymnastics (973-4), and which is enforced 
with corporal punishment (969-72). He points out that in his system, self-control 
(σωφροσύνη) goes hand-in-hand with physical discipline (961-5), and that the best 
education must be conducted by conditioning the body in the gymnasium and not by 
chatting about current events and philosophy in the agora (1002-4). If this curriculum 
seems somewhat rigid, that is only because it has been proven to work; at lines 985-6, 
the Better Argument boasts that it is in this way that “my education bred the men who 
fought at Marathon” (ἄνδρας Μαραθωνομάχας ἡμὴ παίδευσις ἔθρεψεν). An 
Athenian can hope to achieve no higher level of virtue or valor than this. The 
conservative curriculum Aristophanes’ Better Argument describes, then, is aimed at 
producing citizens who are as physically fit, brave, and dedicated to the service of the 
city as those men who fought in the legendary battle of Marathon. 
The Worse Argument, on the other hand, offers a curriculum composed mainly of 
lessons in oratory, specifically how to argue what is contrary to established principles of 
justice (1038-40).33 He scoffs at the Better Argument’s concern with being decent (1061: 
σωφρονεῖν), instead encouraging his listeners at line 1078 to “indulge your nature, 
romp, laugh, think nothing shameful” (χρῶ τῇ φύσει, σκίρτα, γέλα, νόμιζε μηδὲν 
αἰσχρόν). The goal of this instruction is to become capable of talking your way out of 
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33 Aristophanes probably also intended the subject matter of the natural scientists to be included in this 
curriculum. Based on the unflattering treatment of them at the beginning of the Clouds (135ff), their area 
of expertise certainly did not fit into Aristophanes’ ideal curriculum, and he does lump them in with the 
Sophists as a type of “intellectual.” See Chapter 4, Section 2 on Aristophanes’ views concerning 
“intellectuals” and the “New Education” in Athens.
any problem (880ff), and the way Aristophanes describes it, there is very little 
redeeming value to this type of education. It is contrary to what is right and it flies in the 
face of traditional Athenian values. 
As if all this were not incentive enough to choose the conservative model of education, 
the Better Argument finishes his pitch with a comparison of the outcomes a student can 
expect from each of the two curricula (1009-23):        
ἢν ταῦτα ποῇς ἁγὼ φράζω / καὶ πρὸς τούτοις προσέχῃς τὸν νοῦν / ἕξεις αἰεὶ /  
στῆθος λιπαρόν, χροιὰν λαμπράν, / ὤμους μεγάλους, γλῶτταν βαιάν, / πυγὴν 
μεγάλην, πόσθην μικράν· / ἢν δ' ἅπερ οἱ νῦν ἐπιτηδεύῃς, / πρῶτα μὲν ἕξεις / 
χροιὰν ὠχράν, ὤμους μικρούς, / στῆθος λεπτόν, γλῶτταν μεγάλην, / κωλῆν 
μικράν, ψήφισμα μακρόν, / καί σ' ἀναπείσει τὸ μὲν αἰσχρὸν ἅπαν / καλὸν ἡγεῖσθαι, 
τὸ καλὸν δ' αἰσχρόν, / καὶ πρὸς τούτοις τῆς Ἀντιμάχου / καταπυγοσύνης 
ἀναπλήσει.
 
If you follow my recommendations, and keep them ever in mind, you will always have a 
rippling chest, radiant skin, broad shoulders, a wee tongue, a grand rump and a petite 
dick. But if you adopt current practices, you’ll start by having a puny chest, pasty skin, 
narrow shoulders, a grand tongue, a wee rump and a lengthy edict. And he will persuade 
you to consider all that’s foul fair, and fair foul, and furthermore he’ll infect you with 
Antimachus’ faggotry.34
According to this, alumni of a conservative curriculum can expect to become physically 
magnificent and (presumably by extension) morally upright. Meanwhile, students of the 
Worse Argument can look forward to physical infirmity, moral relativism, and sexual 
deviance. This is, of course, a greatly simplified and intentionally polarized depiction of 
the two curricula. It must be said that although Aristophanes presents the Better 
Argument’s education in a much more positive light than that of the Worse Argument, he 
does not wholly endorse either one. The concern that underlies Aristophanes’ 
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34 Translation by Jeffrey Henderson
assessment of both models of education is civic stability.35 He sees in the traditional 
curriculum a model that has worked for generations to create Athenians who understand 
their duties to the city. If this model is tainted a little by pederastic voyeurism, at least it 
is still the lesser of the two evils. The progressive curriculum, in contrast, is untested 
and untenably risky. And when it comes to the health of the polis, in Aristophanes’ view, 
one cannot be too careful.
2.2 Plato and Aristotle
Although their views fall in the middle of the spectrum, Aristotle and Plato offer a 
significantly different take on the ideal curriculum from that of Aristophanes. While they 
both agree with the conservative belief that innovation and creativity in the schoolroom 
should be strictly prohibited,36 and that the training of the body should be given 
precedence over the training of the intellect,37 this is where their similarities with 
Aristophanes end. According to Plato in the Laws, education is a form of “right 
nurture” (ὀρθὴ τροφή; Leg. 643d) that affects the souls of the youth and draws them 
toward virtue (643e-644a):
τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐκ παίδων παιδείαν, ποιοῦσαν ἐπιθυμητήν τε καὶ ἐραστὴν τοῦ 
πολίτην γενέσθαι τέλεον, ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον μετὰ δίκης. ταύτην 
τὴν τροφὴν ἀφορισάμενος ὁ λόγος οὗτος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, νῦν βούλοιτ' ἂν 
μόνην παιδείαν προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δὲ εἰς χρήματα τείνουσαν ἤ τινα πρὸς ἰσχύν, 
ἢ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ σοφίαν ἄνευ νοῦ καὶ δίκης, βάναυσόν τ' εἶναι καὶ 
ἀνελεύθερον καὶ οὐκ ἀξίαν τὸ παράπαν παιδείαν καλεῖσθαι. 
Education [consists of] training from childhood with an eye to virtue (aretê), which makes 
a man eagerly desirous of becoming a perfect citizen, understanding how to both rule 
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35 See longer discussion in Chapter 4 on Aristophanes’ concerns about the role of education in the polis. 
36 Aristotle Politics 1336b and Plato Laws 656d-e
37 Aristotle Politics 1336a and 1338b; and Plato Laws 659d and 790-91
and be ruled justly. And this is the type of nurture which, it seems to me, our current 
argument would wish to call “education”; meanwhile that which is directed toward 
making money or gaining strength, or toward obtaining any other type of wisdom that is 
lacking reason and justice, is banausic and illiberal and entirely unworthy of being called 
“education.”
Hence, in this passage, the ultimate goal of education is to produce citizens who 
possess the proper degree of virtue in their souls. On the flip side, a proper education 
must be limited to those subjects which help to achieve this end; any other pursuit is 
unsuitable for a free person and will be labeled banausic. For Plato, then, it is essential 
to distinguish between trade-based education and liberal education. Only the latter is 
appropriate for creating “perfect citizens”, while the former is the way farmers and 
carpenters and peddlers are trained for their professional lives. 
So, what are the subjects that Plato suggests his “perfect citizens” pursue? For starters, 
military training and gymnastics, then lyre-playing, literature, arithmetic, and 
astronomy.38 In his explanation, he takes the reasons for undergoing physical training 
and learning the traditional curriculum of music and letters to be self-evident, but he 
makes a point of justifying the study of arithmetic and astronomy (Leg. 809c): 
πέρι καὶ λογισμῶν, ὧν ἔφαμεν δεῖν ὅσα τε πρὸς πόλεμον καὶ οἰκονομίαν καὶ τὴν 
κατὰ πόλιν διοίκησιν χρῆναι ἑκάστους λαβεῖν, καὶ πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔτι τὰ 
χρήσιμα τῶν ἐν ταῖς περιόδοις τῶν θείων, ἄστρων τε πέρι καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, 
ὅσα διοικεῖν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν περὶ ταῦτα πάσῃ πόλει 
Also arithmetic, of which I have said that that every person should know enough as is 
needed for the purposes of war, and of household management, and of civic 
administration; and for these same purposes, one must also learn what is useful of the 
courses of the heavenly bodies, that is, the stars and the sun and the moon, inasmuch 
as this information is necessary for the administration of every state.
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38 See Stalley 1983, 132ff for a discussion of the subjects Plato chooses for his curriculum.
Plato uses two words in this passage that bear heavily on his (and Aristotle’s) 
philosophy of education: χρήσιμος (useful) and ἀναγκαῖος (necessary). Certain 
subjects - namely the traditional pursuits of music, letters, and gymnastics - are both 
useful and necessary for life. A non-traditional subject like arithmetic can be useful, but 
not too useful;39 if it offers the opportunity for profit, then it is banausic and no longer 
suitable for study. Under Plato’s curriculum, there is no such thing as a useless subject. 
Every one of the subjects he lists is useful insofar as it contributes to the virtue of the 
student’s soul. 
Just like his mentor, Aristotle also believed that education should aim for what is 
virtuous and noble in every person and that the banausic must be avoided at all costs. 
He, too, struggled with finding a balance between teaching what is useful and 
necessary and teaching too many useful things and thereby making someone unfree 
and banausic (Pol. 1337b4-14). He followed Plato’s lead in describing the subjects of 
the ideal curriculum as “those useful things that leave the mind free to pursue 
virtue” (1337b10). But he was unsatisfied with the way Plato’s system did not account 
for the possibility of studying some things that are not useful or necessary. So he 
expanded upon his teacher’s curriculum, and in his programmatic statement for his own 
educational philosophy, Aristotle famously says that “there is a kind of education that 
sons must be given not because it is useful or necessary but because it is free and 
noble” (ἔστι παιδεία τις ἣν οὐχ ὡς χρησίμην παιδευτέον τοὺς υἱεῖς οὐδ' ὡς 
ἀναγκαίαν ἀλλ' ὡς ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλήν). This idea forms one of the three branches 
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39 In particular, Plato sees arithmetic as a preliminary study on the path to the pursuit of dialectic. On the 
mathematical curriculum at Plato’s Academy, see Fowler 1999, 103-112.
of Aristotle’s curriculum. First, we must teach things that are useful and necessary for 
life, like letters, drawing, and gymnastics: letters because they help with money-making, 
household management, and political activities (1338a15); drawing because it helps 
one to make better judgements about the products of craftsmen (1338a17); and 
gymnastics because it contributes to courage (1337b27). Second, we must teach those 
things, like music, that are neither useful nor necessary but are the domain of the noble 
and free person. Finally, - and in Aristotle’s view, most importantly - we have to teach 
some subjects not because they are useful but because many other studies become 
possible through them (1338a37-b2). For example, drawing should be studied not 
because it helps in commerce but because it makes people contemplate the beauty of 
bodies. Although he spends a great deal of time discussing the proper way to teach 
useful things to the youth, it is clear that Aristotle’s main concern is with those subjects 
that are not particularly useful for life. Indeed, he finishes the discussion of his 
curriculum at 1338b3 with the reminder that “to search everywhere for what is useful is 
what least suits those who are great in soul and free” (τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ 
χρήσιμον ἥκιστα ἁρμόττει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐλευθερίοις).
As the moderates on our imagined curriculum spectrum, Plato and Aristotle offer a 
mixture of traditional and innovative approaches to education. Like Aristophanes, they 
seek to limit students’ exposure to potentially-damaging unapproved subject matter, but 
they have a much more relaxed view of what constitutes unapproved material. Whereas 
Aristophanes’ Better Argument represents a heroic, physically-focused training program, 
Plato and Aristotle are concerned with the education of the soul. However, while these 
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three authors have some disagreement about what types of subjects the curriculum 
should consist of - music, gymnastics, letters, arithmetic, etc - they all are concerned 
with the same thing: the consistent formation of Athenian citizens. In this way, Plato and 
Aristotle fall closer to the conservative end of the spectrum than one might have initially 
thought; they do not want to introduce anything unstable into the curriculum. The non-
heroic subjects they advocate including are in the first instance useful and necessary for 
life. The most progressive thing about the curriculum described by Plato and elaborated 
upon by Aristotle is the focus on fostering the life of the mind.  Whereas Aristophanes’ 
Better Argument might view the intellectual pursuit of drawing for its philosophical value 
as too similar to the education offered by the Sophists, for Aristotle especially the 
education of free and noble adults requires some philosophy.   
2.4 Isocrates
At the far end of the spectrum, Isocrates stands as the champion of the progressive 
intellectual curriculum for which the Sophists were so often maligned. Although he does 
not neglect gymnastics - indeed, he believes it to be a parallel art to philosophy (Antid. 
179ff) -, for Isocrates, the primary goal of education is to lead students to the pursuit of 
philosophy. In the eyes of an orator, of course, philosophy and oratory amount to one 
and the same thing, and in fact, at Antidosis 271, Isocrates explains that he considers a 
man to be a philosopher who occupies himself with the studies from which he will most 
quickly gain the insight to know what to do or say in any circumstance. One can only 
assume that the studies he is referring to include oratory. However, a person cannot 
simply set out to study philosophy from scratch, so Isocrates’ ideal curriculum consists 
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of a program of study in subjects which prepare a student for philosophy. At 
Panathenaicus 26, he argues that young men should pursue geometry, astronomy, and 
eristic, since there is no more helpful or fitting pursuit to be found. He does not 
elaborate on the reasons for this in the current speech, but at Antidosis 264-6 he takes 
up the same subject again in greater detail: 
Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τότ' ὠφελεῖν ἡμᾶς πέφυκεν ὅταν λάβωμεν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, 
ταῦτα δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἀπηκριβωμένους οὐδὲν ἂν εὐεργετήσειεν πλὴν τοὺς ἐντεῦθεν 
ζῆν προῃρημένους, τοὺς δὲ μανθάνοντας ὀνίνησιν·... ἐν τούτοις γυμνασθέντες 
καὶ παροξυνθέντες ῥᾷον καὶ θᾶττον τὰ σπουδαιότερα καὶ πλείονος ἄξια τῶν 
πραγμάτων ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ μανθάνειν δύνανται. Φιλοσοφίαν μὲν οὖν οὐκ οἶμαι 
δεῖν προσαγορεύειν τὴν μηδὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι μήτε πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μήτε πρὸς τὸ 
πράττειν ὠφελοῦσαν, γυμνασίαν μέντοι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ παρασκευὴν φιλοσοφίας 
καλῶ τὴν διατριβὴν τὴν τοιαύτην. 
For the other subjects help us after we gain an understanding of them, whereas these 
studies (geometry, astronomy, eristic) are of no benefit to us after we have mastered 
them unless we have chosen to make our living from them, but the very process of 
learning them is beneficial to us... For after we have been exercised and sharpened on 
these subjects we are able to grasp and learn much more quickly and easily those 
subjects that are of more importance and of greater value. I do not think it is right to term 
“philosophy” a pursuit that is of no help to us at present either in word or in action, but 
rather I call this occupation an exercise of the soul and a preparation for philosophy.
Like Aristotle, Isocrates sees the basic subjects of the curriculum as a stepping stone 
toward a deeper study. Elsewhere in the Antidosis (85), Isocrates describes his teaching 
as inherently useful (chrêsimos), and as with Aristotle and Plato this articulation is 
essential to our understanding of Isocrates’ views on curriculum.40 Whereas Aristotle 
termed useful those pursuits that were applicable to daily life, for Isocrates, a subject is 
only useful if it leads directly to the study of oratory, and by extension, philosophy. So, 
as he sees it, astronomy, geometry, etc are not useful in and of themselves, but they do 
bring the learner one step closer to learning what is useful. In fact, this is the heart of 
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40 On which, see Too 2008, 218: “Utility and benefit are the prime imperatives of Isocratean discourse and 
education.”
Isocrates’ progressiveness. He does not really believe that there are core subjects that 
must be taught in order for students to achieve success; instead, they must take enough 
steps along the path of learning how to learn so that they can begin to study philosophy. 
By this token, Isocrates’ curriculum is much more open-ended than any of the others we 
have looked at, since its progression depends upon the cumulative skills of the student 
and not on the sequence of a set body of knowledge. This means that there was far less 
regulation of the material Isocrates’ students learned, a prospect that would have been 
unthinkable for the other authors. Indeed, the creative oratorical spark that Isocrates so 
carefully cultivated in his students was precisely the thing Aristophanes, Plato, and 
Aristotle feared in theirs. 
Ultimately, the major differences between the curricular models we have examined in 
this section can be attributed to differing views on what is best for the health of the city. 
For Aristophanes, it is creating citizens who respect the values of their forefathers above 
all; for Plato and Aristotle, it is creating citizens whose souls are directed toward virtue; 
and for Isocrates, it is creating citizens who can think for themselves and speak 
eloquently in order to contribute to civic life. 
3. Didaskaloi and Didaskalia Beyond the Classroom
It is apparent from the preceding discussion that there was something about the 
relationship between a student and a didaskalos that the Athenians were intensely 
interested in. Unlike the Spartans, for whom education was confined to a straightforward 
interaction between authority figures and students, the Athenians found in education a 
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productive conceptual framework for many other types of instructional interactions. The 
following section will examine this uniquely-Athenian extension of didaskalia to the civic 
and even the metaphorical realm. 
3.1 Civic Instruction: Public Speakers and Dramatists
In literary discussions of the city, educational vocabulary was applied to nearly every 
activity of Athenian life, including warfare, and especially public business. In fact, one 
could say that the Athenians saw their democracy as nourished and defined by the 
educational process.41 As Neil Croally has observed, “All the main institutions of the 
polis were presumed to have educative effects” (2005, 65).42 Even more specifically, I 
contend that Athenian authors viewed the civic instruction offered by public figures in 
the polis as an extension of the classroom; both the relationship between a public 
speaker and his listeners and that between a dramatist and his audience were often 
described in terms of didaskalia.43 In other words, while formal childhood education 
taught Greek youths the basic skills to function in civilized society, taking part in the 
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41 Indeed, Athens saw herself as the paideusis of Greece. On which, see above Thucydides 2.41 and 
Isocrates 4.47-50. See also Demosthenes 9.73 for Athens as duty-bound to instruct the rest of the Greeks 
because of her superior knowledge. 
42 See also Croally 2005, 59 for the power of rhetoric in the democratic/educational process: “Athens was 
a logopolis, a “city of words”, and the Athenians were, according to the Thucydidean Cleon, “spectators of 
words”, (3.38.4). Athens took a tradition that was already astonished by the powers of language and 
added to that a political system in which language, and more particularly rhetoric, was essential.”
43 For the purposes of this discussion, the term “public speaker” will be used to encompass all men who 
stood up and delivered speeches before large groups in the polis, including litigants, political leaders, and 
professional orators.
democratic life of the city by attending speeches and theatrical performances taught 
Greek adults how to be citizens. To quote Paul Cartledge:44 
Participation in the democratic process, including being present to hear public civic 
orations, was conceived primarily as an education for Athenian citizens, most of whom 
had received no formal schooling during childhood beyond the inculcation...of basic 
literacy, numeracy and musical appreciation. For such average citizens, ...theatre was 
an important part of their learning to be active participants in self-government by mass 
meeting and open debate between peers. (1997, 19)
 
However, while Cartledge, Croally, and others (Dover, Ober and Strauss) have 
recognized the public institutions of Athens as generally educative, none have drawn an 
explicit connection between the vocabulary and methods of school-room didaskalia and 
those of political instruction.
If democratic life was thought of as analogous to formal education, then the students 
were not only the individual citizens but also the polis as a whole, and the teachers were 
the leaders of the city. As Dover notes (1974, 30), “There existed a traditional role...into 
which a man addressing an Athenian audience was permitted to step”, and I submit that 
the role in question was that of the didaskalos. Like a schoolroom teacher, a public 
speaker in Athens was believed to possess a specific body of knowledge that he 
needed to transmit to his audience. As Ober and Strauss point out (1990, 251) “The 
public speaker’s role was, in its essence, a didactic one: he attempted to instruct his 
listeners in the facts of the matter under discussion and in the correctness of his own 
interpretation of those facts.” Whereas Ober and Strauss argue that he did this through 
his superior rhetorical skill, I maintain that a public speaker instructed the polis, in fact, 
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44 See also Ober 1990, 159-60: “A major part of a citizen’s education came through performance of his 
political role.”
by appropriating and exploiting the pre-existing authority of the didaskalos. By stepping 
into the traditional role of the teacher, a public speaker could present the information he 
communicated as true and authoritative without coming across as patronizing or 
bombastic. In turn, the Athenian audience, viewing him as a beneficent and trustworthy 
instructor, was much more receptive to his advice. This kind of information transfer took 
place in every sphere of Athenian political life, including legal proceedings, public 
assemblies, and military strategy sessions.45 When it occurred in the courtroom, it was 
used by a litigant in laying out for the jury his side of the case and the reasons why his 
opponent’s side was wrong.46 For example, in Against Andocides (35), Lysias insists 
that it is necessary to instruct (didaskein) the jury in the defense that his opponent will 
make in order that they may form a better decision, and in Plataicus (7), Isocrates 
explains that it is his responsibility to counteract the opposing side’s deceptions with his 
teaching. The clearest formulation of this idea can be found in the Antidosis (197): 
Δεῖ δὴ μηδ' ἡμᾶς προαπειπεῖν διδάσκοντας καὶ λέγοντας, ἐξ ὧν δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ 
μεταστήσομεν τὰς γνώμας αὐτῶν ἢ τὰς βλασφημίας καὶ κατηγορίας, αἷς χρῶνται 
καθ' ἡμῶν, ἐξελέγξομεν ψευδεῖς οὔσας.
 
I must not stop teaching and speaking until one of two things happens, either I manage 
to change the minds of [my accusers] or I prove that the slanders and charges they are 
using against me are false.
According to this passage, it is the duty of the litigant-cum-didaskalos to shed the 
clarifying light of truth on the false arguments given by the opposition. In the same way, 
a speaker in the assembly could also act as a didaskalos in order to give the people 
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45 This is not to say that every public speaker who stood up before an Athenian audience was an expert 
political instructor, but rather that the didaskalic role existed and was available for a qualified public 
speaker to step into.
46 For examples, see Lysias 3.21, 7.3, 9.3, 12.3, 12.62, 13.4, 14.3, 19.12, 32.3; Demosthenes Against 
Timocrates 71.3, Against Aphobus 1 3, Against Aphobus 3 1 and 5, Against Oneitor 1 5, Against 
Timotheus 59, Against Evergus and Mnesibulus 13; Isocrates Antidosis 29.3, and 58.7, On the Peace 
18.2.  
clearer information about a matter of civic importance.47 For example, in Xenophon’s 
Cyropaedia (8.1.2.1), an assembly is held at which one of Cyrus’s political advisers, 
Chrysantas, attempts to clarify some aspects of the king’s policy decision:48 
Κῦρός τέ μοι δοκεῖ νῦν συμβουλεύειν ἡμῖν ἀφ' ὧν μάλιστ' ἂν εὐδαιμονοῦντες 
διατελοῖμεν· ὃ δέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐνδεέστερον ἢ ὡς ἐχρῆν δηλῶσαι, τοῦτο ἐγὼ 
πειράσομαι τοὺς μὴ εἰδότας διδάξαι.
  
Cyrus seems to me now to be giving us counsel how we may best continue to prosper. 
But there is one thing that he hasn’t made as clear as he should have, and I will try to 
teach this to any who don’t know about it.
Again, as in the examples above, we see that the goal of political instruction is 
increased clarity resulting in improved decision-making. This also holds true when the 
instruction occurs in the context of war, as when a designated authority figure explains a 
tactical or strategic matter to the army or their allies.49 As the Spartan general Brasidas 
in Thucydides (4.126.4) explains, where an enemy seems strong but is actually weak, a 
true didachê of the facts makes his adversary bolder (καὶ γὰρ ὅσα μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἀσθενῆ 
ὄντα τῶν πολεμίων δόκησιν ἔχει ἰσχύος, διδαχὴ ἀληθὴς προσγενομένη περὶ 
αὐτῶν ἐθάρσυνε μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀμυνομένους·) In other words, the best way to dispel 
someone’s misconceptions and correct his mistaken opinions is to teach him the truth. 
And, as the examples above all show, public teaching was the job of a person with 
some claim to true information and the ability to convey it. 
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47 For examples, see Thucydides 2.42.1; Demosthenes Against Aristocrates 25.9; Isocrates 
Panathenaicus 23.3
48 Although it’s true that this passage describes a political assembly taking place in Persia, Xenophon’s 
depiction is clearly that of a democratic Athenian assembly. For other examples of political didaskalia in 
the assembly, see the preceding note.
49 For examples, see Demosthenes Third Phillipic 71.3, Second Olynthiac 11.3, For the Freedom of the 
Rhodians 26 and 27; Thucydides 2.93.1, 4.126.1, 4.46.5, 5.27.3, 5.86.1, 7.18.1; Xenophon Cyropaedia 
2.1.8.6, 3.1.13.8, 5.3.14.4; Isocrates Archidamus 13.6, On the Peace 68.4, Euagoras 55.3, Panegyricus 
15.2, Phillip 6.7. 
This meant that any public figure possessing some specialized knowledge and 
rhetorical skill could present himself as a didaskalos to the city. The only requirement 
was that a teacher had to know more than the people he claimed to be teaching, since, 
as Thucydides tells us (6.80.3), it is useless to try to teach someone what they already 
know as well as you do.50 For this reason, we never hear about ordinary citizens acting 
as didaskaloi to the polis, but only politicians and orators whose professions endow 
them with a greater-than-average degree of expertise in civic affairs. Indeed, according 
to Meletus in Plato’s Apology (24e), it is the jurymen, council members, and 
assemblymen who are responsible for educating the citizens, and in Thucydides Book 2 
(Ch. 2.60.5-6), Pericles claims that he is an extraordinary political leader in large part 
because of his ability 1) to discern (gnônai) what policies are expedient and 2) to teach 
(didaskein) those policies clearly to the city. Specifically, Pericles provides the demos 
with practical information about current military and financial conditions that is vital for 
them to make informed decisions. 
This is the key to the equation of public speaker and didaskalos: the shared goal and 
methodology. Just like the teacher we saw above in Isocrates’ Against the Sophists 
(17.5-6), the public speaker acts, in the first instance, as a knowledge transfer 
professional. He offers a specific body of information to his students through his 
rhetorical skill, with the aim of improving their ability to make decisions in the context of 
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50 See above on Cyropaedia 8.1.2.1. For other examples, see Aristotle Metaphysics 981b8, Eudemian 
Ethics 1245a16-18, and especially Physics 257a13: teaching necessarily implies possessing knowledge 
and learning not possessing it.
the democratic process. As Yunis has observed (1991, 185-7), “The crucial factors of 
Athenian decision-making are an exemplary interaction of leader and demos... A mature 
demos decides best because, when properly instructed, it tends to act with intelligence 
and responsibility.” This is the same kind of instruction that Pericles refers to in the 
funeral oration (Thuc. 2.40.2).51 It is the kind of instruction that is necessary for the city 
to receive prior to making an important decision. As Demosthenes explains (Lept. 166), 
it is the job of the courtroom orator to instruct (didaskein) the jury thoroughly about the 
case so that the best verdict can be reached; after all, the more accurate one’s 
knowledge of the facts is, the more just the verdict will be (Aphob. 3 4). In fact, as he 
points out in Against Aristocrates (25), it is unconscionable for a jury to hand down a 
verdict and punish the accused without first being taught (didaskomenos) the facts of 
the case. 
What’s more, there seems to have been a conceptual link for the Athenians between the 
improvement of the citizens’ decision-making process and the improvement of the polis 
as a whole.52 According to Isocrates in Nicocles (10.1-9), the best forms of discourse 
are those that teach the city how to be the most prosperous:
Ἐγὼ δ' ἀποδέχομαι μὲν ἅπαντας τοὺς λόγους τοὺς καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖν 
δυναμένους, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καλλίστους ἡγοῦμαι...τοὺς περὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ 
τῶν πολιτειῶν παραινοῦντας, καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν ὅσοι διδάσκουσι τούς τε 
δυναστεύοντας ὡς δεῖ τῷ πλήθει χρῆσθαι, καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας ὡς χρὴ πρὸς τοὺς 
ἄρχοντας διακεῖσθαι· διὰ γὰρ τούτων ὁρῶ τὰς πόλεις εὐδαιμονεστάτας καὶ 
μεγίςτας γιγνομένας. 
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51 For a more complete discussion of this part of Pericles’ speech, see the comparison between Athens 
and Sparta above. See also Demosthenes Against Aristocrates 25.9 for another example.
52 For example, see Demosthenes On the Chersonese 72 and Against Aristocrates 21
For my part, I welcome all forms of discourse that can benefit us, even in a small degree; 
however, I regard those as best which advise about habits and civic life, and especially 
those that teach how leaders should treat the masses, and how the people should be 
disposed toward their leaders. For I see that it is in this way that cities become the 
greatest and most prosperous.
In this way, public speakers - like teachers - can have a significant impact on their 
students. Ideally, the result for the polis will be as Isocrates describes: prosperity. 
However, not all public speakers have the city’s best interests at heart. As Demosthenes 
warns in For the Megalopolitans (3.6), he considers himself duty-bound to do what is 
best for the city by preventing it from being led astray by bad speakers. The 
understanding in this passage is that a good speaker should operate in a fundamentally 
different way from a bad speaker. A good public speaker (or political didaskalos, if you 
will), must not try to impose his own will on his audience either through persuasion or 
exhortation without first informing (didaskein) his listeners of all of the facts.53 As 
Isocrates points out in the Panathenaicus (271.10), he has written the preceding speech 
as a good public speaker, that is, one who aims at the truth rather than seeking to lead 
astray the opinions of the listeners (καὶ τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας στοχαζομένους τῶν τὰς 
δόξας τῶν ἀκροωμένων παρακρούεσθαι ζητούντων). To do otherwise would be to 
stray into the realm of the demagogue, whose highly persuasive and self-serving 
discourse represented a real threat to the autonomy of the polis.54 As Ober notes (1990, 
161ff), “Good political decisions would improve the citizenry; poor decisions might 
worsen it... Hence, the orator who could deceive the people into voting wrongly was a 
manifest danger to all other citizens.”   
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53 See also Demosthenes On the False Embassy 156; Thucydides 4.17.3 and 5.98.1.
54 On which, see Yunis 1991, 186-90.
Public speakers weren’t the only authority figures in classical Athens who took on the 
role of didaskalos to the polis. The comic and tragic poets, too, thought of themselves - 
or were thought of by their audience - as teachers, but unlike the public speakers, they 
had a pre-existing educational tradition to draw on.55 Beginning already in the late 
archaic period, long-deceased poets like Homer, Hesiod, and Orpheus were described 
as didaskaloi because their poetry was used to teach school-age children. It is for this 
reason that Xenophanes describes Homer as the teacher of all (ὁ διδάσκαλος 
πάντων),56 and at Frogs 1030ff Aristophanes’ Aeschylus explains the ways the poets of 
old teach their readers:
Σκέψαι γὰρ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς / ὡς ὠφέλιμοι τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ γενναῖοι γεγένηνται.
Ὀρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετάς θ' ἡμῖν κατέδειξε φόνων τ' ἀπέχεσθαι,
Μουσαῖος δ' ἐξακέσεις τε νόσων καὶ χρησμούς, Ἡσίοδος δὲ
γῆς ἐργασίας, καρπῶν ὥρας, ἀρότους· ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ὅμηρος  
ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμὴν καὶ κλέος ἔσχεν πλὴν τοῦδ' ὅτι χρήστ' ἐδίδαξεν,
τάξεις, ἀρετάς, ὁπλίσεις ἀνδρῶν; 
Just consider how beneficial the noble poets have been from the earliest times. Orpheus 
revealed mystic rites to us, and taught us to abstain from killings; Musaeus instructed us 
131
55 The conception of drama as teaching can probably be found in the poetry of the archaic period. See 
Woodbury 1986, 248-9: “There is an important element in early, archaic, and classical verse that might be 
called, broadly, “educational” or “culturally formative.” Homer, Hesiod, Solon, Xenophanes, Theognis, to 
name a few, all address themselves in greater or lesser degree, to the information and admonition of their 
audiences... To say then that a poet was a didaskalos and his poetry didaskalia would have been to 
compare him with a school-master and his poems with lessons for children” and Croally 2005, 56-7: 
“Poetry was generally regarded as having educative effects...and poets were viewed as teachers.”
S This educative type of poetry is not to be confused with the separate and specific genre of 
didactic poetry as described by Katharina Volk (2002, Chapter 2, especially pp. 36-40): “The view that 
one can, or ought to be able to, learn from poetry remains commonplace throughout antiquity. However, 
even if it is true that the Iliad can teach us about the Trojan War, and perhaps even about the art of 
generalship, as the rhapsode Ion contends in Plato’s dialogue (540d1-541d7), this does not make it a 
didactic poem. Whether one can in fact learn something - anything- from a text is a useless criterion since 
by that token, there would be very few, if any, poems that could not pass as didactic.” With a few notable 
exceptions (e.g. Hesiod’s Works and Days), the genre of poetry that modern scholars describe as 
“didactic” was not fully realized until the Hellenistic period (see Volk pp. 56ff), although it undoubtedly 
developed from the early Near Eastern tradition of wisdom/advice poetry. For more on the place of advice 
poetry in the didaskalic tradition, and the work of Theognis in particular, see Chapter 1, Section 2.2.    
56 DK 21 B10. For more examples of poets - especially Homer - and their poetry as teachers see 
Heraclitus DK 22 B57, Xenophon Symposium 3.5, Isocrates Panegyricus 159, and Aristophanes Birds 
912.
on oracles and cures for diseases; Hesiod on agriculture, the seasons for crops, and 
ploughing. And where did the godlike Homer get respect and renown if not by giving 
good instruction in the tactics, virtues, and weaponry of men? 
As Aristophanes makes clear, the works of the ancient poets were thought of in the 
Classical period as indisputable reference guides for living, and as fellow poets, the 
dramatists could follow directly in their footsteps. 
Over and above the question of poetic lineage, however, there is also evidence that 
comic (and to a lesser extent tragic)57 poets occupied the same political space as public 
speakers.58 Indeed, as Ober and Strauss point out (1990, 237-8), “Political rhetoric and 
drama can be seen, and analyzed, as closely related forms of public speech... In each 
case, the mass audience faced, listened to, and actively responded to, the public 
discourse of individual speakers.”59 In addition, both public speakers and dramatists 
aimed at the improvement of the citizens, but they went about it in slightly different 
ways. While public speakers (and comic poets in their parabases) sought to improve the 
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57 Given that comedy will play a much greater role in our discussion in Chapter 4, and because its 
instruction operated in a fundamentally different way than that of tragedy, the following section will focus 
mainly on the political and dramatic instruction offered via comedy, particular Aristophanic comedy.
58 On which, see Dover 1974, 29: “We can observe a striking continuity from the didactic and moralizing 
tradition of archaic poetry, through the late fifth- and early fourth-century comedy, to the lashings which 
Demosthenes administers to his fellow citizens”. Tragedy, on the other hand, operated a little differently, 
since it lacked the meta-theatricality offered by the comic parabasis. Instead of giving explicit political 
instruction in the same way comedy did, tragedy’s teaching worked at a deeper level. See Gregory 2005, 
Cartledge 1997, Croally 2005, 64-5: “The language of tragedy, though often stylized and poetic, is on 
other occasions strikingly similar to that used and heard in both the assembly and the law courts”; and 
Ober and Strauss 1990, 270: “Oratory drew on the audience’s experience of theater; drama drew on the 
audience’s experience of political and legal speeches. By so doing, each genre implicitly taught its 
audience that being an Athenian was a comprehensive experience, that there was no compartmentalized 
division between esthetics and politics... Athenian political culture was created in part in the theater of 
Dionysos, theatrical culture on the Pnyx.”
S In opposition to the view that either comedy or tragedy were intended to act politically, see Heath 
1987a, Chapter 2 and Heath 1987b, 28-9.
59 See also Cartledge 1997, 3.
polis by increasing their knowledge and thereby helping them to make better political 
decisions, dramatists hoped to improve the citizens mainly by presenting them with 
models of behavior to imitate. In this way, dramatic didaskalia represents the second 
part of the teaching interaction described by Isocrates (C. soph. 17.5-6): mimesis.60
Prior to the fifth century, poetry was often thought of as generally instructional, but it was 
Aristophanes who first described it as analogous to political oratory.61 Indeed, in the 
parabasis of Peace (735ff), we learn that Aristophanes sees himself as the best 
kômôidodidaskalos for having elevated comedy to a serious and important art from its 
traditional role as sheer buffoonery. As Henderson has pointed out (1990, 271-2): 
The comic poets pictured themselves as...public voices who could, indeed were 
expected to, comment on, and seek to influence public thinking about matters of major 
importance - the same matters that were being or might be presented to the voting 
dēmos in other settings and in different ways, by competitors in a tragic competition, for 
example, or by speakers in an assembly, or by litigants in a law court.62
In fact, we can observe several major correspondences between the textual 
descriptions of dramatic and political instruction. For example, echoing Demosthenes’ 
claim above in For the Megalopolitans (3.6), in the parabasis of Acharnians, the chorus 
leader tells his audience that the poet (i.e. Aristophanes) believes himself to be 
deserving of rich rewards for keeping the city from being deceived by foreign speakers 
(633ff). Similarly, when the chorus leader tells us that Aristophanes promises to continue 
teaching the citizens good things in order that they might be happy (656: Φησὶν δ' ὑμᾶς 
133
60 In using mimesis in this way, I follow Gebauer and Wulf (1992, 34): “Mimesis is thus defined as the 
imitation of role models, whereby the goal is to become like the models.”
61 Comedy, at least. In addition, if we are willing to take it as such, Aristophanes’ Frogs provides some 
evidence for the didaskalic function of tragedy and the tragic poets in particular.
62 Although Henderson speaks of the comic poets in the plural, the only examples we have for comic 
didaskalia come from Aristophanes.
πολλὰ διδάξειν ἀγάθ', ὥστ' εὐδαίμονας εἶναι),63 we can see a clear parallel with 
Isocrates’ praise of speeches that teach (didaskein) the people good habits so that the 
city will prosper.64 In this way, as Ober and Strauss note (1990, 248), “Both dramatic 
poets and political orators could see themselves as teachers: both aimed at the 
improvement of the citizen, both communicated through rhetoric.”65 
However, there was an added sense in which a dramatist taught that a politician did not, 
that is, through dramatic directorship. Most likely originating from the head (didaskalos) 
of the lyre schools of the archaic period,66 in the Classical period, the director and 
composer of a play (or of a dithyrambic chorus) was called by the technical theatrical 
term didaskalos.67 To quote Claude Calame (1997, 230):
The poet retains a specific function marked with the feature “to compose.” In this 
function, his role is the intermediary between the community and the chorus members to 
whom he transmits the cultural patrimony, of which he is the traditional repository in 
Greece...The poet is thus the perfect instructor, since he can communicate through his 
musical skill and his songs the knowledge necessary to maintain the social system.  
Hence, a poet like Aristophanes taught his audience 1) as a composer and director of 
plays, 2) as a public speaker of sorts addressing the polis through the chorus leader, 
and 3) as a poet whose plays presented paradigms of behavior for his audience. In 
other words, by addressing the Athenian audience in the first person through the mouth 
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63 See also Frogs 687 for another example of this.
64 See above on Nicocles 10.5
65 See also Gregory 1991, 2 : “...the improvement of the polis is the goal of the poet’s instruction.”
66 On which, see Calame 1997, 221-38.
67 This is the standard terminology of the dramatic records, including the hypotheses of the plays and the 
didaskalic inscriptions. For textual examples see Demosthenes Against Midias 58.7, 59.8; Aristophanes 
Birds 1403, 1405.
of the chorus leader, Aristophanes could interact with his listeners in a way that was 
similar to a public speaker giving political instruction to the city. At the same time, he 
could also take advantage of the didaskalic function of poetry to instruct his audience 
through the actions and words of his characters. For example, in Assemblywomen 
(583), Praxagora says that she will teach (didaskein) useful things to the spectators, but 
it is unclear whether she is referring to the political instruction that she will give to the 
assembly in the internal context of the play, or to the teaching she will give to the 
Athenian audience as a character in a drama. It is likely that we are meant to 
understand both types of didaskalia to be operating simultaneously. 
In a way, dramatic didaskalia both encompassed and expanded upon political 
didaskalia. As we have seen from the above examples from Aristophanes, comic poets 
could interact with their audiences in the same way and for the same reason that public 
speakers did with theirs. However, because of the mimetic response poetry naturally 
engendered,68 all dramatic poets (not just comedians) could also improve the polis in a 
way that politicians couldn’t: through paradigms. Aristophanes’ Aeschylus refers to this 
process explicitly in Frogs during the contest between himself and Euripides. At line 
1009, Euripides proclaims that poets should be admired because they make people 
better citizens (ὅτι βελτίους τε ποιοῦμεν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν). 
Aeschylus agrees, bragging (1021ff) that by staging (didaskein) Seven Against Thebes, 
135
68 For example, see Plutarch Life of Solon 29.4-5: Solon attended a tragedy of Thespis after which he 
asked the playwright if he was ashamed to tell lies to so many people. When Thespis responded in the 
negative and asked Solon why it mattered, he answered that if you put something in front of the masses 
in jest it will eventually show up in serious matters, too. That is, the people will imitate what they see on 
stage and apply it to inappropriate situations.
a warlike play, he made his audience hot for the fight and (1038ff) by depicting the 
deeds of brave men like Patroclus and Teucer he inspired men to measure themselves 
against their heroes in war. In other words, his depictions provoked a mimetic response 
in the audience. This is fine if you are composing a play that is “full of Ares” (1021) in 
order to incite the Athenians to courageous action, but problems arise when you write 
about something shameful or controversial, as Aeschylus believes Euripides to have 
done with his depictions of Phaedra and Stheneboea. As Justina Gregory rightly notes 
in this connection, Aeschylus is concerned that “Euripides has made people worse 
instead of better because his characters exhibit moral weaknesses that have inspired 
the audience’s imitation” (1991, 2). According to Dionysus (1012), this is an offense 
punishable by death,69 and Euripides clearly should have known better. Both he and 
Aeschylus must be aware that as dramatists they are doubly accountable in offering 
guidance to the city: they have to teach the Athenians how to become better citizens, 
yes, but they also need to provide appropriate examples of statesmanship for them to 
follow. At lines 1053-6 Aeschylus explains this second aspect of the duty of the dramatic 
poet in more detail: 
ἀλλ' ἀποκρύπτειν χρὴ τὸ πονηρὸν τόν γε ποητήν,
καὶ μὴ παράγειν μηδὲ διδάσκειν. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ παιδαρίοισιν
ἐστὶ διδάσκαλος ὅστις φράζει, τοῖσιν δ' ἡβῶσι ποηταί.  
Πάνυ δὴ δεῖ χρηστὰ λέγειν ἡμᾶς.
It is necessary for the poet to hide what is shameful,
and not stage or teach it. For in the case of small children
it is the didaskalos who explains things, but for young men it is the poets.
So it is essential that we say good things.
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69 This is, of course, a joke, since Euripides is already dead. However, the consequences Dionysus jokes 
about will become very serious when Socrates is later taken to court.
On this view, the polis cannot operate without the constant guidance of the poet; 
everything the citizens are exposed to must be filtered through him so as to prevent 
imitation of the wrong example. Euripides doesn’t agree; he wants to present the 
citizens with un-doctored scenes of complex, everyday situations so that they will be 
forced to think critically about which example to imitate (Ran. 953-79).
Ultimately, the argument between the two poets comes down to the question of 
oversight and regulation in the context of civic instruction.70 If the polis cannot be trusted 
to decide the correct paradigms to imitate, is it then the task of the dramatist to limit 
which paradigms are put before them? If the answer is yes, and the dramatist takes full 
control of the citizens’ education, he also takes on the responsibility for the outcome of 
that education. And as we saw above in the discussion of Athenian school-room 
instruction, a didaskalos - or in this case, a political adviser - who fails in his duty can 
rightfully be punished.71    
In classical Athens, democracy was not just a form of government, it was a process, a 
mentality, and a way of life. It was carried out in the theater, the courtroom, and the 
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70 This is also Plato’s main concern in setting up the training for the guardians of the ideal state in 
Republic 376-7.
71 On which, see Henderson 1990, 275-6; for an ancient example, see Demosthenes Against Aristocrates 
97: a juror who doesn’t understand a point that is explained to him should not be punished, but instead, 
the litigant who made his case so poorly must be held responsible. 
S In some examples, a public speaker expresses concern that his listeners will hold him 
responsible for the outcome of his advice, whether he is truly to blame or not: Thucydides 1.140.1, 7.14.4. 
This will become especially important later in our discussion of Socrates in Chapter 4. 
assembly, but especially the theater.72 For the average Athenian citizen, the fulfillment of 
his political role consisted in attending theatrical performances, and it was in this setting 
that he would receive civic instruction. As Neil Croally has observed (2005, 65), 
“Tragedy filled a real need in fifth-century democratic Athens. On the one hand, there 
was no public system of formal education;73 on the other, the Athenians were very 
interested in education... and also believed - along with Pericles in the Funeral Oration - 
that their whole city could be an education, to themselves no doubt, but also to others.” 
And if Athens herself was an education and all her citizens students, then the public 
figures of the city - the beacons of learning and rhetorical skill - were its teachers. Any 
collective political experience had the potential to improve the citizenry, both on an 
individual level and as an entire polis. 
3.2 Metaphorical Teachers: Need, Poverty, and War
It isn’t surprising then, in the circumstances described above, that the vocabulary and 
concept of education was extended by Greek authors even further - well beyond the 
civic sphere -  and into the realm of abstracts and metaphors. That is to say, any 
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72 For the theater as a site for the fulfillment of civic and democratic duties, see Winkler 1990, 20-21 and 
Goldhill 1987, 60-70, esp. p. 68: “The four moments of ceremonial preceding the dramatic festival are all 
deeply involved with the city’s sense of itself. The libations of the ten generals, the display of tribute, the 
announcement of the city’s benefactors, the parade of state-educated boys, now men, in full military 
uniform, all stress the power of the polis, the duties of the individual to the polis. The festival of the Great 
Dionysia is in the full sense of the expression a civic occasion, a city festival. And it is an occasion to say 
something about the city, not only in the plays themselves. The Great Dionysia is a public occasion 
endowed with a special force of belief. This is fundamentally and essentially a festival of the democratic 
polis.”
73 This does not mean, of course, that there was no education at all in Athens other than the democratic 
institutions (cf. Cartledge quote above) As we have seen in the preceding sections of the chapter, there 
was already structured schooling by a didaskalos in Greece as early as the beginning of the fifth century. 
However, the formal schooling that existed was not available to all and it could vary widely from 
didaskalos to didaskalos. 
abstract noun which was seen to profoundly affect the nature of the polis (and its 
individual citizens) could be personified and described as a didaskalos. This was 
possible because the use of didaskalic language to describe metaphorical teaching 
relationships was anchored in the understanding that a teacher always interacts with his 
student in a particular and recognizable way, whether that teacher is Pericles, 
Protagoras, or Poverty. In this final section of the chapter, we will examine a few 
especially fruitful examples of metaphorical teachers in order to identify what was for a 
Greek author the practice of the didaskalos.
In the example below from Theognis (1.387-92), using the same subject - Need - the 
poet contrasts the teaching metaphor in a very suggestive way with the metaphor of 
giving birth:  
τολμᾶι δ' οὐκ ἐθέλων αἴσχεα πολλὰ φέρειν
χρημοσύνηι εἴκων, ἣ δὴ κακὰ πολλὰ διδάσκει,
ψεύδεά τ' ἐξαπάτας τ' οὐλομένας τ' ἔριδας,
ἄνδρα καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντα· κακὸν δέ οἱ οὐδὲν ἔοικεν·
ἡ γὰρ καὶ χαλεπὴν τίκτει ἀμηχανίην. 
Although unwilling, a man brings himself to endure much that is shameful,
like Need, which teaches many evil things,
including lies and deceptions and deadly strife,
even against his will. And there is no evil like Need,
for it gives birth to painful helplessness.
The view of Need expressed in this passage is pessimistic in the extreme. According to 
Theognis, when a man is set upon by Need (chrêmosunê), he will resort to any manner 
of base behavior in order to survive. Even though he does not want to, he will lie, steal, 
cheat, and fight. In other words, with Need as his teacher, a previously morally 
upstanding person is fundamentally changed, in Theognis’ opinion, for the worse. This 
characterization of the teaching process is consistent with the accounts we examined 
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earlier in the chapter: a didaskalos is described as a constant companion who interacts 
with an individual (or group) and as a result of this interaction changes him for better or 
worse.74 Surprisingly, after first describing Need using the metaphor of teaching, the 
poet provides us with additional insight by further characterizing the same abstract as a 
mother. In purely theoretical terms, the former type of interaction is seen as changing an 
existing situation while the latter produces a new one. Specifically, the metaphor of birth 
- unlike that of teaching - entails the independent creation of offspring by a parent, in 
this case helplessness and need, respectively. This means that in the role of a parent, 
Need naturally produces helplessness, regardless of the disposition - or even the 
contribution - of the affected person. That is to say, where there is Need, there is always 
helplessness, but only when a person has had a sustained educative relationship with 
Need is he made capable of doing evil things. 
It is clear, therefore that the metaphor of teaching was thought of in antiquity as 
essentially different from the metaphor of giving birth, the latter being a generative 
relationship and the former a transformative one. Further, we are given to understand 
that when the teacher is a powerful negative force - like Need - the transformation does 
not always take place with the willing participation of the student. Elsewhere (1.649-52), 
Theognis curses Poverty for similarly forcing its education upon him:             
Ἆ δειλὴ πενίη, τί ἐμοῖσ' ἐπικειμένη ὤμοις
σῶμα καταισχύνεις καὶ νόον ἡμέτερον;
αἰσχρὰ δέ μ' οὐκ ἐθέλοντα βίηι καὶ πολλὰ διδάσκεις
 ἐσθλὰ μετ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ κάλ' ἐπιστάμενον. 
Ah wretched Poverty, why do you lie across my shoulders
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74 For a complete treatment of the outcomes of the teaching relationship, see Chapter 3, Section 2.
and debase my body and mind?
Forcibly and against my will you teach me many shameful things
although I know what is good and noble among men.
As Theognis presents it, Poverty drapes itself like a heavy mantle over the poet’s 
shoulders and teaches him shameful things by force (βίηι), even though he is an 
unwilling student (μ' οὐκ ἐθέλοντα) who knows better. Unlike in the previous passage, 
we are not told exactly what Poverty teaches,75 but Theognis describes the training 
process and its outcome in consistently violent and negative terms: wretched (δειλός) 
Poverty teaches its own brand of wretchedness to its student. 
Theognis isn’t alone in his pessimism about education. The same process of forced 
conditioning and assimilation by a (metaphorical) teacher is explained in greater detail 
by Thucydides in reference to War (3.82.2):    
ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἵ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνους τὰς 
γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν· ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν 
τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς 
τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ.
For in peace and prosperity cities and individuals have better sentiments because they 
do not experience imperious necessities. But war is a violent didaskalos that takes away 
the easy supply of daily sustenance and assimilates the temperaments of the people to 
their circumstances.
As in both of the Theognis passages above, according to Thucydides, the education 
given by War is compulsory (βίαιος; cf with Theognis βίηι) and profoundly debasing. By 
forcibly taking away the people’s access to the necessities (presumably clothing, food, 
and shelter), War teaches them the violence that comes from desperation. Using the 
teacher’s tool of assimilation, it changes their personalities (ὀργαί) to match their 
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75 According to Antiphanes (fr. 293-4.2), Poverty is the teacher of character: πενία γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τρόπων 
διδάσκαλος.
situation, that is, life in wartime. In short, a ruthless teacher makes his students ruthless, 
too.
So far, we have seen that in Theognis’ and Thucydides’ view, a wicked teacher 
inevitably transmits his villainy to his students through assimilation. However, just as 
there was disagreement about the goals and methods of schoolroom education in 
Athens, there were also conflicting viewpoints about education when the teacher is a 
personified abstraction. For example, Need (or Necessity) was thought of by three 
different Greek authors as teaching three different things. In other words, teaching 
wasn’t seen as a straightforward equation wherein one teacher plus one student always 
equals a positive learning outcome. Depending upon one’s beliefs about teaching, the 
role of the teacher himself, and human nature more broadly, the same teacher-student 
interaction could be seen as resulting in a number of different outcomes.76 So while 
Theognis’ view of Need’s teaching is downright negative, Aristotle and Xenophon each 
offer an alternative to this scenario. 
For Aristotle, Need is the universal motivator of human progress and development from 
a bestial existence to civilization. All societies begin with Need and progress to luxury, 
and as a result, he sees Need as a very powerful positive force (Pol. 1329b.25-30): 
σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὑρῆσθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ χρόνῳ,
μᾶλλον δ' ἀπειράκις. τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖα τὴν χρείαν διδάσκειν εἰκὸς αὐτήν, τὰ δ' 
εἰς εὐσχημοσύνην καὶ περιουσίαν ὑπαρχόντων ἤδη τούτων εὔλογον λαμβάνειν 
τὴν αὔξησιν· ὥστε καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας οἴεσθαι δεῖ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον.
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76 This will be important for our argument in Chapter 4 concerning Socrates, since this phenomenon 
explains why Plato, Xenophon, and Aristophanes can each have such different views on the teaching of 
the same person.
In fact, it is necessary to realize that nearly everything has been discovered over and 
over again over a long period of time, or rather infinitely often. For Need itself is likely 
to teach the necessities, and then, once these things are present it is reasonable to 
assume that things that contribute to refinement and abundance will increase. And so it 
is necessary to suppose that what pertains to polities happens in the same way.
On this model, every person is a student of Need, and as we are faced with a lack - of 
food, clothing, etc - , Need teaches us how to provide for ourselves. In this way, Need’s 
teaching is the mode by which humans attain survival and eventually civilization.77 And 
as the final line of the passage implies, Aristotle believes this process applies not only to 
the development of primitive civilizations, but even to the formation of political society: a 
city needs leaders, and so Need teaches men to rule; it needs craftsmen to build 
houses, and make textiles, and bake bread, so Need teaches these skills. As Aristotle 
sees it, far from teaching us to be cruel and immoral through assimilation - as Theognis 
argues - Need teaches us the practical skills to survive and to fulfill our potential as 
social and political beings.
Unlike both Theognis and Aristotle, Xenophon sees Necessity as teaching physical 
endurance through habituation to unpleasantness. According to Xenophon, Necessity 
does not teach by breaking your moral spirit and reducing you to lawlessness, nor does 
it teach by inspiring the discovery of new skills. Rather, it teaches by habituating you to 
painful circumstances and forcing you to develop self-discipline.78 In fact, according to 
Pheraulas’ speech in the Cyropaedia, the poor soldiers hold a distinct advantage over 
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77 This passage may be based on Democritus’ description of the rise of humanity as quoted by Diodorus 
Siculus (DK 68 B5.60): καθόλου γὰρ πάντων τὴν χρείαν αὐτὴν διδάσκαλον γενέσθαι τοῖς 
ἀνθρώποις [For on the whole, in all things necessity itself became the teacher for mankind.]
78 This is strikingly similar to some aspects of the Spartan education system as described by Xenophon 
and Plutarch in the first section of this chapter.
their upper-class counterparts since they have received their training from Necessity 
(2.3.13): 
καίτοι, ἔφη, οἶδα ὅτι οὗτοι μέγα φρονοῦσιν ὅτι πεπαίδευνται δὴ καὶ πρὸς λιμὸν καὶ 
δίψαν καὶ πρὸς ῥῖγος καρτερεῖν, κακῶς εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ταῦτα ἡμεῖς ὑπὸ 
κρείττονος διδασκάλου πεπαιδεύμεθα ἢ οὗτοι. οὐ γὰρ ἔστι διδάσκαλος οὐδεὶς 
τούτων κρείττων τῆς ἀνάγκης, ἣ ἡμᾶς καὶ λίαν ταῦτ' ἀκριβοῦν ἐδίδαξε.
“And yet,” Pheraulas said, “I know that these [upper-class] men pride themselves on 
having been trained to endure hunger and thirst and cold, but they don’t know that we 
have been trained in these same things by a better teacher than they have. For in these 
matters there is no better teacher than Necessity, which has taught us exceedingly 
thoroughly.”
The educational model in this passage is clear: Necessity’s teaching operates through 
continuous exposure (i.e. habituation to cold, hunger, and thirst) to produce a desired 
quality (i.e. physical endurance) in its students. It is worth noting that the teaching is 
described as a positive thing, even if it is carried out by unpleasant means.
Ultimately, the three above depictions of Need/Necessity as a didaskalos have a 
common thread: they all highlight the way a teacher can form and transform his 
student’s character. But although all three texts treat the same teacher, they depict very 
different outcomes of the teaching exchange. The democratic Athenian view as 
expressed by Aristotle and Xenophon is decidedly optimistic. That is to say, they 
describe teaching as an improving process by which a person can reach his potential as 
an individual and a citizen of the polis. However, there also existed a pre-democratic 
tradition, beginning with Theognis in the Archaic period and later taken up by 
Thucydides, that describes teaching as a potentially damaging influence that results in 
students being worse off than when they started. 
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Generally speaking, beyond simply making someone better or worse, teaching was 
seen by Greek authors as resulting in a number of different outcomes ranging from 
fulfillment to perversion. A thorough investigation of these outcomes will be the subject 
of the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
THE TEACHER’S IMPACT
In the preceding chapters, we investigated the textual tradition surrounding the figure of 
the didaskalos and his methods. What remains to be treated is the literature concerning 
the respective roles played in the educational exchange by the influence of the 
didaskalos on the one hand, and the physis of the student on the other, and the degree 
to which the potential outcomes of the exchange depended upon these two factors. 
That is to say, in the following chapter we will explore the range of possible effects of the 
teaching relationship upon a student’s innate nature as described by the Greek authors, 
and whether teaching or innate ability (or something else altogether) was seen as 
playing the greatest role in creating these effects. 
1. Nature versus Nurture1
1.1 The Primacy of Nature
As we saw in Chapter 1, the earliest examples of a structured teacher-student 
relationship come from the Iliad and the Odyssey. But the noble centaur Cheiron and 
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1 This debate, which in contemporary educational theory is referred to as the nature-vs-nurture problem, 
was already being discussed in these terms in antiquity. For nature, the Greeks used physis, and for 
nurture sometimes the more general trophê, but more often paideia or didachê. As early as Homer, Greek 
authors were interested in the potential value of education and the role played by nature in the attainment 
of virtue. For a survey of the Greek texts that address these issues, see Lesky 1939. Lesky concludes 
(378-81) that although the Sophists tried to elevate teaching above all other factors in the educational 
exchange, the rest of the Greeks remained unconvinced and gave teaching the lowest priority in the 
teacher-student relationship after nature and effort on the part of the student. As we shall see below, this 
is not entirely borne out in the texts.  
the aristocratic Phoenix and Mentor didn’t simply offer their services to anyone needing 
advice or instruction. On the contrary, education in the Homeric period was strictly 
limited to the children of kings. Beyond the fact that a working-class family could spare 
neither the time nor the money to send their children to a tutor, there was also a 
prevailing belief (as expressed by Pindar and Theognis) that education would be wasted 
on such people because virtue was innate to the aristocracy and unattainable by 
education alone.2 As Theognis explains (1.429-38) it comes down to the fact that nature 
is a stronger force than nurture in character formation: 
οὐδείς πω τοῦτό γ' ἐπεφράσατο,
ὧι τις σώφρον' ἔθηκε τὸν ἄφρονα κἀκ κακοῦ ἐσθλόν...
εἰ δ' ἦν ποιητόν τε καὶ ἔνθετον ἀνδρὶ νόημα,
 οὔποτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ πατρὸς ἔγεντο κακός,
πειθόμενος μύθοισι σαόφροσιν· ἀλλὰ διδάσκων
 οὔποτε ποιήσει τὸν κακὸν ἄνδρ' ἀγαθόν. 
No one has yet devised a way in which one has made a fool wise and a noble man out 
of one who is base... if it were possible to place good sense in a man, there would never 
be a base son of a noble father, since he would listen to words of wisdom. But you will 
never make a base man noble through teaching.
For Theognis and his contemporaries, no amount of coaxing will turn lead to gold; a 
base nature will never be made noble by external intervention.3 Rather, a person was 
believed to be capable of achieving greatness because he could trace his lineage back 
to a hero or demigod: virtue traveled along bloodlines via divine endowment.4 In the 
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2 Of course, from a purely political standpoint, it was advantageous to the aristocracy to insist that their 
superior position was a result of heredity and therefore inaccessible by learning. See Beck 1964, 307 and 
Kerferd 1981, 37: “The widening of education throughout Athenian society...was not popular with those 
who looked back to an age of greater aristocratic privilege in such matters...If aretē or excellence can be 
taught then social mobility is immediately possible.”
3 The idea of a person who cannot be improved by teaching (or any other means) will return in the next 
chapter in our discussion of the figure of Socrates in Aristophanes’ Clouds. In the play, Strepsiades 
represents a base nature that Socrates cannot affect any positive influence upon, and he is subsequently 
expelled from the Phrontistêrion.
4 On which, see Pindar Olympian 11.11 and 20 and Romilly 1998, 45: “In an aristocratic society virtue is 
regarded as innate. If one possesses it, it is either a chance of birth or, more usually, a result of heredity.”
minds of the Greeks, this meant that a man was born who he was and there was no 
sense pretending otherwise. As Pindar notes (Ol. 13.13), it is impossible to hide one’s 
inborn qualities (ἄμαχον δὲ κρύψαι τὸ συγγενὲς ἦθος), and (Ol. 11.20) like the fiery 
fox and the loud-roaring lion, man cannot change his innate nature (τὸ γὰρ ἐμφυὲς 
οὔτ' αἴθων ἀλώπηξ / οὔτ' ἐρίβρομοι λέοντες διαλλάξαιντο ἦθος).5 Rather, a person 
begins with a certain amount and type of virtue, which education can refine so as to 
help him reach his full potential. At Pythian 2.72, the poet encourages his aristocratic 
addressee to “by learning, become who you are” (γένοι' οἷος ἐσσὶ μαθών). Pindar is 
not fundamentally against education, but in his view, it only makes sense when given to 
a person of noble birth, and he has nothing but contempt and outright insults for the 
non-aristocratic educated man. At Olympian 9, he scorns the learned man because a 
god had no part in his excellence (103ff), and reasserts the superiority of innate virtue 
over education (100-02): 
τὸ δὲ φυᾷ κράτιστον ἅπαν· πολλοὶ δὲ διδακταῖς / ἀνθρώπων ἀρεταῖς κλέος / 
ὤρουσαν ἀρέσθαι· 
What is inborn is always best; but many men strive to pluck glory by means of virtues 
that have been taught.
Similarly, at Olympian 2 (86-88), he describes the man who has only learned compared 
with the man who is skillful by nature as a squawking crow compared with the divine 
bird of Zeus.6 According to Pindar, true excellence is only accessible to those with the 
proper pedigree; all others, no matter how learned, are simply pretenders. This doctrine 
was always implicit in the aristocratic mindset, but it was only when educational 
148
5 See also Sophocles’ Philoctetes 79, 88, and 1310-11: “You have shown the nature that you were born 
with” (τὴν φύσιν δ' ἔδειξας, ὦ τέκνον, ἐξ ἧς ἔβλαστες)
6 See also Nemean 3.42ff and Aristotle’s Rhetoric 1365a30. 
opportunities began to become available to those in the lower classes that staunchly 
elitist writers like Pindar were forced to articulate it.
For several decades the debate seems to have died down, but by the mid fifth century, 
the question of nature or nurture had reappeared in the public consciousness, and this 
time it took hold. Overnight, writers from all genres, including Euripides, Democritus, 
Protagoras, “Hippocrates”, and Isocrates became fixated on the questions of whether 
virtue can be taught and if teaching is more important than heredity.7 On one side, 
continuing a modified version of the aristocratic view, Euripides has one of the 
characters in the Hippolytus point out that education is a fine thing, but on its own it is 
not enough.8 Like Theognis, he describes nature as the crucial factor in the acquisition 
of virtue: nurture can never turn a base man into a good one (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν οὐδεὶς 
τρέφων εὖ χρηστὸν ἂν θείη ποτέ).9 Moreover, like Pindar, he also recognizes that for 
a noble person, education has an enhancing power. For instance, in the Suppliants 
(911ff), he has Adrastus tell Theseus to have his children educated since noble nurture 
can remove unwanted behaviors:
τὸ γὰρ τραφῆναι μὴ κακῶς αἰδῶ φέρει·
αἰσχύνεται δὲ τἀγάθ' ἀσκήσας ἀνὴρ
κακὸς γενέσθαι πᾶς τις. ἡ δ' εὐανδρία
διδακτόν... / οὕτω παῖδας εὖ παιδεύετε.
 
For noble nurture brings reverence with it. Every man, once he has practiced good 
things is ashamed to be base. And courage is teachable... so have your children 
educated well.
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7 See Romilly 1998, 45-53, esp. 49: Athens in the fifth century was “positively obsessed with the problem.”
8 See Euripides Hippolytus 79ff: those who are innately chaste may pluck the flowers of the pure meadow, 
but not those who have been taught for they are base men.
9 See Euripides Phoenix fr. 810; see also Hecuba 592ff
This passage hints at what may have been the Greeks’ understanding of how education 
could change a person. That is, education is described here as a way of altering one’s 
behavior and thereby his character. Put another way, a person’s actions can shape his 
personality; he literally becomes what he does.10 Of course, this process is strictly 
limited by a person’s nature: you can only change as much as your physis has the 
potential to allow. 
1.2 The Potential Power of Teaching
Despite seeming to lean toward the aristocratic view, Euripides also acknowledged that 
there was a conflict brewing in Athens and that others were either strongly opposed to 
or at least somewhat-less-than-supportive of this old-fashioned educational philosophy. 
In the Hecuba (595-602) he has the title character express some internal turmoil over 
the validity of the aristocratic view, initially agreeing with it but ending her speech on a 
note of uncertainty:11 
...ἄνθρωποι δ' ἀεὶ / ὁ μὲν πονηρὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν κακός,
ὁ δ' ἐσθλὸς ἐσθλὸς οὐδὲ συμφορᾶς ὕπο
φύσιν διέφθειρ' ἀλλὰ χρηστός ἐστ' ἀεί;
ἆρ' οἱ τεκόντες διαφέρουσιν ἢ τροφαί;
ἔχει γε μέντοι καὶ τὸ θρεφθῆναι καλῶς
δίδαξιν ἐσθλοῦ· τοῦτο δ' ἤν τις εὖ μάθηι,
οἶδεν τό γ' αἰσχρὸν κανόνι τοῦ καλοῦ μαθών.
 
Among men is it the case that the base man is nothing other than wicked,
and the noble man is noble and his physis is not changed by misfortune
but he is always good? 
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10 On the idea that environment, education, and personality reinforce one another, see Galen Quod animi 
mores..., especially sections 798-803 on Hippocrates’ Airs, Waters, Places and the ways physical 
environment can affect someone’s natural disposition.
11 Despite the significance of this passage for our purposes, it does not express an important sentiment in 
the play, but rather represents a mere random digression. At line 603-4, immediately following the 
passage quoted here, Hecuba chides herself for straying from her point and the subject is never revisited.
Do they differ then by birth or upbringing?
Positive nurture has the power to provide 
noble instruction, and if someone learns this well,
by learning he knows what is shameful by the measure of the good.
In sharp contrast with the bold assertions of Pindar and Theognis that a base man can 
never be made good by teaching, this passage touches on the key educational 
philosophy question of the time: can a man’s personality be traced back to his 
parentage or his education, to nature or nurture? Euripides’ Hecuba does not claim to 
know the answer to the question she poses, but the end of the passage implies that she 
is leaning toward nurture. After all, even a base man, she theorizes, can be taught right 
from wrong, and then, even if his own nature opposes, he can always act nobly by 
comparing possible courses of action with what he knows intellectually to be right. It 
should be recognized that this is not quite the same as turning a base man into a noble 
one. The base man in this case would only be acting like a noble man and ignoring his 
own natural impulses; perhaps it is Hecuba’s belief that by being nobly trained and 
acting nobly a base person may eventually become noble. 
It was in response to the elitist view as expressed by Pindar, Theognis, and more 
recently, Euripides, that Democritus12 is reported to have said that more men are 
virtuous through practice than by nature (fr. 242: πλέονες ἐξ ἀσκήσιος ἀγαθοὶ 
γίνονται ἢ ἀπὸ φύσιος), a sentiment that paved the way for the Sophists13 who set 
themselves up as the anti-aristocrats. In terms of education, when faced with the 
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12 Most likely, this fragment attributed to Democritus was not actually spoken (or written) by him, and 
should be more properly labeled Pseudo-Democritus. However, for our purposes, it does not so much 
matter whether the fragment is truly from Democritus, but rather that it represents one side of the 
educational philosophy debate that was raging during this particular period in Athens.
13 With the exception of Protagoras, whom we will discuss shortly.
argument for nature, the Sophists established teaching to counteract it and claimed that 
they could make anyone virtuous through their lessons.14 For example, in Plato’s 
Protagoras (318a-319a), the famed Sophist promises that any person who attends his 
classes will experience constant improvement and will eventually become a good 
citizen. Similarly in the Gorgias (449b), the title character informs Socrates that he 
makes all of his students into skilled rhetoricians.15 This is, as we will see in the next 
chapter, the same promise that Aristophanes’ Socrates makes to Strepsiades in the 
Clouds, that is, to take a student of any type and produce a capable public speaker. 
However, like the uncompromising elitism of the aristocrats, this view, too, proved 
untenable when it became clear that the Sophists (and Aristophanes’ Socrates, for that 
matter) could not possibly deliver all that they had promised. As Isocrates famously says 
in Against the Sophists (10), the Sophists “do not attribute any power either to practical 
application or the innate ability of the student” (καὶ ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως οὐδὲν οὔτε 
ταῖς ἐμπειρίαις οὔτε τῇ φύσει τῇ τοῦ μαθητοῦ μεταδιδόασιν) but assert the 
supremacy of teaching above all else. 
While the Sophists and the elitists sat staunchly at either end of the educational 
spectrum, many of the thinkers of the period, including Protagoras, “Hippocrates”, and 
Isocrates, sought a workable compromise between the two views. The first to bridge the 
152
14 The Sophists’ apparently democratic view of teaching does, of course, present us with a paradox: it is 
easy to say that you can make any of your students virtuous when you only accept upper class students 
who can afford to pay your exorbitant fees.
15 For other examples of Sophistic promises, see Plato Protagoras 357e, Hippias Major 283c; Xenophon 
Cynegeticus 13.1; Isocrates Antidosis 147.9, Against the Sophists 1. For more on the extravagant 
promises of the Sophists and the way these promises distinguished them as educational professionals, 
see Chapter 1.
gap was Protagoras, who stood with the other Sophists in asserting that virtue could be 
taught to all, but he insisted that the process required a combination of nature, teaching, 
and practice in order to be successful (φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῖται).16 
In similar fashion, the Hippocratic corpus describes nature as the most important factor 
in all good qualities and a prerequisite to learning while emphasizing that many other 
elements are needed for education to take place (Lex 2.2ff):17  
Χρὴ γὰρ, ὅστις μέλλει ἰητρικῆς ξύνεσιν ἀτρεκέως ἁρμόζεσθαι, τῶνδέ μιν 
ἐπήβολον γενέσθαι· φύσιος· διδασκαλίης· τόπου εὐφυέος· παιδομαθίης· 
φιλοπονίης· χρόνου. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν πάντων δεῖ φύσιος· φύσιος γὰρ 
ἀντιπρησσούσης, κενεὰ πάντα· φύσιος δὲ ἐς τὸ ἄριστον ὁδηγεούσης, διδασκαλίη 
τέχνης γίνεται·
It is necessary for anyone intending to acquire a precise understanding of medicine to be 
in possession of these things: the proper physis; didaskalia; an appropriate location for 
learning; the chance to learn from an early age; an industrious spirit; and time. But 
above all, it is necessary to have the proper physis, for if physis opposes, everything 
else is pointless. But with physis guiding someone toward the best outcome, a didaskalia 
in the [medical] craft can happen. 
So, in addition to the usual duo of nature and teaching, according to Hippocrates, the 
student must also make an investment of effort in the form of good work ethic 
(philoponia),18 and a number of other circumstantial factors must align with these (time, 
location, etc). However, he makes a point of emphasizing the primacy of physis. A 
student could have all of the other elements of the exchange, but without physis, it 
would all be in vain.
  
Isocrates takes this two-part physis-didaskalia formulation to heart, on the one hand 
criticizing the elitists for their scorn of education (Antid. 210ff, 291) and on the other 
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16 DK 80 B3. Cf. Plato Protagoras 323c and 327c. See also Beck 1964, 158-9.
17 See also De Decente Habitu 4.3ff.
18 Cf. with askêsis/epimeleia/empeiria at Introduction, Section 3.2.
rebuking the Sophists for refusing to take into account the innate natures of their 
students and giving too much credit to teaching (C. soph. 10).19 He clearly still clings to 
the aristocratic belief in the importance of inborn talent in the attainment of virtue, but as 
a teacher himself, he also has faith in the power of education to shape and improve the 
character of his students. The compromise he settles on is one in which virtue is 
produced through the combination of nature, experience (or practice), and teaching, in 
that order of importance.20 However, he is quick to point out (Antid. 185-6; C. soph. 15) 
that teachers (of oratory) cannot make capable orators out of just anyone. It’s true, they 
can contribute to the results, but these powers are never perfected except in those who 
also possess preexisting talent and engage in practice. At Antidosis 187-92 he explains 
this belief in detail:   
Λέγομεν γὰρ ὡς δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας διοίσειν ἢ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἢ περὶ τὰς 
πράξεις ἢ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐργασίας πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι καλῶς, 
πρὸς ὅπερ ἂν προῃρημένοι τυγχάνωσιν, ἔπειτα παιδευθῆναι καὶ λαβεῖν τὴν 
ἐπιστήμην, ἥτις ἂν ᾖ περὶ ἑκάστου, τρίτον ἐντριβεῖς γενέσθαι καὶ γυμνασθῆναι 
περὶ τὴν χρείαν καὶ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν αὐτῶν·... Εἶναι δὲ τούτων προσῆκον ἑκατέροις, 
τοῖς τε διδάσκουσιν καὶ τοῖς μανθάνουσιν, ἴδιον μὲν τοῖς μὲν εἰσενέγκασθαι τὴν 
φύσιν οἵαν δεῖ, τοῖς δὲ δύνασθαι παιδεῦσαι τοὺς τοιούτους, κοινὸν δ' ἀμφοτέρων 
τὸ περὶ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν γυμνάσιον·... εἰ δὲ δή τις... ἔροιτό με, τί τούτων μεγίστην 
ἔχει δύναμιν πρὸς τὴν τῶν λόγων παιδείαν, ἀποκριναίμην ἂν ὅτι τὸ τῆς φύσεως 
ἀνυπέρβλητόν ἐστιν καὶ πολὺ πάντων διαφέρει·... Καὶ μὲν δὴ κἀκείνους ἴσμεν 
τοὺς καταδεεστέραν μὲν τούτων τὴν φύσιν ἔχοντας, ταῖς δ' ἐμπειρίαις καὶ ταῖς 
ἐπιμελείαις προέχοντας, ὅτι γίγνονται κρείττους οὐ μόνον αὑτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν 
εὖ μὲν πεφυκότων, λίαν δ' αὑτῶν κατημεληκότων· ὥσθ' ἑκάτερόν τε τούτων 
δεινὸν ἂν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν ποιήσειεν, ἀμφότερά τε γενόμενα περὶ τὸν 
αὐτὸν ἀνυπέρβλητον ἂν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀποτελέσειεν. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως καὶ 
τῆς ἐμπειρίας ταῦτα γιγνώσκω· περὶ δὲ τῆς παιδείας οὐκ ἔχω τοιοῦτον λόγον 
εἰπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ ὁμοίαν οὔτε παραπλησίαν ἔχει τούτοις τὴν δύναμιν.
I say that it’s necessary for those intending to excel in the pursuit of words or deeds or 
any other work first to be naturally gifted in whatever activity they have chosen to 
undertake, second to be taught and acquire knowledge, whatever that entails for each 
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19 In fact, Isocrates repeats the established aristocratic doctrine that there is no way to make base natures 
good through education. See Against the Sophists 21 and Antidosis 274.
20 On which, see Beck 1964, 288. Cf. Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1103b.
pursuit, and third to become practiced and trained concerning the use and practical 
application of their art... And in this, there is a role for both those who teach and those 
who learn: the learner alone provides the necessary innate ability, and the teacher 
alone has the power to educate, but together they undertake the exercise of practical 
application... But if anyone were to ask me which of these is the most important for 
oratorical training, I would answer that physis is paramount and comes before all 
else... Indeed, we know that those men who are lacking in innate ability but excel in 
practical application and diligence not only improve themselves but surpass others who 
are naturally talented but have been too negligent of their gifts. This means that either 
of these things can produce a capable orator and man of action, but both of them 
together might result in a man surpassing all others. These are my thoughts 
concerning physis and practical application. But I can’t say the same thing about 
education for its power is neither the same nor comparable to theirs.
This passage sums up Isocrates’ own personal conflict over the issue of nature versus 
nurture in the achievement of virtue. In the beginning, he expresses a definitive opinion 
about the relative importance of nature, teaching, and practice in education, claiming 
that they are all part of the pursuit of excellence in any field since nature is provided by 
the student, teaching by the didaskalos, and practice by the two of them working 
together. However, he then qualifies his previous statement by reasserting the 
importance of physis above all. But only a few lines later, he equivocates, insisting 
instead that practice and diligence can result in the same level of success as innate 
ability alone, especially if a naturally talented person neglects his gifts. Of course, it 
would be best, in Isocrates’ view, to combine innate ability with practice, but either of the 
two alone will suffice. Despite being a teacher by trade, he does not place this same 
degree of faith in education, saying that its power cannot hope to rival that of physis or 
empeiria. In the section that follows the passage above, he goes on to contradict 
himself yet again by reminding us that an orator can have all the training and practice in 
the world, but if he gets up to speak and is lacking the proper innate ability, he will 
always fail. In the end, Isocrates could not quite reconcile his profession with his 
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aristocratic beliefs, and the formula he settles upon is one in which nature, practice, and 
teaching are all important elements in education, but nature is essential. 
This passage from Isocrates perfectly encapsulates the spirit of the nature-versus-
nurture debate in fifth- and fourth-century Athens. Despite a growing interest and faith in 
the potential improving power of education, for the Athenians, innate nature was what 
made them who they were,21 and it was unthinkable to suggest that with enough 
teaching and practice a foreigner (or a commoner, for that matter) could achieve the 
same things as a noble-born Athenian citizen. Hence, according to all of the literature, 
education is, at best, a supplement to natural ability, and none of the authors abandon 
nature altogether: after all, teaching must have something to act on.22 This was, 
arguably, the Sophists’ fatal flaw - they tried to remove nature from the discussion. As 
Lesky (1939, 378) has noted, “The concept of nature as determined by birth was 
planted too deeply in Greek thought for it to have been easily swept away by the new 
confidence in the power of education and teaching.”23 
2. Outcomes of Teaching
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21 See Chapter 2, Section 1.2 discussion on the Funeral Oration and the Athenian view of their own innate 
nature versus Spartan habituation.
22 This explain’s Galen’s observation at Quod animi mores... 817 that children who have had the exact 
same upbringing often turn out very differently; the deciding factor is each child’s innate nature.
S For a further ancient example see Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1179b21-23: virtue may be 
obtained through teaching, but only if the student possesses the proper nature.
23  This discussion would continue in the literature well past the Classical period. Cf. Plutarch’s De Liberis 
Educandis 2a: Nature without teaching is a blind thing, teaching without nature is an imperfect thing, and 
practice without both is an ineffectual thing.
By the end of the fifth century, it was more or less established that the process of 
education consisted at the very least of a contribution on the part of the teacher - 
didachê - and one on the part of the student - physis.24 However, the potential outcome 
of the educational exchange was thought to depend heavily on the type of didachê and 
physis involved. Specifically, good and bad teaching could have vastly different effects 
on a student’s physis. Three different categories of outcome are described in the 
literature based on whether the student’s nature and the teaching are good or bad:25 
fulfillment, mitigation (often followed by relapse), and perversion.   
2.1 Fulfillment
When a noble physis is acted upon by positive teaching, the result is, in a Greek 
author’s mind, the default educational outcome: fulfillment (τέλος). That is to say, for 
the Greeks, a human physis is designed to do a particular thing and it is good teaching 
that helps them do it. Put another way, the proper role of teaching is to help a person 
turn into what he has the potential to become.26 So, for Isocrates, the ideal teaching 
outcome was the production of the best possible orator, for Hippocrates it was the best 
possible doctor, and for Protagoras, the best possible citizen. As Teresa Morgan (1998, 
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24 Some kind of practice or attention on the student’s part was also expected, but for some reason this 
element of the teaching exchange attracted much less interest in the literature. For the three traditional 
elements of the teaching exchange, see Introduction, Section 3.2.
25 The Greek terms of this discussion καλός and κακός are used just as vaguely as the English “good” 
and “bad”. Occasionally the word for “good” will be ἐσθλός and the word for “bad” πονηρός, which 
implies that the distinction is one of moral disposition, e.g. noble versus base, at least when discussing a 
person’s preexisting nature. Concerning the types of teaching, however, I take “good” and “bad” to 
designate both the intent and the result of the teaching; that is, “good” teaching is both kind-hearted, and 
it also is likely to produce a “good” person, while “bad” teaching might be described as both mean-spirited 
and corrupting. In the following section, I will refer to good nature as “noble” and good teaching as 
“positive”, likewise bad nature as “base” and bad teaching as “negative”.
26 Cf. Pindar Pythian 2.72; on which, see discussion above at Section 1.1. 
256) has noted, “[Education] is presented [by ancient authors] as natural because it 
complements and fulfils the pupil’s natural tendencies.” Because the specific nature of 
each student would have dictated the proper outcome of his educational experience, 
Greek authors tended not to write about this type of outcome with any degree of 
specificity. Instead of recounting the particular educational exchange of a given person, 
they chose to describe the interaction in much more abstract terms by using the 
metaphor of instruction as farming.27 The earliest complete articulation of this idea 
comes from the Hippocratic corpus (Lex 3.3ff):28  
Ὁκοίη γὰρ τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ φυομένων ἡ θεωρίη, τοιήδε καὶ τῆς ἰητρικῆς ἡ μάθησις. 
Ἡ μὲν γὰρ φύσις ἡμέων, ὁκοῖον ἡ χώρη· τὰ δὲ δόγματα τῶν διδασκόντων, ὁκοῖον 
τὰ σπέρματα· ἡ δὲ παιδομαθίη, τὸ καθ' ὥρην αὐτὰ πεσεῖν εἰς τὴν ἄρουραν· ὁ δὲ 
τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἡ μάθησις, ὁκοῖον ἡ ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος ἠέρος τροφὴ γιγνομένη τοῖσι 
φυομένοισιν· ἡ δὲ φιλοπονίη, ἐργασίη· ὁ δὲ χρόνος ταῦτα ἐνισχύει πάντα, ὡς 
τραφῆναι τελέως.
 
Instruction in medicine is like the culture of the products of the earth. For our physis is, 
so to speak, the soil; the lessons of our teachers are like the seeds; instruction in 
childhood is like the planting of those seeds in the ground during the proper season; the 
place of instruction is like the nourishment provided to the plants by the surrounding 
atmosphere; diligence is like working in the fields; and time imparts strength to all things 
and brings them to maturity.
For Hippocrates, there are a number of elements that must be present for effective 
education to take place. Not only do the expected pieces of the puzzle - nature, 
teaching (and a teacher), and work ethic - have to be provided, but also the right season 
of life for education, a good location for instruction, and a sufficient duration of time to 
complete the lessons. Recalling the earlier passage from Hippocrates, we know that the 
most important of these is physis, but it is unclear from either passage whether the 
author felt that education would fail if any of the other elements were missing. 
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27 On which, see Morgan 1998, 255-60.
28 For a brief mention of this idea in the contemporary literature, see Antiphon DK 87 B60.
The assimilation of teaching to agriculture here shows us that a student’s growth and 
development were conceived of by the Greeks as a natural process involving set steps 
and a predetermined outcome. As with a healthy seedling that is planted in the right kind 
of soil and given the proper nutrition and cultivation, positive lessons when imparted to a 
person with a noble nature and reinforced with the appropriate practice will yield the 
best possible fruit: a fully developed Greek citizen. This concept is taken up in even 
more simplistic terms by (Pseudo-) Plutarch in De Liberis Educandis (2b-c): 
ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῆς γεωργίας πρῶτον μὲν ἀγαθὴν ὑπάρξαι δεῖ τὴν γῆν, εἶτα δὲ τὸν 
φυτουργὸν ἐπιστήμονα, εἶτα τὰ σπέρματα σπουδαῖα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον γῇ μὲν 
ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις, γεωργῷ δ' ὁ παιδεύων, σπέρματι δ' αἱ τῶν λόγων ὑποθῆκαι καὶ τὰ 
παραγγέλματα. ταῦτα πάντα διατεινάμενος ἂν εἴποιμ' ὅτι συνῆλθε καὶ 
συνέπνευσεν εἰς τὰς τῶν παρ' ἅπασιν ᾀδομένων ψυχάς, Πυθαγόρου καὶ 
Σωκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ τῶν ὅσοι δόξης ἀειμνήστου τετυχήκασιν.
Just as in agriculture first of all the soil must be good, second, the farmer must be 
skilled, and third, the seeds must be sound, in the same way physis is like the soil, the 
educator is like the farmer, and the verbal precepts and lessons are like the seeds. And I 
would strenuously insist that all of these things met together and formed a unity in 
the souls of those who are praised by all, namely Pythagoras and Socrates and 
Plato, and all those who have achieved everlasting fame.
The focus here shifts from all of the other elements that will make for a successful 
educational exchange (location, timing, etc) in the Hippocrates passage, to the three 
most important: the teacher, his lessons, and the student’s physis. Not only must all 
three of them be present in an ideal educational exchange, but the physis must be 
good, the didaskalos must be skilled, and the precepts must be sound. When these 
three things are found together, Plutarch tells us, they form a unity (sumpnein) in the 
soul of the student which allows him to achieve the same level of excellence as the 
most virtuous men of all time (e.g. Plato, Socrates, and Protagoras). Although this is 
clearly an exaggeration - most men will never attain the same degree of virtue as Plato 
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et al - the intent of the passage is clear: successful education consists of a positive 
contribution on the parts of both teacher and student. By this token, the task of the 
teacher is to use his precepts to foster and enhance the preexisting qualities of a 
student in the hopes that if the exchange operates as expected, a good citizen will 
emerge, and if it operates flawlessly, an extraordinary one will emerge.  
These examples of ideal teaching outcomes demonstrate two things about Greek 
attitudes concerning education: 1) that it was possible - indeed, expected - for a student 
to emerge from a teaching interaction having been changed for the better; and 2) that 
Greek authors were much more interested in the negative outcomes than the positive 
ones. In other words, when the system functioned as it was intended, there was no 
need to describe the outcome of education in detail, hence we hear about the 
straightforwardly positive outcomes infrequently and only in theoretical terms. The 
negative outcomes, however, were a different story, as we will see below.
2.2 Mitigation and Relapse
Being Athenians, and therefore in their own estimation innately virtuous, the authors of 
this period clearly preferred not to admit that on occasion a teacher might encounter a 
person with a base nature.29 In those few cases (e.g. Hecuba) where a base nature was 
met with positive teaching, the result was a significant improvement of the student’s 
preexisting character to the extent that even savage natures might be tamed by 
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29 Plato is a notable exception to this. At Laws 7.808d-e he explains that all boys must have a teacher for 
without education, they are insolent and treacherous, not to mention sly, wild, and ignorant.
teaching. For example, the so-called “Sisyphus Fragment”30 describes an early period of 
human history when lawlessness ruled and men behaved like beasts (1-12) until an 
unnamed person introduced “the sweetest of teachings” (24-5: τούσδε τοὺς λόγους 
λέγων διδαγμάτων ἥδιστον εἰσηγήσατο). However, the message of the fragment is 
not that of the unqualified success of teaching. The early lawgiver is credited with 
eradicating lawlessness, but he does so by tricking the people into fearing divine 
retribution for criminal behavior. His instruction does not remove their desire to act 
criminally, but rather it creates a disincentive for doing so. Hence, teaching is seen here 
as a mitigating force on base natures, but not a transformative one.  
In fact, some Greek writers believed that all it takes for a student’s nature to lapse into 
wickedness after any improvement is the removal of the positive influence that brought 
about the change. In practical terms, this meant that without the constant exercise of 
self-discipline, a person - whether initially virtuous or not - would fall into base behavior. 
Indeed, this is exactly what Xenophon describes in Cyrus’ speech to his men in the 
Cyropaedia (7.5.75): 
οὐ γάρ τοι τὸ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας γενέσθαι τοῦτο ἀρκεῖ ὥστε καὶ διατελεῖν ὄντας
ἀγαθούς, ἢν μή τις αὐτοῦ διὰ τέλους ἐπιμελῆται· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι 
ἀμεληθεῖσαι μείονος ἄξιαι γίγνονται... οὕτω καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια καὶ 
ἡ ἀλκή, ὁπόταν τις αὐτῶν ἀνῇ τὴν ἄσκησιν, ἐκ τούτου εἰς τὴν πονηρίαν πάλιν 
τρέπεται.
  
Having been noble men at one point is not sufficient for the continuation of goodness in 
the future if one does not maintain this quality continuously. But just as other arts 
retrograde when neglected, in this same way self-control and temperance and strength 
will turn back to vice as soon as one stops cultivating them.
161
30 Attributed to either Critias or Euripides; DK 88 B25, quoted in Sextus Empiricus Against the 
Mathematicians 9.54
According to Cyrus in this passage, the catalyst for relapse may simply be neglect. 
Although Cyrus does not describe his men as having been especially wicked prior to 
their victory, the concern he expresses is that any man - especially one who feels safe 
and relieved after a long battle - can fall victim to laziness and greed. In the context of 
education, this means that when separated for long enough from the improving 
influence of his teacher, a student is likely to revert to a lesser state of virtue or, as the 
case may be, even to relapse into baseness. 
Although he describes this principle as it applies to all people’s natures in the 
Cyropaedia, Xenophon applies it very specifically to students with base natures in an 
important passage about Socrates and his pupils Critias and Alcibiades in the 
Memorabilia (1.2.24-5):31 
Καὶ Κριτίας δὴ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ἕως μὲν Σωκράτει συνήστην, ἐδυνάσθην ἐκείνῳ 
χρωμένω συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν· ἐκείνου δ' ἀπαλλαγέντε, 
Κριτίας μὲν φυγὼν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἐκεῖ συνῆν ἀνθρώποις ἀνομίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ 
δικαιοσύνῃ χρωμένοις, Ἀλκιβιάδης δ' αὖ διὰ μὲν κάλλος ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν 
γυναικῶν θηρώμενος, διὰ δύναμιν δὲ τὴν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὑπὸ 
πολλῶν καὶ δυνατῶν ἀνθρώπων διαθρυπτόμενος…τοιούτων δὲ συμβάντων 
αὐτοῖν, καὶ ὠγκωμένω μὲν ἐπὶ γένει, ἐπηρμένω δ' ἐπὶ πλούτῳ, πεφυσημένω δ' ἐπὶ 
δυνάμει, διατεθρυμμένω δὲ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις 
διεφθαρμένω καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἀπὸ Σωκράτους γεγονότε, τί θαυμαστὸν εἰ 
ὑπερηφάνω ἐγενέσθην;
And so Critias and Alcibiades, as long as they were with Socrates, were able - with him 
as an ally - to master their wicked desires. But when they left his company, Critias fled to 
Thessaly where he associated with men who practiced lawlessness rather than justice; 
and Alcibiades, because of his beauty, was hunted by many great women, and because 
of his influence in the city and among her allies, was spoiled by many powerful men... 
Such was the fortune of these two men, and when on top of pride of birth, 
confidence in wealth, arrogance concerning ability, and temptation by many men, 
were added complete corruption and the fact that they were apart from Socrates 
for a long time, is it any wonder that they became overweening?
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31 For a more thorough discussion of this passage as it relates to the trial and execution of Socrates, see 
Chapter 4.
As Xenophon points out, Critias and Alcibiades were already arrogant and overly proud 
before they went to study under Socrates, but his mitigating influence kept these 
negative traits in check for the duration of their association. It was only when they had 
been away from him for a long time and had spent that time in the company of other 
base-natured people that their original personalities took over again.
The view of education that emerges from these two Xenophon passages is a decidedly 
pessimistic one. It’s true that teaching can have a positive impact on a base nature, but 
that impact will almost certainly be temporary. Teaching is not conceived of here as 
producing a permanent effect, and despite the best efforts of the teacher, a student’s 
physis must revert to its original state (or at least degrade to a less desirable state), 
even after instruction directed to the opposite end. In this way, Xenophon shows himself 
to be aligned with the prevailing contemporary view that physis is the most important 
element of an educational exchange and as we saw in the passage from Hippocrates 
above (Lex 2.2), if physis opposes, everything else is pointless.32 
2.3 Perversion
The least desirable but most interesting outcome of the educational relationship for 
Greek authors was perversion: when misguided or intentionally wicked instruction 
degraded a noble physis. Already in the Archaic period it was believed that a person’s 
good qualities were vulnerable to corruption simply through casual contact with less 
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32 It is presumably for this reason that there is no mention in the literature about educational exchanges 
wherein negative teaching is applied to a base physis: nothing wholly good or even good enough to be 
worth discussing can possibly come of it.
virtuous people. In his advice to his young friend Cyrnus, Theognis warns him not to 
associate with base men but only to cling to the noble, for “from noble men you will 
learn noble things; but if you mingle with base men, you will lose even the sense that 
you have” (1.35-6: ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ' ἐσθλὰ μαθήσεαι· ἢν δὲ κακοῖσιν / 
συμμίσγηις, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἐόντα νόον).33 On the face of it, this passage would 
seem to contradict the aristocratic view that virtue is innate and therefore beyond the 
control of the individual who possesses it. However, it is worth noting that the passages 
touting the supremacy of the aristocratic physis do not claim that this physis is 
necessarily immutable. Just because you are born possessing aretê does not mean you 
don’t have to work to hold onto it. In fact, as we saw above, Pindar, Isocrates, and 
others believed it was the duty of those who had been endowed with natural talents to 
cultivate them through education rather than allow them to be corrupted or to wither 
away from neglect.
But what if the teacher to whom you turn to preserve and enhance your noble physis 
turns out to himself be base?34 This is the very scenario Aeschines warns about in 
Against Timarchus (11): 
ὁ νομοθέτης ἡγήσατο τὸν καλῶς τραφέντα παῖδα ἄνδρα γενόμενον χρήσιμον 
ἔσεσθαι τῇ πόλει· ὅταν δ' ἡ φύσις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εὐθὺς πονηρὰν ἀρχὴν λάβῃ τῆς
παιδείας, ἐκ τῶν κακῶς τεθραμμένων παίδων παραπλησίους ἡγήσατο πολίτας 
ἔσεσθαι Τιμάρχῳ τουτῳί.
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33 The same theme is taken up later by Menander in the famous fragmentary maxim from Thaïs, “bad 
company corrupts good character” (φθείρουσιν ἤθη χρηστὴ ὁμιλίαι κακαί). This passage is quoted in 
St. Paul’s Second Letter to the Corinthians and in the later Christian tradition seems to be a piece of 
cautionary advice about minding the company you keep.
34 The theme of the bad teacher will also be important for our later discussion of Socrates, especially as 
he is portrayed in Aristophanes’ Clouds.
The lawmaker believed that a well-nurtured boy would be a useful member of the city 
when he had grown up, but when a person’s physis is subjected at the outset to base 
education, the lawmaker believed that the children produced by this kind of wrong 
nurture would become citizens like this man Timarchus.
Timarchus, of course, is presented as an immoral villain in the speech, and the last type 
of person a parent would want his/her child to turn out like. With this passage, 
Aeschines is able to simultaneously malign Timarchus and emphasize the importance of 
maintaining regulations concerning the types of people who are allowed to have 
educational interactions with children. This only makes sense given that children were 
(and still are) perceived as especially vulnerable to corrupting influences, particularly by 
those whom they are expected to emulate,35 i.e. their teachers. However, a teacher is 
still a teacher, even when his students have grown up, and a teacher’s potential ability 
to ruin his student’s physis does not necessarily diminish if the student is no longer a 
child. 
For example, in the passage from Thucydides that we discussed in Chapter 2, War is 
seen as a negative teacher (3.82.2):        
ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἵ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνους τὰς 
γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν· ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν 
τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς 
τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ.
For in peace and prosperity cities and individuals have better sentiments because they 
do not experience imperious necessities. But war is a violent didaskalos that takes 
away the easy supply of daily sustenance and assimilates the temperaments of the 
people to their circumstances.
For our purposes, the most telling word in the passage is βίαιος, “violent, forcible”. 
When Thucydides says that War is a violent teacher, the implication is that War not only 
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35 For the role of emulation in education, see Chapter 2, Section 1.3.
conducts its teaching violently, but also that the result of the instruction for the people is 
an increased level of violence in their natures. Indeed, this is what we learn in the next 
line when the author tells us that War assimilates the personalities of the people to their 
circumstances. Given that desperation, ruthless self-preservation, and wanton violence 
are all characteristic of life in wartime, according to Thucydides, previously noble people 
living through war will inevitably take on these negative traits as a result of their (albeit 
metaphorical) teaching relationship with War. In other words, when a noble nature 
comes into contact with a negative teacher, the result will never be improvement of the 
physis. On the contrary, a noble physis cannot withstand the degrading effects of a base 
influence like War, especially when that influence is acting in the role of the didaskalos. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Athenian education operated in large part by 
exploiting a student’s natural tendency to admire and emulate his teacher, and when 
that teacher was War, there were only negative traits for a student to emulate. If we 
apply the metaphorical teaching relationship from this passage of Thucydides to a 
hypothetical Athenian classroom, it is clear what would have happened: a group of 
impressionable, noble-natured youths would have paid rapt attention as their base-
natured teacher encouraged them to conduct themselves wickedly, and by imitating 
their didaskalos, in no time they would also have become base. 
Indeed, if what Thucydides says about the teaching influence of War is true, this paints 
a rather bleak picture of the positive potential of education, i.e. a noble student who 
comes into contact with a negative teacher will always be corrupted. Fortunately, as the 
passage above tacitly implies, at least in the case of War, the effect may have been 
166
temporary. That is to say, the first lines of the passage describe how people are kinder 
and happier when living in peace and prosperity, but it is the intervention of War that 
causes them to become base. Thucydides doesn’t say so in as many words, but by 
reading between the lines we can envision a time after the war when peace has 
returned and with it the better natures of the people. As in the Xenophon example above 
where the positive influence of a teacher only lasts as long as his association with the 
student and in his absence the student’s original base nature reasserts itself, perhaps 
the unspoken implication of the passage from Thucydides is similar: the negative 
influence of the βίαιος διδάσκαλος only lasts for the duration of the war and in its 
absence the people’s original noble natures reemerge.        
The most detailed example of the perverting effect of base teaching upon noble natures 
can be found in Sophocles’ Philoctetes. The premise of the play is simple: the Trojan 
seer Helenus has told the Greeks that in order to win the war they will need to recover 
the crippled archer Philoctetes and his bow - the bow of Heracles - from the island of 
Lemnos where they abandoned him ten years prior. Given that Philoctetes harbors 
extreme hatred toward the Greeks who left him alone on the island, the cunning and 
amoral Odysseus is sent to persuade him. As part of his plan to win Philoctetes over, 
Odysseus enlists the help of Neoptolemus, the son of Achilles, who will earn the 
archer’s trust by pretending to have been similarly maltreated by Odysseus. At lines 
383-8, Neoptolemus tells Philoctetes:   
πλέω πρὸς οἴκους, τῶν ἐμῶν τητώμενος 
πρὸς τοῦ κακίστου κἀκ κακῶν Ὀδυσσέως.  
Κοὐκ αἰτιῶμαι κεῖνον ὡς τοὺς ἐν τέλει· 
πόλις γὰρ ἔστι πᾶσα τῶν ἡγουμένων 
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στρατός τε σύμπας, οἱ δ' ἀκοσμοῦντες βροτῶν 
διδασκάλων λόγοισι γίγνονται κακοί.
I am sailing home, deprived of what is mine 
by the most wicked of wicked men, Odysseus. 
And I do not blame him as much as those in authority. 
For a city, like an army, is entirely dependent upon its leaders, 
and those men who do wrong 
become wicked because of the lessons of their teachers.
In this way, as in the Thucydides passage, Odysseus’s wickedness is the result of the 
influence of wicked didaskaloi. Hence, Neoptolemus does not hold Odysseus entirely 
responsible for his base actions, since a negative teacher can destroy even the noblest 
of natures. However, regardless of whether Odysseus is to blame for his own 
wickedness, as Philoctetes points out later in the play, he is certainly responsible for the 
wickedness of his protégé, Neoptolemus (1013-15):
Ἀλλ' ἡ κακὴ σὴ διὰ μυχῶν βλέπουσ' ἀεὶ 
ψυχή νιν ἀφυῆ τ' ὄντα κοὐ θέλονθ' ὅμως 
εὖ προὐδίδαξεν ἐν κακοῖς εἶναι σοφόν. 
But your wicked soul, always looking out [for opportunity] from hidden corners, taught 
[Neoptolemus] to be skilled at wickedness, even though he is neither willing nor well-
suited. 
Again we see a significant point of connection between the description of teaching in 
this play and the Thucydides passage above. In both texts, the training given by wicked 
didaskaloi (Odysseus and War, respectively) is seen as both compulsory and contrary to 
the natural disposition of the student.36 Like Thucydides’ citizens whose natures in 
peacetime tend toward kindness and virtue, Neoptolemus is described here as lacking 
the predisposition toward wickedness (ἀφυῆ). But in the same way that War forcibly 
assimilates the people’s natures to their circumstances, Odysseus, acting in the role of 
the didaskalos, imposes his own baseness upon his student anyway. Neoptolemus may 
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36 For another example of negative education given to unwilling students, see Plato Timaeus 86d-e.
not be innately base, but that won’t stop Odysseus from exerting influence to make him 
act basely. In this passage, we receive a harsh reminder that in the Greek view, 
paradoxically, the teacher held far more power than the student over the outcome of an 
educational exchange.37 
From an educational philosophy standpoint, the situation described in the Philoctetes is 
distressing on another level as well. According to this play, base teaching can be seen 
as setting in motion a kind of domino effect. That is, base teachers make base men (like 
Odysseus) who, by imitating their teachers and assimilating their own students to 
themselves, go on to make more base men (like Neoptolemus). In this way, the harmful 
influence of a single bad teacher could spread exponentially, and the whole virtuous 
Greek world might be corrupted very rapidly.38 However, the final scene of the 
Philoctetes offers some hope. After successfully tricking the crippled archer out of his 
bow, Neoptolemus is preparing to depart with Odysseus when he undergoes a crisis of 
conscience. Ignoring his teacher’s orders to stop, he runs back to Philoctetes, returns 
the bow to him, and offers to bring him back to Troy so he may receive the proper 
medical treatment for his foot. Upon receiving the bow, the surprised and grateful 
Philoctetes praises Neoptolemus for living up to his innate potential (1310-13):
...τὴν φύσιν δ' ἔδειξας, ὦ τέκνον,
ἐξ ἧς ἔβλαστες, οὐχὶ Σισύφου πατρός,
ἀλλ' ἐξ Ἀχιλλέως, ὃς μετὰ ζώντων ὅτ' ἦν
ἤκου' ἄριστα, νῦν δὲ τῶν τεθνηκότων.
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37 For teachers as always more blameworthy than their students for negative educational outcomes, see 
Plato Timaeus 87b. Cf. above Chapter 2, Section 1.3 on teacher responsibility.
38 For the way this idea informed the contemporary discourse concerning Socrates’ teaching, especially 
as depicted in Aristophanes’ Clouds, see Chapter 4.
Child, you have shown the physis 
from which you were born, and Sisyphus was not your father,
but Achilles, who was the greatest among the living,
and is still so even now among the dead.
The message here is clearly that even despite the most corrupting of teaching, a noble 
nature can still win out in the end, for teaching can affect how you act but it cannot 
change who you innately are. In the same way that Critias and Alcibiades relapsed into 
wickedness once they had left Socrates’ noble company, in this play, Neoptolemus’ 
innate goodness was able to overcome Odysseus’ base teaching once the latter had 
ceased actively trying to influence his student. In short, in this particular battle between 
nature and nurture - and in the one described by Xenophon -, nature prevails.       
3. Character Formation and the Role of the Didaskalos
The above discussion of education in the Philoctetes brings us full circle to the point 
where we began this chapter: with the importance of physis. Despite their authors’ 
varying degrees of conviction in the matter, all of the passages we have examined 
exhibit a belief in the power of nature to shape personality in a way that nurture alone 
can never achieve. As Heraclitus is quoted by Strabo as professing (DK 22 B119), “A 
man’s character is his destiny” (ἦθος ἀνθρώπωι δαίμων). Try as he might, an innately 
base person can never hope to attain the same degree of virtue as one who is innately 
noble. 
However, this does not mean that character formation was thought to be impossible. 
When faced with concrete examples of the ways teaching could change a person’s 
behavior (and possibly even his nature) for better or worse, Greek authors reconciled 
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this information with their long-held beliefs about the primacy of physis in a variety of 
ways. As the passages in this chapter attest, teaching was seen to profoundly affect 
both base and noble natures. Exemplary teaching was believed by Greek authors to 
have a positive effect on all types of physis, while unscrupulous teaching could only 
result in debasement of the student’s physis. 
As a result, writers like Thucydides and Xenophon came to the conclusion in their 
writing that although nature is a prerequisite to virtue, nurture can sometimes overcome 
it, at least temporarily. Specifically, a base nature can be improved by good teaching, 
but the improvement will only last as long as the teaching relationship. However, in the 
opposite circumstance, that is, noble natures acted upon by base teaching, the outcome 
was slightly less predictable. Negative teaching corrupted noble natures without 
exception, but in some cases the corruption was temporary. The Greek writers 
themselves do not explain why this could happen with some students but not others, but 
by setting the examples side-by-side as we have done above, we may come to some 
tentative conclusions. 
First, the corrupting effects of base teaching seem to have been more permanent for 
younger students. As both Aeschines and Theognis warn, a young person who is 
exposed to bad nurture will be made wicked, and neither author mentions the possibility 
of reversing this effect. This only makes sense given that children were believed to be 
more vulnerable than adults to the influence of an authority figure, particularly a teacher. 
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Second, the likelihood of a person’s nature returning to its original noble state correlated 
to some extent with the duration of the corrupting influence. That is, it may have been 
that the longer the base teaching went on, the less likely a person’s physis was to 
recover from it. Hence, in the examples from Thucydides and Sophocles, both War and 
Odysseus have only short-term interactions with their students, and as a result, the 
students’ original natures are able to overcome the negative effects of the teaching. This 
would also explain why a well-known Menander fragment (φθείρουσιν ἤθη χρηστὴ 
ὁμιλίαι κακαί)39 tacitly implies that the corruption of good character by bad company is 
a permanent state. The noun ὁμιλία meaning “company” or “association”, is often used 
to describe continuous and ongoing contact between two parties, and if that is the case 
with the bad company in the fragment, it would be nearly impossible for a noble 
person’s physis to recover from it. After all, people tend to act in ways that correspond 
with the behavior of their associates - through emulation or otherwise -, and if one 
behaves badly for long enough, his physis may change to match the behavior. 
These conclusions raise an important question about the character of the didaskalos 
that will prove vital to our discussion in the next chapter. That is, given that it is possible 
for a base teacher to permanently corrupt a noble child through the process of 
emulation, should some steps be taken to ensure that base teachers are held 
accountable for doing so? More specifically, is it acceptable to punish a didaskalos for 
ruining a previously noble physis? 
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39 As we will recall, this is the same thing that Socrates is accused by Meletus of doing to the youth of 
Athens: διαφθείρειν 
As we saw in Chapter 2, for the Athenians, the answer to this question was undoubtedly  
“yes”. Indeed, it is this very thing for which charges are brought against Socrates by 
Meletus and for which Aristophanes lampoons him in the Clouds. Socrates himself tries 
to refute the accusation by denying that he is actually a didaskalos, or that didachê as 
such even exists.40 As we know, the jury was unconvinced by Socrates’ defense, and it 
was only posthumously that Xenophon was able to redeem his friend by explaining that 
Critias and Alcibiades had never had noble natures to begin with so Socrates could not 
have corrupted them. He simply mitigated their preexisting baseness and as soon as 
they parted from him, they relapsed completely. In Xenophon’s view, far from receiving 
blame, Socrates should have been commended for the ennobling influence he exerted 
upon his pupils while they were in his company (Mem. 1.2.26). 
Let us turn now in Chapter 4 to a more complete investigation of the issues surrounding 
Socrates’ trial and execution and the question of whether or not he was a base - or 
indeed any kind of - didaskalos. We will begin our discussion with Aristophanes’ Clouds 
where we will see many of the ideas presented above - the unteachable student, the 
bad teacher - recurring in the most sustained ancient depiction of the teacher-student 
relationship from its promising beginning to its catastrophic end.
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40 For complete discussion of the passages in which Socrates denies the existence of teaching, see 
Chapter 4.
CHAPTER 4
SOCRATES THE TEACHER
At this point, in light of our earlier investigation of the didaskalos, we can undertake the 
re-interpretation of the literary accounts about Socrates. In this chapter, it will be seen 
that the whole complex of ideas surrounding teaching and the role of the teacher in 
Classical Athens had a large part in shaping the depictions of Socrates by Aristophanes, 
Plato, and Xenophon.
1. The Real Problem of Socrates
The overwhelming trend in scholarship about Socrates has been to try to reconcile the 
picture of him in Aristophanes’ Clouds with his defense speech in Plato’s Apology, and 
then to look for a way to fit the evidence from Xenophon’s Memorabilia into this 
framework. To do this, scholars have come up with all sorts of more or less plausible 
theories: one or the other or all three of these authors were incorrect about Socrates’ 
personality; they each were writing about different times in Socrates’ life; one or more of 
them lied in their depictions of him. The goal of the final part of this study is not to add 
another theory to the already vast collection; instead, I submit that theories of this sort 
are unnecessary. 
In the following chapter, I hope to show that the previous approaches to how Socrates is 
characterized in the literature have been missing the crucial point. There is no need to 
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massage the texts in order to achieve a unified picture of Socrates, for there is a 
substantive continuity between the charge against Socrates in the Clouds and the 
defenses of him by Plato and Xenophon. The point of Aristophanes’ depiction of 
Socrates in the Clouds is not mischaracterization, stereotyping, or mockery, but rather 
crime and punishment. The crime, as Aristophanes presents it, is improper didaskalia, 
and the punishment is the burning of the Phrontistêrion. In other words, the most 
serious charge against Socrates in the Clouds is that he teaches in the manner of a 
didaskalos, and it is for this crime that he is punished both in the play and (at least in 
part) in reality. Even more importantly, in response to this depiction in the Clouds, it is 
the charge of being a didaskalos that Plato’s Socrates contests most strongly in the 
Apology and the Euthyphro and that Xenophon spends the bulk of the Memorabilia 
qualifying and accounting for.        
 
2. Aristophanes’ Accusation: The Case of the Clouds
Aristophanes’ Clouds is the only extant work about Socrates that was written during his 
lifetime, and as such, the portrait of Socrates in it inevitably influenced the later 
depictions of him by Plato and Xenophon. The premise of the play is simple enough – 
after attempting unsuccessfully to get his spendthrift son Phidippides to go to school, 
the middle-aged, bumbling Strepsiades goes to the Phrontistêrion himself to learn from 
the eccentric, subversive, and somewhat pompous Socrates figure how to talk his way 
out of his debts. At the Phrontistêrion, Strepsiades interacts with a variety of ridiculous 
characters: some of Socrates’ students who are learning natural science; the Clouds, 
who are the patron deities of argumentation in the play; and Socrates himself, who 
attempts to give Strepsiades a one-on-one lesson in grammar and music. When 
Strepsiades fails to learn what Socrates teaches, he is expelled from the Phrontistêrion. 
As a last resort, he finally convinces his son Phidippides to submit to Socrates’ 
teachings instead, and Phidippides is subsequently courted by two Arguments, each 
representing a contemporary educational model on offer at the Phrontistêrion, before 
choosing to learn disputation from the Worse Argument. The play concludes with 
Strepsiades talking his way out of his debts, then coming to fervently regret his decision 
to send his son to school when Phidippides uses his skill in disputation to justify beating 
his father. Desperate for revenge, Strepsiades seeks advice from Hermes on the proper 
punishment for his son’s teachers, and the final scene depicts a crazed Strepsiades 
burning down the Phrontistêrion with Socrates and all of his students inside.1 
As was mentioned briefly above, Aristophanes’ Socrates is interested in a variety of 
ordinarily unrelated fields of study.2 In this connection, Konstan has pointed out (2011, 
85), “Aristophanes assembled a hodge-podge of intellectual pursuits, from eristic 
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1 The final scene of the play described above is, of course, the re-written and possibly re-staged version 
that survives. It is not part of my argument to speculate on the changes that may have been made 
between the first version of the play and the one we have. The only thing that matters for our purposes is 
that the extant version of the play was written and made public during the last quarter of the fifth century.
2 Some scholars (e.g. Vander Waerdt 1994, 61) have made much of the distinction to be drawn based on 
who is speaking in the play, arguing that the educational and intellectual practices of the Socrates 
character must be kept separate from the ideas and practices of his students, the Clouds, and the two 
Arguments. For example, Vander Waerdt has asserted that because Socrates says at line 882ff that the 
Worse Argument will teach Phidippides because he himself will be elsewhere, we cannot associate the 
Sophistic training of the Worse Argument with Socrates. However, this claim has been thoroughly refuted 
by Nussbaum (1980, 48) et al who point out that the Socrates character is probably just following 
theatrical convention whereby (excluding the chorus) only two actors could be present on stage at a time, 
and further, Socrates is not exempt from the abuse heaped on the two Arguments in the play and his 
teaching is never clearly distinguished from the other intellectual activity taking place at the 
Phrontistêrion. It seems clear to me that Aristophanes intended his audience to associate all of these 
activities with Socrates, and this is certainly the impression we are left with at the end of the play.
argumentation to speculation about the gods, astronomy, meteorological phenomena, 
biology, poetry, and grammar and combined them all in Socrates.” The resulting 
amalgamation has drawn much scholarly attention, and a number of different 
explanations have been given for the portrayal of Socrates in the Clouds.3 Most 
commonly, Aristophanes’ Socrates is said to be a Sophist, like Hippias or Prodicus.4 
Sometimes he is seen as a natural philosopher of either the Ionian or Milesian school.5 
Occasionally, he is called some combination of these two things as a sort of neo-
intellectual figure or phrontistês,6 and for a handful of scholars Aristophanes’ character 
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3 All of the current scholarly theories will be treated below, save one: There are undeniably some aspects 
of mystery cult parodied in the Clouds (e.g. 140ff), and some scholars have made much of this in their 
analyses of the play (e.g. Konstan 2011, 86), but since I do not believe these bear directly on the question 
of Socrates’ teaching, they will not be treated in this chapter. 
4 This is the prevailing view. Robb 1993, 97: “In fifth-century conservative eyes, the differences between 
Socrates and a Sophist - ones that Plato was at such pains to demonstrate - were, it seems, not 
perceived as overly relevant, as the nomenclature used in Old Comedy reveals. Socrates is never a 
philosophos; he is another sophistês, one of the sophoi, figures who were, in the fifth-century literature, 
often considered too clever by half. It is in their role as innovative educators, teachers of the young, that 
they were most deeply resented.” Konstan 2011, 77: “Aristophanes’ Socrates will thus emerge as a 
composite figure, representing not a single individual but Sophists in general, bearing whatever traits 
were most striking and likely to amuse.” Guthrie 1971a, 51: “[Socrates in the Clouds] is in fact a replica of 
Protagoras.” For further examples, see Strauss 1966, 3; Guthrie 1971a, 39-57; Kerferd 1981, 56; Dover 
1968, lii-liv; Romilly 1992, 43-4; Blackson 2011, 92 n. 3.
5 Burnet 1914, 118: “The Phrontisterion, in fact, is a burlesque of an organized scientific school of a type 
which was well known in Ionia and Italy... If [Aristophanes] had voluntarily or involuntarily confused 
Sokrates with anyone, it is not with sophists like Protagoras and Gorgias or their followers, but with 
Anaxagoras and Archelaos.” Vander Waerdt 1994, 61: “Socrates is consistently represented in the Clouds 
as an adherent of the views of Diogenes of Appollonia.” Konstan 2011, 80-1: “Aristophanes aligns his 
Socrates principally with the mechanistic views of thinkers such as Anaxagoras and the Ionian 
cosmologists.” Blackson 2011, 47: “Socrates was firmly within the tradition of the Milesian revolution.” See 
also Taylor 1911, 135ff; ; Edmunds 2006, 416; Woodruff 2011, 95; Navia 1993, 50.
6 Scott 2000, 185: “Socrates was some kind of marginal Sophist crossed with a natural philosopher.” 
Woodruff 2011, 94: “Aristophanes imagined a school, run by Socrates, that promotes both natural science 
and persuasive argument; thus Aristophanes conveniently painted one human target for the conservative 
wrath that both of these trends aroused.” Guthrie 1971b, 100; Navia 1993, 49. For the coinage of 
φροντιστής by Aristophanes to describe Socrates and his circle in the Clouds, see discussion below, and 
also Edmunds 2006, 416-18 and Taylor 1911, 134-5. 
primarily represents the historical Socrates with all of his well-known idiosyncrasies.7 
Still others resist a simple classification, settling instead on a multi-stranded argument, 
like Guthrie’s claim that in the Socrates of the Clouds, “we can recognize at least three 
different types which were never united to perfection in any single person”: first, the 
Sophist, who teaches the art of making a good case out of a bad one; secondly, the 
atheistic natural philosopher like Anaxagoras; and thirdly, Socrates himself, the ascetic 
moral teacher, ragged and starving through his indifference to his own worldly interests.8 
In my view, none of these theories is entirely wrong. However, despite this variety of 
treatments and analyses, no one has yet associated the character of Socrates in the 
Clouds with the figure of the didaskalos, and this, I would argue, is his primary function 
in the play. 
In the rest of this chapter, I hope to show that scholarly neglect of the didaskalic 
elements in Aristophanes’ portrayal of Socrates has been a critical error for our 
understanding of the Socratic works of Plato and Xenophon, and of ancient education 
more broadly. I am not arguing that Socrates in the Clouds was simply a didaskalos. 
Rather, I would submit that Aristophanes’ character is a blend of all types of 
contemporary intellectual - including the Sophist, the natural philosopher, Socrates 
himself, and the didaskalos - but that the evidence for the didaskalos is most pervasive 
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7 Andic 2001, 163: Socrates is “the same person that we find in the Platonic dialogues.” Edmunds 1986, 
210: “We are facing the same Socrates known to us from Plato and Xenophon.” See also Nussbaum 
1980, 70ff; Mignanego 1992, 98.
8 On which, see Guthrie 1971a, 52. The issue is further complicated by the fact that there was significant 
overlap between all of these categories in antiquity, and the categories themselves were far from the 
black-and-white labels scholars use today to refer to them by. For category confusion in the Clouds, see 
Konstan 2011, 80: “Comedy has its own license, and the picture of Socrates that emerges from Clouds is, 
as one might have expected, inconsistent.”
in the play, and for our purposes, this final figure is the most important. In order to show 
this, in the remainder of this section, I will make a brief survey of the evidence for each 
of the theories presented above - including the hitherto unacknowledged evidence for 
Socrates as a didaskalos - and conclude with analyses of two important scenes from 
the Clouds.
2.1 Socrates as a Sophist
 The prevailing view concerning Aristophanes’ Socrates is that he is presented as a 
Sophist. According to Blackson (2011, p. 92 n. 3), “The parody of Socrates in 
Aristophanes’ Clouds shows that the Athenians were not concerned to distinguish 
Socrates and his methods from those of the Sophists.” But what exactly were the 
methods of the Sophists, and how are these portrayed in the Clouds? The following 
table presents the seven qualifications of a Sophist as they were determined in Chapter 
1 and lays the evidence from the play alongside them.9
179
9 Numbers in the table denote line numbers from the Clouds.
Table 2
Qualities of a 
Sophist
Evidence for Socrates as a Sophist in the Clouds
Polymathy He studies geometry, astronomy, geology, geography, 
meteorology, and biology: 144-407; He teaches grammar and 
music: 636-95 
Charisma n/a
Mastery of 
Disputation
He teaches how to make the Weaker Argument the Stronger: 
112-16, 429-36, 1229, 1000-1105, 1399-1405 
Itinerancy n/a
Promise of 
Results
After instruction, Strepsiades will be identical to Chaerephon (one 
of Socrates’ students): 500; Phidippides will be made into a clever 
sophist by the Worse Argument:1111
Self-Professed 
Title of sophistês
n/a
Pay Strepsiades says the men at the Thinkery will train people in 
disputation for pay: 98; Strepsiades offers to pay tuition: 245, 
1146
Clearly, there are some key points of connection between Socrates and the Sophists in 
the Clouds, namely the character’s promise of results and his instruction in disputation. 
As for the others, there has been some debate about whether Socrates actually accepts 
any money from Strepsiades;10 regardless, the evidence of pay to denote sophistry is 
not very strong, given that a didaskalos would also have taken money for teaching. 
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10 See Vander Waerdt 1994, 59; Nussbaum 1980, 73; and Dover 1968, liv.
Furthermore, Socrates’ polymathy, since it comprises science11 and music,12 works 
better as evidence that Socrates is a natural philosopher and/or a didaskalos. The most 
definitive difference between Aristophanes’ Socrates and a Sophist, however, is the 
latter’s itinerancy. The Socrates figure in the Clouds is clearly stationed in a specific 
building longterm;13 no parallel for this exists with any of the Sophists. Additionally, 
Socrates in the Clouds never claims the title either of sophistês14 or sophos,15 nor is he 
ever described as being enchanting or irresistible, as Protagoras and others were.16 In 
sum, then, Socrates in the play displays 3 (perhaps 4) traits that are associated 
specifically with the Sophists. Yet as we determined in Chapter 1, the Sophists 
themselves shared a number of characteristics with other categories of intellectual, 
specifically public wise men like the Seven Sages, and it is only by taking all of their 
defining qualities together that we can distinguish a separate category of the Sophist. 
Since Socrates in the Clouds possesses some, but not all and not only Sophistic traits, 
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11 The experimental and observational science were the field of the natural philosophers. According to 
Kerferd 1981, 39, “The sophists were simply not interested in physical speculations.” Cf. Beck 1964, 142 
for the Sophists, “astronomy, geometry, and the like could be studied, but rather as a basis of 
philosophical speculation than as experimental or observational sciences. Hypotheses might not be 
tested experimentally in nature - the only test was that of internal logical consistency.”
12 Which would have included grammar. For grammar and music as more didaskalic than Sophistic, see 
the discussion below under “Socrates as a didaskalos.” 
13 See discussion under “Episode One” below for more on Socrates’ schoolhouse in the play.
14 At line 360, the Clouds lump Socrates together with Prodicus under the heading of μετεωροσοφισταί, 
but it seems unlikely that this is being used in the specialized sense of a Sophist qua educator, but rather 
like phrontistês to describe the general type of intellectual who studies both argumentation and celestial 
phenomena.   
15 At lines 94, 491, 517, and 841 Strepsiades refers to the Thinkery as a place where one can find wise 
men and/or learn wise things, and at lines 955 and 1024 the Chorus refers to the two Arguments as 
practitioners of sophia. At no point in the play does anyone refer to Socrates specifically as sophos. I 
would argue as well that there is a significant difference between the connotations of sophos and 
sophistês in Aristophanes’ plays. For sophos as a value-neutral term for intelligent folk in the Clouds see 
Dover’s (1968, 106) discussion on line 94.
16 See Chapter 1, section 3.2.2 for examples.
he cannot simply be a Sophist, as we have defined this type. The character of Socrates 
may resemble a Sophist, but he is not identical with one.    
2.2 Socrates as a Natural Philosopher
The evidence for Socrates as a natural philosopher in the Clouds comes primarily from 
lines 144-424. This episode consists of Strepsiades’ discovery of the scientific subjects 
that are studied at the Thinkery - astronomy, geometry, geography, and experimental 
biology (144-216) - and then a lesson from Socrates on meteorology (220-424). Each of 
these fields was known already in antiquity as the pursuit of one or more of the pre-
Socratic natural philosophers, specifically Anaxagoras, Anaximander, Anaximenes, 
Thales, and Diogenes of Apollonia, and it is in their footsteps that Socrates and his 
students are following in this scene.17 As with the previous section on Socrates as a 
Sophist, the evidence for this character as a natural philosopher is undeniable. Certainly 
scholars who have made claims to this effect are not wrong, but in this analysis they are 
leaving out the rest of the play. How can Socrates’ promise to teach Strepsiades to 
make the Weaker Argument the Stronger be reconciled with the view of Socrates as a 
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17 Astronomy and meteorology were the province of Anaxagoras: see Navia (1993), 50; Plato’s Phaedrus 
270a3-8; Diogenes Laertius Lives of the Philosophers 2.4. Geometry was the field of Thales, who was 
said to have been the first person to measure large distances on land and at sea using geometry: see 
Diogenes Laertius Lives of the Philosophers 1.24. Geography belonged to Anaximander, who was listed 
in Strabo’s Geography (1.1.1; 1.1.11) as one of the first cartographers. Experimental biology was 
dominated by Diogenes of Apollonia: see Vander Waerdt 1994, 74 for Diogenes as an experimental 
scientist; see DK 64 B8 for a Diogenean parallel with the gnat buzzing problem that Socrates solved at 
Clouds 155ff. In fact, the famous image at Clouds 232-4 of Socrates observing the sky from a basket 
suspended in midair draws on a theory of Diogenes of Apollonia that moisture inhibits the mind, since the 
mind itself is made up of Air. On which, see Vander Waerdt  1994, 61; for the texts and translations of the 
fragments of Diogenes of Apollonia, see Laks 1983.
! Lines 220-424 provide a further example, for Socrates is seen worshipping a set of female deities 
that he calls Clouds (316-18; 365) and some relatives of theirs he refers to as King Air (264) and Dinos 
(378-81), the latter of whom has displaced Zeus from his position as ruler of the gods. According to 
Diogenes of Apollonia, Air is the single source from which everything comes into being (DK 64 B2), and 
Air is the ruler of all (DK 64 B5), while Anaximenes claimed Air as a deity (Burnet 1914, 19).  
natural philosopher? The pre-Socratics did not take theoretical interest in rhetoric and 
argumentation, just as the Sophists did not study observational science.        
2.3 Socrates as Himself  
Some scholars have advanced an interpretation of the Clouds wherein the figure of 
Socrates reflects more or less the person we have come to think of from Plato and 
Xenophon as the historical Socrates. As Kierkegaard famously stated in the seventh 
thesis of his dissertation (1965, 349), “Aristophanes has come very close to the truth in 
his depiction of Socrates.”18 Although most people would not go quite that far, all would 
agree that as a public figure in Athens in the fifth century, Socrates came to be 
associated in the historical record with a number of odd personal characteristics and 
unusual teaching methods which must have offered irresistible fodder for comedians 
like Aristophanes, as we can see from the evidence of the other surviving fragments of 
Old Comedy,19 as well as from the Clouds. For example, in the play, Socrates is 
depicted as unshod (103; 363) and casting his eyes sideways as he walks (362),20 both 
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18 See also Andic 1992, 161.
19 Ameipsias in Konnos (fr. 9 = Diogenes Laertius 2.27-8) says that as well as “being foolish, going 
hungry, having no decent coat and being “born to spite the cobblers” (since he never wore shoes), 
Socrates had great powers of endurance and never stooped to flattery” (Guthrie 1971a, 40). Eupolis is 
said to have described Socrates as a beggar who contemplates everything but doesn’t know or care 
where his next meal will come from (fr. 386 = Asclepiades on Aristotle, Metaphysics (Commentaria in 
Aristotelem Graeca VI.2.135.21) and Olympiodorus on Plato, Phaedo 70b), and in one fragment he is 
said to have been attacked by Eupolis even more than by Aristophanes in the entirety of the Clouds (fr. 
395 = Scholia on Aristophanes’ Clouds 96). For a translation of these fragments, see Rusten 2011, 356-7 
(Ameipsias) and 271-2 (Eupolis). 
20 The other Socratic traits that are most frequently referred to in the play (and which match up with the 
other fragments of Old Comedy) are the ability to endure unpleasantness and a concomitant tendency 
toward asceticism. For example, at lines 415-17, this takes the form of being on one’s feet all day (415), 
being constantly cold and hungry (416), and abstaining from wine and gymnastics (417). Socrates himself 
was said to have spent all of his time walking around and conversing with young men, he supposedly did 
not care about physical discomfort, and he made a point of living like an ascetic, particularly with respect 
to drinking (see Plato Symposium 200, Crito 34b; Xenophon Memorabilia 1.1.10, 1.2, 1.3).
of which were unique traits of the historical Socrates as described by Plato.21 In 
addition, at lines 385 and 740-5 Aristophanes references specific Socratic teaching 
methods: maieusis, diairesis, and aporesis.22 At line 385, Aristophanes’ Socrates offers 
to teach Strepsiades “from himself” (ἀπὸ σαυτοῦ᾽ γώ σε διδάξω), which recalls 
Socrates’ maieutic methods from the Meno and the Theaetetus.23 Then, at lines 740-5, 
the character of Socrates employs a kind of deductive reasoning with his student that 
closely resembles Socratic diairesis;24 and he follows this by applying the doctrine of 
aporia.25 Aristophanes clearly exploited the most recognizable Socratic traits as material 
for parody and lampoon in several scenes in the Clouds.        
2.4 Socrates as a Didaskalos
Up to this point, with each of the other types of intellectual, I have merely summarized 
the arguments that other scholars have made concerning Socrates in the Clouds. Here, 
however, I will shift tactics. Whereas it was sufficient above to make a general survey of 
the well-established evidence for each category, with the didaskalos we are on an 
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21 Cf. Symposium 174, 220
22 For a survey of each of these methods in the Platonic corpus, see Beck 1964, 190-8. For further 
elaboration on the Aristophanic parody of the methods of the historical Socrates, see Konstan 2011, 83-4, 
especially note 14.
23 More on this below under “Plato’s Response”.
24 First, at 740-2, he instructs Strepsiades to “cut up his thinking and refine it; examine the problem piece 
by piece, correctly sorting and investigating,” a method that echoes the way Socrates, Theaetetus, and 
the Eleatic Stranger go about categorizing the figure of the Sophist in Plato’s Sophist. This is also the 
method used in Plato’s Statesman.
25 At lines 743-5, when Strepsiades has expressed resistance to the first method, Socrates tells him that if 
he hits a dead end (aporia) in his thought process, he should simply skip to another train of thought and 
come back to the first one later. Aristophanes makes the connection with the Socratic doctrine of aporia 
clear by using the verb aporein at line 743. On which, see Konstan 2011, 83: “This sounds like a parody 
of the Socratic procedure of driving deliberation to the point of aporia (the scholia...already noted the 
resemblance).” See also Clouds 702-5.
untrodden path. Not even Konstan, the scholar who recognizes the greatest number of 
Socrates’ pursuits in the play, has acknowledged his role as a didaskalos in it. Hence, 
since the evidence below represents a new interpretation of Aristophanes’ Clouds, I will 
spend much more time analyzing each passage, focusing on specific word choices and 
turns of phrase in the Greek text. 
From a didaskalic standpoint the two most important passages from the Clouds are 1) 
the one-on-one lesson between Socrates and Strepsiades (476-790), and 2) the agôn 
between the Better and Worse Arguments over who will teach Phidippides (889-1113). 
Although both of these scenes have been described as generally Sophistic by other 
scholars, it is my aim to show that the curriculum and methodology employed by 
Socrates and his representatives (i.e. the Arguments) in the given passages are the first 
sustained statements of what would come to be associated with the traditional work of a 
didaskalos.
First, let’s consider the individual lesson between Socrates and Strepsiades at lines 
476-790, beginning with the curriculum Socrates offers his student (476-7, 636-8, and 
655-8):  
{Χορ.} ἀλλ' ἐγχείρει τὸν πρεσβύτην ὅτιπερ μέλλεις προδιδάσκειν καὶ διακίνει τὸν 
νοῦν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς γνώμης ἀποπειρῶ... 
{Σω.} ἄγε δή, τί βούλει πρῶτα νυνὶ μανθάνειν ὧν οὐκ ἐδιδάχθης πώποτ' οὐδέν; 
εἰπέ μοι. πότερον περὶ μέτρων ἢ περὶ ἐπῶν ἢ ῥυθμῶν;... 
{Στ.} οὐ γὰρ ᾠζυρὲ τούτων ἐπιθυμῶ μανθάνειν οὐδέν.
{Σω.} τί δαί;
{Στ.} ἐκεῖν' ἐκεῖνο, τὸν ἀδικώτατον λόγον.
{Σω.} ἀλλ' ἕτερα δεῖ σε πρότερα τούτου μανθάνειν, τῶν τετραπόδων ἅττ' ἐστιν 
ὀρθῶς ἄρρενα.
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CHOR: So go ahead and give the old man whatever preliminary lessons you want and 
stir up his mind and test his intelligence...
SOC: Okay then, what do you want to learn first of the things you’ve never been taught 
before? Tell me, would you rather learn about measures or words or rhythms?... 
STR: The truth is, poor man, I don’t want to learn any of these things.
SOC: What then?
STR: That one there, the Very Worst Argument.
SOC: But you have to learn other things before you can learn that, for instance, which of 
the quadrupeds is actually masculine.
Socrates’ curriculum, as Aristophanes describes it, has three characteristics: 1) It covers 
measures, rhythms, and words (638); 2) It begins with the most basic level of instruction 
(636-7); and 3) It proceeds in a set sequence (476-7; 655-8). All three of these 
characteristics are specific to the instruction of a didaskalos. 
Concerning characteristic (1), course content, according to Beck (1964, 311), at the 
elementary level of education, a student would receive instruction from a didaskalos in 
basic arithmetic, music, literature, poetry, and often grammar.26 This matches up with 
Socrates’ offer to teach Strepsiades “measures” - which could refer to both 
mathematical lengths and volumes and also musical meter - “rhythms”, and “words”. 
Similarly, at lines 641-54 Socrates’ dispute with his student about which measure is the 
most beautiful is clearly a parody of an elementary music lesson,27 while the instruction 
on grammatical gender at lines 660-93 is an exaggeration of the “incessant mental 
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26 See also Marrou 1956, 142.
27 For rhythms and meter as a subject of elementary education, see Plato Protagoras 326b.
gymnastics” taught by a grammarian or grammatodidaskalos (Cribiore 2001, 205).28 As 
Cribiore (2001) has pointed out regarding the lessons of the grammar teacher:
Not only did exercises include unusual tenses and forms that were rare in... correct 
common usage, but they also called for practice with nonexistent forms, purely artificial 
constructions such as future imperatives, born out of artificially logical thinking. In his 
niche of expertise, the grammarian was king and he dictated the rules of the game. (215)
This fits the ridiculous drills Aristophanes’ Socrates puts Strepsiades through on the 
grammatical gender of various common nouns and personal names, and although some 
scholars have associated this episode with the linguistic teaching of Prodicus or 
Protagoras, the kind of language play seen in these lines is without a doubt the province 
of the didaskalos. The Sophists, inasmuch as they were interested in language and 
linguistic theory, are known for their concern with the philosophical basis of words, not 
with the specifics of usage.29 Even so, it would not be surprising if there were some 
intentional blending of Sophistic and didaskalic traits in this passage. In this way, 
Aristophanes could hint at (and therefore make fun of) the linguistic interests of some of 
the Sophists, while still keeping the focus of the scene on his parody of the lessons of a 
didaskalos.30  
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28 This person was often simply referred to as a didaskalos, although more specialized terms existed, e.g. 
grammatistês or grammatikos. Complicating this matter is the fact that the boundaries between the 
functions of the elementary schoolmaster and the grammarian were often nonexistent and “secondary 
teachers might be called simply didaskaloi” (Cribiore 2001, 53). 
29 See Kerferd 1981, 46. Cf. Plato Cratylus for the sort of linguistic theorizing that Protagoras and 
Prodicus were thought to have engaged in.
30 Aristophanes may be doing something similar in the Banqueters. In fr. 205 and 233 of the play, the 
father who has sent one of his sons to a didaskalos and one to a Sophist engages in a back-and-forth 
with the latter over useless Homeric glosses he has learned from his smooth-talking teacher. However, 
compilations of Homeric glosses and related grammatical minutiae were not the domain of the Sophist, 
but of the didaskalos (Cribiore 2001, 142). Aristophanes, knowing that it would make the scene even 
more laughable, may have put this material in the mouth of the Sophist-trained boy, with the expectation 
that his audience would recognize the conflation of the two types of teacher. For a translation of the 
fragments of the Banqueters, see Henderson in Rusten 2011, 302 and 304. 
As for the starting point of the curriculum (characteristic (2) above) provided by 
Aristophanes’ Socrates, only a few things need to be mentioned. First, Socrates, like a 
didaskalos starting a new student off on his initial course of study, offers to begin 
teaching Strepsiades one of the subjects about which he has not previously learned. 
This is made more comical, of course, by the fact that Strepsiades is a middle-aged 
man, and the normal starting age for elementary education would have been 
somewhere between ages five and seven. As a result, Strepsiades has already had a 
small amount of education - enough to read his account books, at least - and does not 
have to begin with the alphabet. So, Socrates in the play begins with the level of 
instruction immediately following basic familiarity with letters and words. This contrasts 
sharply with the way the Sophists operated - that is, by teaching students who had 
already completed their elementary and secondary education and were sufficiently 
advanced in literacy to study rhetoric and argumentation. 
The last thing to note about the curriculum in the Clouds is its rigid sequencing 
(characteristic (3) above). At lines 476-7 (see above), the Chorus leader tells Socrates 
to give Strepsiades his “preliminary instruction” (προδιδάσκειν) before the Clouds will 
teach him how to make the Weaker Argument the Stronger, and at lines 655-8, when 
Strepsiades throws a tantrum because he is being made to study grammar and music 
instead of learning the Very Worst Argument, Socrates insists that there are other things 
that must be learned first. Strepsiades does not have the requisite background in the 
basic rules of syntax to attempt the study of advanced rhetoric. The curriculum at the 
Thinkery, like that of a didaskalos, was organized into stages of ascending difficulty and 
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complexity, beginning with the alphabet and progressing all the way up to rhetorical 
theory; each preceding stage had to be completed before the student could advance to 
the next. In this way, as Raffaella Cribiore argues (2001, 222), “learning was organized 
into a series of tightly connected links, each joined to the previous and giving a base to 
the next” in a system that was very familiar to a student from the earliest levels of 
schooling onward. Although the discussion about grammatical gender that follows at 
lines 660-93 is certainly exaggerated for comedic effect, the strictly enforced 
progression of Socrates’ lessons, and the focus on the nuts and bolts of the Greek 
language seem to reflect the curricular practices of a typical school-teacher.
From the discussion above, we can conclude that Socrates’ curriculum at lines 476-790 
is indistinguishable from that of a didaskalos. But what of his teaching methods? Before 
Socrates begins his course of instruction with Strepsiades, he takes some time to learn 
about his pupil’s innate abilities (478-80; 481-8): 
{Σω.} ἄγε δή, κάτειπέ μοι σὺ τὸν σαυτοῦ τρόπον, ἵν' αὐτὸν εἰδὼς ὅστις ἐστὶ 
μηχανὰς ἤδη 'πὶ τούτοις πρὸς σὲ καινὰς προσφέρω... ἀλλὰ βραχέα σου πυθέσθαι 
βούλομαι, εἰ μνημονικὸς εἶ. 
{Στ.} δύο τρόπω, νὴ τὸν Δία. ἢν μέν γ' ὀφείληταί τι μοι, μνήμων πάνυ, ἐὰν δ' 
ὀφείλω σχέτλιος, ἐπιλήσμων πάνυ. 
{Σω.} ἔνεστι δῆτά σοι λέγειν ἐν τῇ φύσει;  
{Στ.} λέγειν μὲν οὐκ ἔνεστ', ἀποστερεῖν δ' ἔνι.
{Σω.} πῶς οὖν δυνήσει μανθάνειν;
{Στ.} ἀμέλει, καλῶς.
SOC: Well then, tell me about your character, so that I, once I know about that, can 
apply the appropriate current teaching methods... so I want to ask you a few questions, 
for example, do you have a good memory?
STR: Yes and no, by Zeus. If I am owed something, it’s very good, but if I am wretchedly 
in debt, I am quite forgetful.
SOC: Then are you naturally gifted at speaking?
STR: Not at speaking but at fraudulence.
SOC: Then how will you be able to learn?
STR: Don’t worry; I’ll be fine.
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This passage reflects the importance of natural ability, especially memory,31 in 
elementary education. As Leo Strauss (1996, 21) has noted with respect to the methods 
of Classical didaskaloi and their connection with modern teaching techniques, “different 
pupils need different approaches.” The first step for a didaskalos is to determine the 
basic ability level of the student, and according to Socrates in the Clouds, the two most 
important innate characteristics for learning are a good memory and eloquence. Without 
them - as he wonders in the passage above - how will a student learn anything at all? 
Strepsiades tells him breezily not to worry, but his teacher is not reassured, and with 
another nod to the practices of a didaskalos,32 at line 493 Aristophanes has Socrates 
suggest that perhaps his difficult student will need to be literally whipped into shape 
(δέδοικά σ᾽, ὦ πρεσβῦτα, μὴ πληγῶν δέει). The threat is defused when Socrates 
decides to turn it into a teachable moment,33 and he has almost convinced his pupil to 
doff his cloak and enter the Phrontistêrion when Strepsiades asks him one more thing 
about the educational transaction about to take place (500-3): 
{Στ.} εἰπὲ δή νυν μοι τοδί· ἢν ἐπιμελὴς ὦ καὶ προθύμως μανθάνω,τῷ τῶν μαθητῶν 
ἐμφερὴς γενήσομαι; {Σω.} οὐδὲν διοίσεις Χαιρεφῶντος τὴν φύσιν.
STR: Tell me this, then: if I am attentive and study hard, which one of your students will I 
become like? SOC: You will be indistinguishable in your nature from Chaerephon.
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31 See also line 414 for the Clouds’ statement that memory (mnêmôn) is the most important pre-requisite 
for admission to the Thinkery. For the importance of memory in ancient elementary education, see 
Cribiore 2001, 166-7: “A more capacious and elastic memory had to be nourished with tender care from 
the early years of childhood. Early education was not so much concerned with developing artificial 
memory, but rather with nurturing the natural memory of children: memory was the “store-house of 
education” and had the capacity to create and foster.” For the role of memory in antiquity, and esp. 
education see Carruthers 2008, Chapter 1 and Small 1997, Chapter 7. 
32 For corporal punishment in ancient education, see Cribiore 2001, 65ff and Beck 1964, 104-5.
33 Socrates asks Strepsiades what he would do, legally speaking, if someone were to assault him.
Taken along with the preceding dialogue about innate qualities (478-88), this passage 
describes what were thought of in antiquity as the three key elements of a traditional 
educational exchange - physis, epimeleia and/or askêsis, and didaskalia/didachê -,34 
and the result to be expected if all elements of the exchange are present. The student 
himself provides the first two of these: he must have some innate ability (i.e. a good 
memory, eloquence, etc); and either he must devote his whole attention to the endeavor 
or he must work hard at whatever his teacher tells him to do. The teacher, in return, 
offers his expertise in the form of instruction. If all goes well, the student can expect to 
be assimilated to a model, either a paradigm of some kind or the didaskalos himself.35 
In the case of Strepsiades, his educational exchange with Socrates will result in his 
becoming identical to Socrates’ close friend and presumably his model student, 
Chaerephon. Whereas a Sophist would educate through epideixis and expect his 
students to absorb whatever was given to them on their own, regardless of their ability 
level,36 the instruction of a didaskalos was based on innate ability and often tailored to 
the individual needs of each student.37 Paradoxically, despite the Sophists’ extravagant 
promises of results, they didn’t adapt their teaching to each student to produce those 
results, relying instead on their own skill to bring about the learning outcomes they 
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34 For a complete discussion of which, see Introduction, Section 3.2.
35 For a more thorough treatment of imitation and assimilation of the didaskalos, see discussion under 
“Episode Two” below. See also Chapter 2, Section 1.3 for Athenian education as characterized by 
emulation of the didaskalos.
36 On which generally, see Chapter 1, Section 3. For an example of a Sophist promising  instruction and 
results to all comers regardless of age or innate ability, see Plato Euthydemus 303-4 
37 For the afterlife of this practice by grammar teachers in the Roman period (approx. first century CE), 
see Aelius Theon Progymnasmata 134.24-135.1
guaranteed and not taking responsibility if the student did not turn out as promised.38 A 
didaskalos, on the other hand, while generally refraining from making promises about 
the results of his instruction, was much more likely to achieve the desired results 
because he took his students’ innate abilities into account. Hence, in this scene from the 
Clouds, Socrates’ grammatical lesson would, under normal circumstances, most likely 
have been followed by a more in-depth study of poetry. However, Strepsiades, having 
proven himself to be a terrible learner (627-31), would certainly not have succeeded in 
studying poetry, and so Socrates substitutes some preparatory instruction on how to 
think about one’s own affairs instead (694-790).39 Even in this he approaches the 
situation the way a didaskalos would have, by leaving Strepsiades with a specific 
problem to solve and in the care of the Chorus Leader, his hypodidaskalos,40 while he 
goes back into the Thinkery, presumably to check on the progress of his other students. 
It is clearly Socrates’ hope that this independent problem-solving will spark Strepsiades’ 
intellect, but it is not to be. At line 780ff, when Strepsiades suggests that he might 
escape impending litigation via suicide, Socrates gets fed up and expels his elderly 
pupil from the Phrontistêrion. In this way, just as innate ability makes a difference in the 
course of instruction a didaskalos will choose for his student, it also makes a difference 
for learning outcomes; a teacher provides as much as he can in whatever way will help 
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38 For Gorgias denying any responsibility for his students’ behavior, see Plato Gorgias 456c-461b. 
Isocrates criticizes the Sophists for this very practice at Against the Sophists 3-6, where he argues that 
the problem is not teaching for pay (since he himself does this), but making promises that you cannot 
keep about individual results and requiring your students to pay in advance. According to Gray 1998, 45, 
this practice is proof that the Sophists know they are not successful teachers.
39 On which, see Strauss 1996, 25.
40 For the hypodidaskalos working one-on-one with a student while the didaskalos is busy with other 
students, see the Douris Cup (ARV 283, number 47) and discussion thereof at Introduction 3.2.
a student to be successful, but not all educational exchanges result in knowledge 
transfer. In the admittedly extreme case of Strepsiades, a student who proved to be 
impossible to teach could simply be expelled.41 The entire scene between Strepsiades 
and Socrates at lines 476-790 can be lined up, point for point, with an educational 
exchange between a student and his didaskalos, and it seems indisputable that 
Aristophanes intended this parallel to inform the way his audience understood the play.    
Next, let us turn to the agôn between the two Arguments at lines 889-1113. In this 
scene, the Better and Worse Argument spend seventy lines insulting one another before 
each presents his case for why Strepsiades should choose him to educate Phidippides. 
As with the scene above, it will be easiest if we examine these lines with two different 
points of comparison in mind: 1) curriculum, and 2) methodology. 
The place where parallels with the didaskalic curriculum are evident in this scene is the 
speech of the Better Argument.42 At lines 961-972, he describes what is essentially the 
teaching of a didaskalos: the boys would travel in orderly groups to the didaskaleîon, or 
house of the music master (964: βαδίζειν ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς εὐτάκτως εἰς κιθαριστοῦ) 
who would teach (966: ἐδίδασκεν) them songs in the traditional mode (968: τὴν 
ἁρμονίαν ἣν οἱ πατέρες παρέδωκαν), and would punish them (972: ἐπετρίβετο 
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41 Although there is scant literary evidence for didaskaloi expelling students, it only makes sense given 
that didaskaloi were poorly paid (so the money did not matter very much), and unlike the Sophists, they 
did not profess to be able or willing to teach absolutely anyone regardless of innate ability. For the power 
of the teacher to choose his own students in the Hellenistic period, see Cribiore 2001, 54.
42 Due to the length of this scene, I will not provide the full text, but will summarize the most relevant 
points for our discussion, providing small passages from the text where useful.
τυπτόμενος πολλὰς) if they tried to modify the traditional music.43 Although the word 
kitharistês is used here for the music teacher, the audience would almost certainly have 
understood - especially given the use of the verb didaskein to describe the way the 
music master teaches - that this was another word for a didaskalos in this case. 
According to Beck (1964, 89), “letters and music were normally taught in the same 
establishment, and the grammatistês and the kitharistês would often have been the 
same person.” Indeed, the famed Douris Cup shows a student being instructed in both 
poetry and the lyre by a single didaskalos, and writers from all genres in antiquity were 
known to refer to musikê as the domain of the Muses in the widest sense, that is, it 
encompassed reading and writing as well as musical performance. 
The remaining content of the Better Argument’s curriculum is basic training in τὰ δίκαια 
and ἡ σωφροσύνη (justice and decency, 962). He boasts about how the students under 
his care were seen and not heard (963), knew how to smudge out the marks of their 
genitals in the sand of the gymnasium to avoid tempting their lovers (975-6), ate 
delicately (981-3), obeyed their elders (994) and avoided bathhouses and the agora 
(991-2). This resembles, more than anything, the basic moral training that Protagoras 
describes in Plato’s Protagoras 325d-e, where he explains that when parents send their 
sons to the didaskalos, they expect him to take even greater pains over their child’s 
behavior than over his letters or music, and accordingly, the didaskalos teaches his 
pupils about the admirable men in the Homeric epics in the hopes that his charges will 
seek to emulate them. This seems quite the opposite of the traditional conception of 
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43 See discussion of Clouds 493 above on corporal punishment in elementary schools.
Sophistic education.44 Certainly it is the opposite of the case presented by the Worse 
Argument wherein he promises that Phidippides will not have to consider anything 
shameful for he will be able to talk his way out of anything if he studies disputation with 
him (1077-80): 
ἐμοὶ δ' ὁμιλῶν χρῶ τῇ φύσει, σκίρτα, γέλα, νόμιζε μηδὲν αἰσχρόν. μοιχὸς γὰρ ἢν 
τύχῃς ἁλούς, τάδ' ἀντερεῖς πρὸς αὐτόν, ὡς οὐδὲν ἠδίκηκας·. 
If you associate with me, indulge your nature, run around, laugh, consider nothing 
shameful. For if you happen to get caught playing the adulterer, say this in reply: that 
you’ve done nothing wrong. 
So it is clear that the Better Argument represents the education offered by a 
didaskalos,45 and the Worse Argument - in content, at least - the education offered by a 
Sophist. However, we mustn’t neglect our discussion of methodology, for even though 
the Worse Argument teaches a Sophistic curriculum, he does so as a didaskalos. At 
lines 916-19, the Better Argument accuses the Worse Argument of ruining traditional 
education, using the verb didaskein to describe what the Worse Argument does: 
{Κρ.} διὰ σὲ δὲ φοιτᾶν οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει τῶν μειρακίων.
καὶ γνωσθήσει ποτ' Ἀθηναίοις οἷα διδάσκεις τοὺς ἀνοήτους.
BETTER: Because of you, none of the youth wants to come to [my] school,46 and one 
day it will become clear to the Athenians what sort of things you are teaching the idiots.
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44 i.e. An education made up primarily in learning disputation. For the Sophists as above all teachers of 
disputation, see Chapter 1, Section 3.2.3.
45 This is true for both curriculum and methodology. At line 929, the Worse Argument states that his 
adversary will never teach (didaskein) Phidippides, and at 936 the Chorus Leader tells the Better 
Argument to describe how he used to teach (didaskein) the ancestors, both of which show that the Better 
Argument teaches like a didaskalos, or is at least viewed by the other characters as doing so.
46 Although its basic meaning is simply “to frequent”, the verb phoitân is used regularly in the fifth century 
and after to describe the action of a boy going to the schoolhouse: Aristophanes Knights 1235; Plato 
Symposium 206b, Protagoras 326c, Alcibiades 1 109d, Gorgias 456d, Laws 804d; Xenophon Cyropaedia 
1.2.6; Demosthenes De Corona 265.4; Isocrates Antidosis 183.4
By choosing the verb didaskein, Aristophanes is signaling that in the Clouds, the 
Sophists are above all didaskaloi of disputation, and given this, we can see that the 
training offered by the Worse Argument, although Sophistic in content, is didaskalic in 
mode of instruction.47 In fact, this is clearly the impression Aristophanes wishes to leave 
the audience with; the temporal particle ποτε foreshadows that it is this crime - i.e. 
didaskalia - for which Socrates will be punished at the end of the Clouds and, of course, 
in his actual trial. Indeed, the Worse Argument’s final question for Strepsiades is framed 
in these same terms (1105-6): τί δῆτα; πότερα τοῦτον ἀπάγεσθαι λαβὼν / βούλει 
τὸν υἱόν, ἢ διδάσκω σοι λέγειν; (What now? Do you want to take your son home, or 
shall I teach him to make speeches for you?) When Strepsiades agrees to the training 
in public speaking, the Worse Argument reassures him by promising that Phidippides 
will be made into a clever sophist (dexios sophistês), that is, a didaskalos of disputation, 
just like the Worse Argument himself. Once again, an aspect of the play that initially 
seemed to be directed at the Sophists turns out to actually be about the didaskalos.     
At this point, a note is needed on Aristophanes’ motivation and rationale. The problem of 
authorial intent is one that I cannot hope to solve at present, nor is it in the purview of 
this study to do so. However, insofar as we can speculate on the reasons for 
Aristophanes’ depiction of Socrates in the Clouds, it may prove useful to our 
investigation to follow this speculation through. In this connection, two questions present 
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47 This simply means that the instruction provided by a didaskalos would have been carried out like a 
simple exchange of goods for money, the transmission of a finite body of knowledge to another person in 
the manner of handing someone an object. This exchange would have been conducted at least in part via 
imitation, and as will be discussed below at length, it would have resulted in the student being a copy of 
his teacher (or an idealized model).
themselves: 1) Why does Aristophanes lampoon Socrates specifically? and 2) What 
exactly is the nature of Aristophanes’ concern about education, or, in other words, why 
does he use this particular depiction of Socrates and the Phrontistêrion? 
The answer to the first question is simple. Socrates was an unmistakable public figure 
with peculiar physical characteristics; he never left Athens, was known to associate with 
Sophists, and famously held long dialogues with young men all over the city on such 
novel ideas as whether virtue is teachable. As Konstan (2011, 88) has noted, in an 
Athens where so many new types of intellectuals seemed to spring up overnight, 
Socrates “was typical enough to represent the movement as a whole and at the same 
time sufficiently idiosyncratic enough to be identifiable as a unique personality.” The 
combination of these factors must have made him the ideal proprietor for Aristophanes’ 
Phrontistêrion. 
The answer to the second question is more complicated, as it depends upon some 
speculation about Aristophanes’ views on education as they can be extrapolated from 
the play itself. As the historians tell us, Athens in the fifth century was a hotbed of 
political and social change, and educational institutions were far from immune to these 
forces. In the Clouds, we see Aristophanes venting his (or at least some Athenians’) 
fears about the ways that new educational systems may affect the stability of the entire 
polis. Guthrie (1971a) has summarized these fears: 
Aristophanes was deeply concerned at the decay of the old ideals of conduct, the 
lowering of moral standards which was corrupting the youth of Athens. This he attributed 
to a variety of influences in the education and environment which all alike tended to 
undermine the sense of loyalty to the old-fashioned values and virtues formerly accepted 
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without question. To attack these tendencies through the medium of comedy, they must 
all be embodied in a single individual, and the obvious person was Socrates. (51)
Aristophanes, like many social critics before and since, recognized that the values of a 
given society are safeguarded and perpetuated by its teachers.48 For this reason, it is 
absolutely imperative to separate the positive teachers from the harmful. Hence, in the 
Clouds, Aristophanes does not distinguish between Socrates, Sophists, natural 
philosophers, phrontistai, and didaskaloi. Rather, as Dover has pointed out: 
He drew one basic distinction, between the normal man and the abnormal man. The 
normal man works and fights, and takes as much as he can of song, dance, food, drink, 
sex, sleep, and good company. The abnormal man is essentially parasitic on the normal; 
he does no real work, he undermines the loyalties on which the city’s continued 
existence depends, and he casts a shadow over the ordinary pleasures of life by the 
unspoken implication that there may be other, secret pleasures accessible to him alone.
Aristophanes characterizes the abnormal men with words like ἀργοί, “idlers”, and 
φροντισταί, “intellectuals,” and at Clouds 331ff he lists under the same category 
sophists, seers, medical writers, and dithyrambic poets. As becomes clear early on in 
the play, in Aristophanes’ view none of the men at the Phrontistêrion is suitable for 
inculcating the youth with the proper values,49 and to the contrary, association with 
these sorts of people could actually do harm to the fabric of Athenian society. It is telling 
that the word Aristophanes coined for Socrates’ school in the play is Phrontistêrion. 
According to Goldberg (1976, 255), Aristophanes almost always used words for places, 
and for places of business in particular, that had been formed by adding the nominal 
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48 This is a theme of several of Aristophanes’ other plays, specifically Knights, Wasps, and Frogs.
49 Even though Aristophanes presents the Better Argument (i.e. the “Old Education”) as the most 
favorable of the many choices at the Thinkery, he doesn’t make it out to be very good either. According to 
Nussbaum 1980, 89: “We cannot read the play as advocating a simple return to the old education...we 
have been given reason to be suspicious of his intolerance and irrationality.” However, this 
characterization may have simply served a comic purpose. See Strauss 1996, 312: “By presenting as 
laughable not only the unjust but the just as well, he brings it about that his comedy is total: there is no 
Aristophanean character of any consequence who does not act laughably, let alone who is good sense 
incarnate.”
suffix -εῖον to the chosen stem.50 By using the far less common suffix -τήριον, 
Aristophanes added the Phrontistêrion to the pre-existing small number of politically and 
socially significant Athenian locations like the βουλευτήριον, the δικαστήριον, and the 
χρηστήριον. However, instead of a place where the traditions of Athens were 
perpetuated, Aristophanes’ Thinkery was a center for anti-traditional innovation.
Keeping this in mind, let us return to our previous discussion about the type(s) of 
intellectual being parodied in the Clouds. We have seen that there is evidence for all of 
the theories about Socrates in the play, including and especially the didaskalos. A brief 
analysis of two further episodes should serve to demonstrate that Aristophanes is 
intentionally blending several different figures together in his depiction of Socrates and 
company, but that in each instance the characterization of Socrates as a didaskalos is 
the most important for our understanding of the play.  
2.5 Episode One
The first episode takes place at the very beginning of the Clouds, and as such, it is an 
opportunity for Aristophanes to demonstrate early the types of people he intends to 
mock in the rest of the play. At Clouds 94-118, Strepsiades argues with his son, 
Phidippides, about the kind of education offered at the Phrontistêrion in an attempt to 
convince him to go study there:
{Στ.} ψυχῶν σοφῶν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ φροντιστήριον. / ἐνταῦθ' ἐνοικοῦσ' ἄνδρες οἳ τὸν 
οὐρανὸν / λέγοντες ἀναπείθουσιν ὡς ἔστιν πνιγεύς, / κἄστιν περὶ ἡμᾶς οὗτος, 
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50 For just a few examples, βαλανεῖον, a bathing place (Clouds 837, 1054; Frogs 1279; Wealth 952), 
κουρεῖον, a barbershop (Birds 1441; Wealth 338), and πανδοκεῖον, an inn (Frogs 550).
ἡμεῖς δ' ἅνθρακες. / οὗτοι διδάσκουσ', ἀργύριον ἤν τις διδῷ, / λέγοντα νικᾶν καὶ 
δίκαια κἄδικα.
{Φε.} εἰσὶν δὲ τίνες; 
{Στ.} οὐκ οἶδ' ἀκριβῶς τοὔνομα. / μεριμνοφροντισταὶ καλοί τε κἀγαθοί.  
{Φε.} αἰβοῖ, πονηροί γ', οἶδα. τοὺς ἀλαζόνας, / τοὺς ὠχριῶντας, τοὺς ἀνυποδήτους 
λέγεις, / ὧν ὁ κακοδαίμων Σωκράτης καὶ Χαιρεφῶν.  
{Στ.} ἢ ἤ, σιώπα. μηδὲν εἴπῃς νήπιον. / ἀλλ' εἴ τι κήδει τῶν πατρῴων ἀλφίτων, / 
τούτων γενοῦ μοι, σχασάμενος τὴν ἱππικήν. 
{Φε.} οὐκ ἂν μὰ τὸν Διόνυσον εἰ δοίης γέ μοι / τοὺς φασιανοὺς οὓς τρέφει 
Λεωγόρας.
{Στ.} ἴθ', ἀντιβολῶ σ', ὦ φίλτατ' ἀνθρώπων ἐμοί, / ἐλθὼν διδάσκου. 
{Φε.} καὶ τί σοι μαθήσομαι; 
{Στ.} εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς φασὶν ἄμφω τὼ λόγω, / τὸν κρείττον', ὅστις ἐστί, καὶ τὸν 
ἥττονα. / τούτοιν τὸν ἕτερον τοῖν λόγοιν, τὸν ἥττονα, / νικᾶν λέγοντά φασι 
τἀδικώτερα. / ἢν οὖν μάθῃς μοι τὸν ἄδικον τοῦτον λόγον, / ἃ νῦν ὀφείλω διὰ σέ, 
τούτων τῶν χρεῶν / οὐκ ἂν ἀποδοίην οὐδ' ἂν ὀβολὸν οὐδενί.
STR: That is a Thinkery for sage souls. Some gentlemen live there who argue 
convincingly that the sky is a barbecue lid, and that it surrounds us, and that we’re the 
coals. These people train you, if you give them money, to win any argument whether it’s 
right or wrong.
PHI: And who are they?
STR: I don’t know the term exactly. Thoughtful cogitators, fine and genteel people.
PHI: Yuk! That scum. I know them; you mean the charlatans, the pasty-faced, the 
unshod, like that miserable Socrates, and Chaerephon.
STR: Hey, hey! Be quiet, don’t say anything so childish! Now, if you care at all about 
your father’s daily bread, cut out the riding and please become one of them.
PHI: No way, by Dionysus, not even if you gave me those fancy pheasants that 
Leogoras breeds.
STR: Come on, I’m begging you, dearest of all to me, to go and be trained.
PHI: And what am I supposed to learn?
STR: I’m told they have both Arguments there, the Better, whatever that may be, and the 
Worse. And one of these Arguments, the Worse, I’m told, can plead the unjust side of a 
case and win. !So, if you learn this Unjust Argument for me, then I wouldn’t have to pay 
anyone even a penny of these debts that I now owe on your account.51
In this fairly short exchange, we can see mention of four (arguably five) different 
categories of intellectuals mixed together to make up the club at the Thinkery. As far as 
Strepsiades is concerned, they all fall under the heading of sophoi (94), and despite the 
fact that certain characteristics belong to each type, he makes no distinction, simply 
assimilating all of the traits to one category. 
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51 Translation by Jeffrey Henderson
The most obvious figure here is, of course, the phrontistês, or neo-intellectual for whom 
the Phrontistêrion is named. At line 101, Strepsiades refers to the inhabitants of the 
Thinkery as μεριμνοφροντισταί, which Henderson translates as “thoughtful 
cogitators,” but in fact, μέριμνα is a favorite word of the pre-Socratic natural 
philosopher Empedocles,52 and φροντιστής is (most likely) an Aristophanic coinage53 
used by the characters in the play as a nom de profession that covers both the sophistry  
and natural science practiced at the Thinkery.54 Indeed, in this passage, the figure of the 
natural philosopher is present - albeit at least in part for the sake of a joke - in 
Strepsiades’ claim that the wise men at the Thinkery argue that the sky is a barbecue 
lid55 and we humans are the coals (95-7).56 Meanwhile, the Sophists can be seen at 
lines 98-9 where Strepsiades tells his son that if he pays them, the men at the Thinkery 
will train him to win any argument, and at lines 112-16, where he claims that they teach 
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52 See DK 31 B2.2, B11.1, and B110.7
53 There has been some scholarly debate about this based on a testimonium from Athenaeus (218 C) 
about Protagoras that says that Ameipsias in Konnos “οὐ καταριθμεῖ αὐτὸν (sc. Πρωταγόραν) ἐν τῷ 
φροντιστῶν χορῷ.” I agree with the conclusion of Dover (1968, l-li) and Guthrie (1971a, 41) that there is 
no reason to believe from this fragment that Ameipsias actually used the word φροντισταἰ in the play, 
and I think it likely that Goldberg (1976, 254) is correct in calling this an Aristophanic coinage.
54 For example, at line 1039, the Worse Argument describes himself as a phrontistês because he can 
make the Weaker Argument the Stronger. For more on this word, see Edmunds 2006, 416; φροντιστής 
occurs 5 times in the Clouds (101, 266, 414, 456, and 1039), while φροντιστήριον occurs 6 times (94, 
128, 142, 181, 1144, and 1487)
55 This view is attributed in the scholia to the pre-Socratic scientist Hippon: see Dover, loc. cit. It is 
possible the scholia on Aristophanes’ Clouds is correct and he was following the lead of Cratinus, who 
made fun of Hippon in his play Panoptai (fr. 167). For Jeffrey Henderson’s translation of this testimonium 
from the scholia, see Birth of Comedy 2011, 279. 
56 This probably refers to a view preserved in a fragment of Heraclitus (DK 22 A16).
two Arguments at the Thinkery, and one of them can plead the unjust side of a case and 
win.57 
Socrates himself can be identified in this passage by Phidippides’ reference at lines 
102-4 to unshod people like Socrates and Chaerephon.58 In addition, καλοί τε κἀγαθοί 
in line 101 may be a reference to Socrates’ concern (as recorded in Xenophon’s 
Oeconomicus) with the proper way for a man who is καλὸς κἀγαθὸς to live.
Finally, we come to the didaskalos. Although pushed into the background a bit by the 
other figures crowded into this passage, the didaskalos is present here in a couple of 
important ways. First, in the location for instruction. Although the building where 
Socrates teaches is called the Phrontistêrion and not the didaskaleion, the fact that he 
conducts his classes in a stationary and specific location is a definite point in the 
didaskalos column. The Sophists certainly did not have schoolhouses that they 
operated out of, and Socrates can be argued to have taught in a different location in 
each dialogue. While the natural scientists may have had physical school buildings in 
Ionia,59 there is no evidence for the existence of any establishment of this kind in Athens 
by the fifth century, nor do any contemporary authors mention such locations. 
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57 See Clouds 419 for an echo of this: νικᾶν πράττων καὶ βουλεύων καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ πολεμίζων. 
“Fighting with the tongue”, meanwhile, sounds a lot like the καταβάλλοντες λόγοι, “overthrowing 
arguments,” of Protagoras and Gorgias (see Tell 2010, 142-3). This recalls Hippias’ claim at Hippias Major 
287b that he can teach Socrates to answer any question in such a way that no one will be able to dispute 
him.  
58 See Plato Symposium 174 and 200 for Socrates as “shoeless”. For Chaerephon as a close companion 
of Socrates, see Plato Gorgias, Charmides, Apology; Xenophon Memorabilia; and Aristophanes Wasps, 
Birds.
59 On which, see Burnet 1914, 147.
The second, and most important set of references to the didaskalos in the passage 
above is lexical. The verb that Strepsiades uses at lines 98 and 111 to describe the 
methodology of Socrates and the other intellectuals at the Thinkery is didaskein. 
Aristophanes could easily have used sophizein or paideuein for the training of the 
Sophists; both of these verbs existed and were in use for instructional interactions 
during the Classical period,60 and Aristophanes himself uses both of these verbs in 
other plays,61 yet he did not use them here. Even the verb epideiknunai (and the noun 
epideixis), which was frequently used by Aristophanes’ contemporaries to describe an 
educational demonstration,62 especially in connection with the Sophists,63 only appears 
3 times in the play.64 In fact, when one conducts a basic lexical analysis of the Clouds, 
the results are overwhelmingly didaskalic. The words phrontistês, phrontisma, and 
phrontistêrion together show up 12 times in the play, while sophistês and paideusis 
each occur 4 times, as compared with 30 times for all forms of didask- (including the 
verb didaskein, and the nouns didaskalos and didagma). Clearly, Aristophanes’ choice 
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60 sophizein occurs as early as Hesiod Works and Days 649, Ibycus fr. S162.3, and Theognis fr. 6.2 in the 
sense of “to instruct” (especially in the middle-passive “to be educated in something”) It is also used 
frequently by Aristophanes’ near contemporaries including Euripides, Sophocles, Demosthenes, and 
Herodotus. paideuein is used specifically to describe the teaching of the Sophists in Isocrates Against the 
Sophists 291.1, and in Plato’s Sophist 223b4 and Hippias Minor 364d2.
61 sophizein is used at Knights 299, 721; Birds 1401, 1619, and 1642; the latter two references describe 
sophistic disputation. paideuein is used at Knights 636, 1099; Frogs 1502.
62 This was a value-neutral term, for it is the word Plato’s Socrates uses in the Apology for his own 
defense (22a7, 24c9), in the Phaedo when he is explaining something to Cebes (99d2), and in the 
Sophist for his investigation with Theaetetus (217e2); Isocrates also uses it frequently to describe his own 
speeches to the imaginary jury in Antidosis. See also Thucydides 5.77.8, 6.47.1, 3.16.1.
63 See for example Isocrates Antidosis 1.2, 55.5, 147.6; Plato Sophist 224b5; Euthydemus 293b5, 278c5; 
Protagoras 320b8; Gorgias 447b2.
64 And only one of these occurrences describes a Sophistic-type epideixis (935): the Chorus tells each of 
the arguments to demonstrate (epideiknunai) how he teaches.
of didaskein is integral to an understanding of his depiction of Socrates in the play, 
indicating as it does a definite acknowledgement of the connections between Socrates 
and a didaskalos. 
2.6 Episode Two
The second episode is much shorter than the first. Consisting of only six lines and 
located near the end of the play, this passage offers a neat summation of the outcome 
of a course of instruction at the Thinkery, and a reminder of all that is wrong with this 
type of education. At lines 1399-1405, Phidippides waxes poetic about the way his 
newfound skills in argumentation will allow him to justify beating his father:
{Φε.} ὡς ἡδὺ καινοῖς πράγμασιν καὶ δεξιοῖς ὁμιλεῖν
καὶ τῶν καθεστώτων νόμων ὑπερφρονεῖν δύνασθαι.! ! ! 1400
ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅτε μὲν ἱππικῇ τὸν νοῦν μόνῃ προσεῖχον,
οὐδ' ἂν τρί' εἰπεῖν ῥήμαθ' οἷός τ' ἦν πρὶν ἐξαμαρτεῖν·
νυνὶ δ', ἐπειδή μ' οὑτοσὶ τούτων ἔπαυσεν αὐτός,
γνώμαις δὲ λεπταῖς καὶ λόγοις ξύνειμι καὶ μερίμναις,
οἶμαι διδάξειν ὡς δίκαιον τὸν πατέρα κολάζειν.! ! ! ! 1405
PHI: How sweet it is to be familiar with new and clever activities, and to have the ability 
to scorn established customs! Back when I only paid attention to horse racing, I couldn’t 
say three words in a row before making a mistake. But now, since this man here has 
stopped me from engaging in those pursuits, and I’m at home with subtle ideas, 
arguments, and contemplations, I think I can teach that it’s right to punish one’s father.
Most scholars would say that Aristophanes’ primary concern with the “New 
Learning” (Woodruff 2011, 91) is summed up in the first two lines of this passage. And 
indeed, it is clear throughout the play that he sees a real threat from men who use new 
(kainos)65 and clever (dexios) things to scorn the established nomoi of Athens. At line 
1404, he has Phidippides list the types of interests these men have, and we are 
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65 Cf. Clouds 896 for the Worse Argument’s claim that he will defeat the Better Argument by inventing new 
ideas (γνώμας καινὰς).
reminded once more how many different types make up the category of abnormal men 
for Aristophanes. Leptai gnômai and logoi recall the slippery argumentation of the 
Sophists, while merimnai reminds us of Empedocles and the natural philosophers.66 
The most important part of the passage for our purposes, however, is the final line, 
where Phidippides claims that as a result of his training at the Thinkery, he now feels 
confident that he can teach (didaskein) his listeners that it is acceptable to beat one’s 
father. This, I would argue, is the real source of Aristophanes’ fear about new types of 
ideas. As we have seen in the previous chapters, a didaskalos does his work through 
mimêsis; that is, he provides his students with a paradigm which they should imitate. 
Sometimes this paradigm comes in the form of a piece of literature, particularly 
Homer,67 but most often, the model for correct behavior is the didaskalos himself.68 If we 
apply this information to the above episode from the Clouds, we can begin to see why 
Aristophanes was so concerned about teaching. Socrates in the Clouds is depicted as a 
didaskalos who teaches his students how to win any argument regardless of what is 
just; his students learn through imitation with the ultimate goal of becoming just like their 
teacher.69 This means that Socrates is not only teaching values that contradict the 
established customs of Athens, but he is also teaching his students how to become 
didaskaloi of this material in their own right. Indeed, this is what we see at line 1405 
above, where Phidippides, after learning this lesson from his own didaskalos, turns 
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66 See Episode One above for citation.
67 On which, see Plato’s Protagoras 326a.
68 For the role of imitation in ancient education see Chapter 2, Section 1.3 above, and also Cribiore 2001, 
132ff. For examples of the ancients’ understanding of the teacher as model for his students to imitate, see 
Xenophon Memorabilia 1.2.3 and Cyropaedia 2.29.3; Thucydides 3.82.2; Plato Euthyphro 3c-d and 
Protagoras 312a, Antiphon (fragment in Stobaeus, DK 87 B62); Isocrates Against the Sophists 17.5-6.
69 Cf. Apology 23c, discussed below in Section 3.
around and offers to didaskein the audience why it is just to do something that 
contradicts all established principles of decency and honor, i.e. to physically assault 
one’s parent. On this model, the Thinkery could be turning out impious, disrespectful, 
subversive didaskaloi every day, with the result that a small group of intellectuals like 
these could hypothetically overturn the entire social order in a short time. It is this very 
threat that Aristophanes is responding to in the Clouds when at lines 1478-92, he has 
Strepsiades consult Hermes to determine how he should properly punish the men at the 
Thinkery for destroying his son’s morals. The outraged father had been intending to take 
the phrontistai to court, but given that these men know how to refute any argument 
regardless of justice, Hermes advises him to take more drastic action by burning down 
the Thinkery. As he is climbing up onto the Phrontistêrion and setting fire to the roof, 
Strepsiades mockingly spouts Socrates’ own words from the beginning of the play 
(225ff) back at him (1496-1503). Hence, we are given to understand that in 
Aristophanes’ estimation, improperly conducted didaskalia should not and will not go 
unpunished; an immoral didaskalos (i.e. Socrates in the Clouds) must be prevented at 
all costs from producing more copies of himself. 
From the examples above, we can see that the evidence for Socrates as a didaskalos in 
the Clouds is truly pervasive, whereas the evidence for each of the other intellectual 
figures is limited in scope to individual scenes and episodes, and even when a 
characterization seems straightforwardly just Sophistic or natural philosophic or 
Socratic, Aristophanes often evokes the didaskalos at the same time with his word 
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choice. With this in mind, we are now ready to address the literary backlash from 
Aristophanes’ Clouds in the works of Plato and Xenophon.
3. Plato’s Response     
That the accusation of sophistry and natural philosophy was not so threatening to 
Socrates and his followers as that of didaskalia is apparent in the way Plato’s Socrates 
treats both the implicit and explicit charges presented by Aristophanes.70 At Apology 
18a8-b10, Socrates recounts the charges of his first accusers, emphasizing that he 
believes these to be the most dangerous of the accusations against him: 
Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά 
μου ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρώτους κατηγόρους, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ 
ὕστερον καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς
καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ 
τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὦ 
ἄνδρες, οἳ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ 
κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὡς ἔστιν τις Σωκράτης σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τά 
τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς πάντα ἀνεζητηκὼς καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον 
κρείττω ποιῶν.
First, gentlemen of the jury, it is right for me to defend myself against the first false 
accusations and the first accusers, and then against the later accusation and accusers. 
For many accusers against me have appeared before you and they have been speaking 
false things for many years now, and I fear these men more than those in Anytus’ circle, 
although the latter are also dangerous. But the former are more dangerous, gentlemen, 
since they, getting ahold of you as children, have convinced you, and they have accused 
me entirely untruthfully, saying, “There is a certain Socrates, a wise man, a phrontistês 
who has discovered the things in the heavens and all that is beneath the earth, and one 
who makes the weaker argument the stronger.” 
The charges leveled by the first accusers here are two:71 1) Socrates is a phrontistês 
who studies geology and astronomy; and 2) he is a Sophist who practices disputation. It 
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70 On Plato’s subtle recognition that most Athenians would have viewed Socrates as a teacher, see Pucci 
2002, 9: “In the mind of the Athenians Socrates was a political teacher... Plato thought it important to 
discuss, even if indirectly and elusively, this deep-seated image his fellow citizens had of Socrates.”
71 Cf. Xenophon Memorabilia 1.1.1
is clear from the language and phrasing of the accusation that Plato’s Socrates is 
responding to the depiction of himself in Aristophanes’ Clouds and his supposed interest 
both in natural science and unjust argumentation.72 However, Plato’s Socrates spends 
almost no time rebutting the two above charges,73 choosing instead to redirect the 
beginning of his speech toward what he sees as a more troubling accusation. At 
Apology 19b, using the didaskalic language from the Clouds, he takes the charge 
against himself (above) - which does not mention teaching - and rephrases it in an 
attempt to clarify his role as an anti-didaskalos (as opposed to an anti-Sophist or an 
anti-natural-philosopher): 
τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν 
ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν· “Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τά 
τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν καὶ ἄλλους ταὐτὰ ταῦτα 
διδάσκων.” τοιαύτη τίς ἐστιν·
What then did those who slandered me say? I have to read their affidavit, so to speak, 
as if they were plaintiffs: “Socrates breaks the law and is a busy-body, since he 
investigates what is under the earth and in the heavens and he makes the weaker 
argument the stronger and he teaches these things to others.” The accusation would be 
something like that.
  
Whereas the earlier accusation in the Apology only condemns Socrates for investigating 
things in the sky and below the earth and for making the Weaker Argument the 
Stronger, Plato’s Socrates claims the real accusation is not that he studies certain 
subjects, but that he teaches these things to others. Indeed, this is the same charge that 
Socrates describes in more detail to the title character in the Euthyphro, when asked to 
explain why Meletus is taking him to court (3c):
208
72 See discussion above on Clouds for examples.
73 As will be discussed below, scholars who have seen Socrates’ defense as primarily about Sophistry are 
neglecting the nuance of the evidence. For example, see Leibowitz 2010, 52ff. For Socrates’ comparison 
of himself with the Sophists in the Apology, see 19e.
Ὦ φίλε Εὐθύφρων, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν καταγελασθῆναι ἴσως οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα. Ἀθηναίοις 
γάρ τοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ σφόδρα μέλει ἄν τινα δεινὸν οἴωνται εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι 
διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὑτοῦ σοφίας· ὃν δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλους οἴωνται ποιεῖν τοιούτους, 
θυμοῦνται, εἴτ' οὖν φθόνῳ ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δι' ἄλλο τι.
My dear Euthyphro, perhaps their ridicule doesn’t matter. For it seems to me that the 
Athenians don’t get upset when they think someone is clever, as long as he does not 
teach his own wisdom. But if they think that he is making others like himself, they get 
angry, either out of jealousy, as you say, or for some other reason.
In Socrates’ view, the Athenians are most concerned with men who act as didaskaloi 
and in so doing, make their students similar to themselves, as Socrates in the Clouds is 
believed by Strepsiades to have done with his son Phidippides (Nub. 1338-41). Hence, 
instead of rebutting the original charges of Sophistry and natural science, Socrates uses 
a disproportionate measure of his defense contesting what he perceives as the real - 
and most dangerous - accusation of the Clouds, i.e. that he is a didaskalos.74 At 
Apology 33a-b, Socrates denies being a didaskalos outright75 and proceeds to list the 
reasons why the Aristophanic picture of him as such is wrong:   
ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην· εἰ δέ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ 
ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμοῖ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος,
οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι μὴ λαμβάνων 
δὲ οὔ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἐάν τις 
βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς 
γίγνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδενὶ 
μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα·
I have never been anyone’s didaskalos. But if anyone wishes to listen to me speaking or 
going about my business, whether he is a young man or an old man, I have never 
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74 As Leibowitz (2010, 50) has noted, teaching was not on the minds of Socrates’ first accusers when they 
made the accusations described at the beginning of the Apology (except, perhaps, Aristophanes).
75 There is considerable modern debate over whether we can take this statement of Socrates at face 
value. A number of scholars have opted in reading this passage to take Socrates’ rejection of the role of 
teacher as ironic, therefore removing the necessity for an explanation of what many have seen as a 
paradoxical situation, i.e. Socrates who is clearly a teacher denying being a teacher. For Socrates’ 
defense as ironic, see Vlastos 1991, 32; Leibowitz 2010, 21-37. Contra see King 1976, 223; Brickhouse 
and Smith 1989, Introduction; Reeve 1989, xi and 3-9. Given the interpretation I offer in this chapter, I do 
not believe the theory of Socratic irony is needed to explain Socrates’ denial. I agree with Nehamas 
1992b, 295ff: “It is true that both his enemies and his friends considered Socrates a teacher, but that is no 
reason to refuse to take his own disavowal of that role at face value.”
begrudged this to anyone, nor do I converse with someone who pays me and not with 
someone who doesn’t, but I provide myself equally to rich and poor, and I ask questions, 
and if anyone wishes to answer they can hear what I say in response. And whether any 
of these people turns out good or not, I should not rightfully be held responsible, since I 
never promised any learning to nor did I teach (didaskein) anyone.
By enumerating here the ways he is not a didaskalos, Socrates also reveals what he 
believes to be the salient characteristics of an actual didaskalos: 1) A didaskalos may 
reject prospective students on the basis of age (and presumably, ability level); 2) A 
didaskalos demands payment for instruction; 3) A didaskalos gives lessons that consist 
in more than just asking and answering questions; and 4) A didaskalos is thought to be 
responsible for the conduct of his students. 
The qualities Socrates emphasizes in the passage above are the same traits that 
Aristophanes focuses on in the Clouds. As was discussed in detail above, 
Aristophanes’ Socrates charges tuition and expels Strepsiades for being too old and 
forgetful to learn -  characteristics (1) and (2) above -, and although Socrates in the 
Clouds does ask a lot of questions, many of his lessons are conducted through 
persuasive exposition (characteristic (3)).76 As for characteristic (4), at Clouds 1446-66 
Strepsiades curses Socrates and the Clouds and the Worse Argument for ruining his life 
and turning his son against him, but when he asks Phidippides to come destroy 
Socrates, the young man refuses to harm his teachers (1467: ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἂν ἀδικήσαιμι 
τοὺς διδασκάλους). At the morbid and unsettling end of the play Strepsiades burns 
down the Thinkery as revenge for the wrong he believes Socrates, his son’s didaskalos, 
has perpetrated against their family. We are left with the understanding that for many an 
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76 For example, see Clouds 350ff.
Athenian a bad didaskalos would absolutely have deserved to feel a parent’s ire for not 
holding up his end of the educational bargain. 
This gets at the heart of the rationale for Socrates’ denial in the Apology that he has 
ever been anyone’s didaskalos. As we saw above, there are several specific didaskalic 
traits that Plato’s Socrates tries to distance himself from, and I would argue that he does 
this in order to escape the jury’s pre-existing expectations about the way a didaskalos 
operates. In particular, a panel of Athenian citizens would have understood three things 
about the profession of a didaskalos:
1. Teaching was a banausic (i.e. low social status, wage-earning) profession. Teachers 
in antiquity were paid only slightly better than skilled laborers, and there were no 
specific qualifications for becoming a teacher.77 Given that for most boys, their formal 
schooling only covered the barest essentials - the alphabet, simple arithmetic -, 
teaching was thought to be a very low career. In the De Corona (258), for example, 
Demosthenes mocks Aeschines for growing up in poverty since he was the son of a 
didaskalos and for helping his father with the preparatory tasks of the schoolhouse in 
the manner of an oiketês. That Socrates would probably have agreed with this is 
evidenced by a passage from Xenophon’s Oeconomicus (4.2-3) in which his Socrates 
character denounces all βαναυσικαὶ τέχναι for the ill effects they have on 
philosophers and laborers alike. 
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77 For the low social status of teachers, see Marrou 1956, 145-7, Cribiore, 2001, 59ff; see also 
Introduction, Section 3.4. 
2. A didaskalos was, by nature, a knowledge transfer professional. That is, he was 
contracted by a parent to transmit a specific body of knowledge to his student in 
exchange for payment. Socrates, a man whose entire persona was built on the 
premise that he knew nothing, was very uncomfortable with the contractual nature of 
didaskalic instruction through which he would be required to deliver something to 
students who were paying customers. At no point in the extant literature does 
Socrates endorse the commodification of knowledge. As distinguished philosopher 
and Plato scholar Gary Alan Scott has observed (2000, 26), “Socratic education is 
incompatible with a conception of the education process as some kind of knowledge 
transfer and of the teacher as a mere “content provider”.”
3. Because one of the didaskalos’ primary teaching methods is assimilation, he is held 
responsible for the conduct of his students - both current and former. For Socrates, 
this is by far the most dangerous implication of didaskalic instruction. It was widely 
known that he had conversed with Critias and Alcibiades, and in order to exculpate 
himself from any responsibility for their crimes, he had to convince the jury that he 
had never been in a position to influence his associates’ behavior in the first place. A 
friend or companion cannot be held legally responsible for another man’s bad 
behavior, but a person whose very job description includes moral instruction is a 
different matter altogether. In the fraught political climate at the end of the fifth century 
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at Athens, Socrates could not afford to be mistaken for a behavioral coach.78 As Scott 
rightly points out (2000, 19), “In declaring, “I have never been anyone’s didaskalos,” 
Plato is, in the first place, making Socrates respond to quite concrete circumstances 
and very recent political events. What the philosopher is denying is playing the role of 
mentor or advisor to anyone, since if he never advised anyone at all, he could not 
have been a mentor or advisor to the Thirty oligarchs.” 
It is quite clear, then, why Socrates would have eschewed the title of didaskalos. The 
question that inevitably follows is, if Socrates does not want to be called a didaskalos, 
then what words does he use to describe the educational interactions in his dialogues?   
For the answer, we turn to the Meno, in which the title character claims that it is 
impossible to learn without a teacher, and in response, Socrates attempts to 
demonstrate that it is not only possible to learn without a teacher, but that it is not 
possible to learn any other way.79 The example he uses is a slave boy who has not 
been taught any geometry, but who Socrates will demonstrate can solve a geometric 
proof because he has correct opinions which simply need to be transformed into 
knowledge through intensive questioning. At 82a1 Socrates sets the stage for his 
reinvention of education by telling Meno that there is no teaching, but only recollection 
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78 Someone could point to Apology 23c as evidence that Plato’s Socrates is a didaskalos since he admits 
that his young companions (neoi) imitated him. He could not simply deny that they did this, considering 
that his dialectic style was so distinctive, so in this passage Socrates emphasizes that his associates did 
this of their own accord (automatoi) since they enjoyed hearing people being examined dialectically. At 
worst, this would make him an unintentional didaskalos, i.e. someone whose associates treated him as a  
didaskalos despite his own protestations. Although Plato has Socrates deny that he is a didaskalos, and 
Plato never characterizes Socrates as one, Socrates’ associates could still have seen him as one, just as 
Aristophanes did in the Clouds. This corresponds with the way Socrates defends himself in the rest of the 
Apology and the way Xenophon defends him in the Memorabilia (on which, see below).  
79 On Socratic teaching in the Meno, see Devereux 1978, 118-20.
(οὔ φημι διδαχὴν εἶναι ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάμνησιν), and so, he will do his best to demonstrate 
(ἐπιδείξεσθαι) this by conversing with the slave boy. The demonstration begins the way 
most Socratic interactions do, with the elenchus that proves the interlocutor’s ignorance. 
At 84b-c, after proving the slave wrong in all of his assumptions, Socrates convinces 
Meno that he has helped the slave boy to find the truth, namely that he does not 
actually know what he previously thought he knew. He has awakened the boy’s desire 
to learn, and it is only at this point that the true Socratic education can begin, when his 
interlocutor recognizes his own aporia and wishes to reverse it. Hence, at 84d, Socrates 
explains to Meno the instructional method he plans to undertake now that he and the 
slave boy are on the same page:  
Σκέψαι δὴ ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας ὅτι καὶ ἀνευρήσει ζητῶν μετ' ἐμοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ 
ἐρωτῶντος ἐμοῦ καὶ οὐ διδάσκοντος· φύλαττε δὲ ἄν που εὕρῃς με διδάσκοντα 
καὶ διεξιόντα αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰς τούτου δόξας ἀνερωτῶντα. 
So observe how, because of this aporia he will discover something by joint enquiry with 
me, while I do nothing other than question him and do not teach (didaskein) him. But be 
on the lookout if you find me teaching (didaskein) and expounding to him rather than 
simply questioning him about his opinions.
 
Socrates is careful to point out that the only way he will contribute to the learning of the 
slave boy is through his questions.80 At this point, he still needs to emphasize that he is 
not a didaskalos as much as he needs to present an alternative model. So he will not 
teach (since he does not believe teaching exists) and he will not expound; he will only 
investigate the question together with the boy by seeking out his interlocutor’s pre-
existing opinions. In this way, Socrates shifts the emphasis of his learning model to the 
autonomous intellectual capacities of the answerer, and as a result, he is able to give 
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80 For an echo of this method, see Apology 29e.
over responsibility for the boy’s answers to the boy himself.81 As Scott has aptly 
concluded concerning Socrates’ pedagogy (2000, 46):82
His educational approach is not designed to instill in others something that was entirely 
absent before, as the “additive” or “knowledge-transfer” method of pedagogy presumes 
to do. In his role as teacher, this philosopher knows that he can only nourish seeds that 
are already within his students. He is depicted in the dialogues as teaching primarily by 
guiding and questioning, leading others to pay attention to, to recollect, what is in some 
pre-philosophic way already within them.
This theory does, of course, depend upon the boy having some correct opinions in his 
soul at the outset. As Socrates explains at 86a5, the slave boy has always had true 
opinions inside him which needed only to be awakened by questioning to become 
knowledge (ἐνέσονται αὐτῷ ἀληθεῖς δόξαι, αἳ ἐρωτήσει ἐπεγερθεῖσαι ἐπιστῆμαι 
γίγνονται).83 On this view, education does not involve teaching at all, and the 
established educational exchange wherein the teacher provides the lessons and the 
student provides his memory and attention is utterly invalidated.84 All that are needed for 
a Socratic education are the recognition of one’s own general ignorance, a few correct 
opinions, and the willingness to learn. Add to these some questions from a person who 
is admittedly ignorant, too, and anyone can recollect real knowledge.        
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81 On which, see Teloh 1986, 153-8. 
82 While Scott’s primary aim is to show that Plato’s Socrates is not a didaskalos, but a failed educator of a 
different sort, it is my aim to demonstrate that Plato’s Socrates isn’t an educator at all.
83 This claim by Socrates has surprising implications concerning the so-called “Socratic method” of 
education. According to the passages discussed above, investigation and questioning - far from being the 
ideal mode of teaching - are, in fact, Socrates’ alternative to teaching and the most important way in 
which he distances himself from the methods of traditional education.
84 For more on the three elements of educational exchange, see Introduction, Section 3.2 above. For an 
example of this trope in antiquity, see Isocrates Antidosis 187ff. See also Teloh 1986, 154-5.
In this dialogue, Socrates begins with the traditional mode of education, that is, didachê, 
which he rejects in favor of questioning and joint enquiry, and ends with a new theory, 
anamnesis. In this way, the Meno acts as a transitional dialogue, a sort of way station 
between the familiar world of didachê and the novel Socratic methods of anamnesis and 
maieusis. By the time we see Socrates treat this subject again in the Theaetetus, the 
transition is complete. At no point does he call himself a teacher, nor does he refer to his 
associates as students.85 We can clearly see that he has moved beyond refutation of 
the Aristophanic picture of him as a didaskalos,86 and his focus now is on recasting his 
relationship with his associates. However, the role he chooses in the Theaetetus is 
more metaphorical than any of his previous guises; he sees himself as a midwife of 
men’s souls (150b-d):
Τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιεύσεως τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὑπάρχει ὅσα ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ 
τῷ τε ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ μὴ γυναῖκας μαιεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τικτούσας
ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ σώματα... καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοί μοι ὠνείδισαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν 
ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποφαίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν 
σοφόν, ἀληθὲς ὀνειδίζουσιν. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τόδε· μαιεύεσθαί με ὁ θεὸς 
ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώλυσεν. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάνυ τι σοφός, οὐδέ 
τί μοι ἔστιν εὕρημα τοιοῦτον γεγονὸς τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἔκγονον· οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ 
συγγιγνόμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται ἔνιοι μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ 
προϊούσης τῆς συνουσίας, οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκῃ, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον 
ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργὲς ὅτι παρ' 
ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρ' αὑτῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ εὑρόντες
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85 On which, see Hansen 1988, 221.
86 There has been much ink spilt over the question of whether the Socratic “midwife” image was already 
well-known enough by the time Aristophanes wrote the Clouds for him to have been referencing it at line 
137 when the student at the Thinkery berates Strepsiades for causing the “abortion of a newfound 
idea” (φροντίδ᾽ ἐξήμβλωκας ἐξηυρημένην). Dover (1968, xlii-xliii) offers what I find to be a compelling 
answer to this question: “If this is a genuine point of contact [between the Clouds and the Theaetetus], 
some remarkable conclusions follow. The first is that Aristophanes is so well acquainted with Socrates’ 
terminology that he can allude to it in a single word, without any enlargement - without even ending the 
line within the same field of metaphor. The second is that, if this is so, the play should be full of similar 
allusions; yet, as we read on, we find that the words and phrases which sound like allusions...are not 
attested in Plato... The third conclusion is that a Socratic metaphor so important and well known that one 
word in Clouds sufficed to make a humorous allusion was wholly neglected by Plato in his earlier 
representations of Socrates (including Apology) and exploited, at a comparatively late date, in one 
dialogue alone.” For further discussion see Nussbaum 1980, 73 n. 60; Burnyeat 1977.  
τε καὶ τεκόντες. τῆς μέντοι μαιείας ὁ θεός τε καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος.
Now my art of midwifery is just like [traditional midwives’] in most respects. The 
difference is that I attend men and not women, and that I watch over the labor of their 
souls, not of their bodies... The common reproach against me is that I am always asking 
questions of other people but never express my own views about anything, because 
there is no wisdom in me; and that is true enough. And the reason of it is this, that God 
compels me to attend the travail of others, but has forbidden me to procreate. So that I 
am not in any sense a wise man; I cannot claim as the child of my own soul any 
discovery worth the name of wisdom. But with those who associate with me it is 
different. At first some of them may give the impression of being ignorant and stupid; but 
as time goes on and our association continues, all whom God permits are seen to make 
progress – a progress which is amazing both to other people and to themselves. And yet 
it is clear that this is not due to anything they have learned from me; it is that they 
discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, which they bring forth into the 
light. But it is I, with God’s help, who deliver them of this offspring.87
This, then, is the true Socratic education: maieusis. There can be no blame laid on 
Socrates in this type of interaction. We would never say that it is the midwife’s fault if a 
child is born with a birth defect; only the mother and father (and chance) are 
responsible. As with the slave in the Meno, Socrates’ associates here bring ideas and 
seeds of beautiful things within themselves to their conversations with him, and it is 
through this maieutic gift that the God forced upon him that Socrates is able to help 
them give birth to the fully-developed offspring from those seeds. At the end of the 
passage, he points out that no learning (mathein) takes place in these interactions, only 
self-discovery (heuriskein) with the God’s help. In this short passage, the God compels, 
permits, and aids; Socrates sets himself up simply as a divinely-appointed facilitator of 
God’s will for other wise men. Hence, he takes all responsibility for the educational 
exchange off of himself. He has no wisdom of his own, nor does he claim to, so he 
cannot teach anything, and when he offers his aid to others who have ideas needing to 
be delivered, he is only fulfilling his obligations to the God.
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87 Translation by M.J. Levett
This approach allows Plato’s Socrates to finally address the issue of Critias and 
Alcibiades from a position of blamelessness. At Theaetetus 150e, Socrates observes 
that there have been some people who, believing that they themselves were 
responsible for the delivery of their ideas, left his company too soon and either 
miscarried or gave birth but did not know how to properly rear their offspring. He does 
not mention these two men by name, but there can be no doubt that he is referring to 
them. Under this model, Socrates could no more be responsible for the conduct of his 
associates than the midwife can be responsible for the personality of a child she 
delivers.88 Socrates, acting under instruction from the God, took Critias and Alcibiades, 
pregnant with the seeds of ideas, into his company and spent time with them so that 
they could progress to a point of self-discovery where they might deliver full-grown 
offspring. But all did not go to plan. Critias and Alcibiades terminated their association 
with Socrates before they had delivered their offspring, and the results were malformed 
children who did not bear any marks of Socratic influence.
4. Xenophon’s Response
That Socrates’ concern about being perceived as a didaskalos is not just Plato’s 
invention is also suggested by passages from Xenophon’s Memorabilia and Apology of 
Socrates to the Jury. As we have seen above, Plato tries to eliminate the problem of 
Socrates as a didaskalos by having his mentor deny the very existence of teaching 
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88 This matches up with the discussion above on Apology 23c. Socrates admits that his youthful 
companions imitated him, but he implies that because they did so under their own steam, he should not 
receive any share of the Athenians’ blame or anger for their behavior.
(didachê). Xenophon, on the other hand, simply sees Socrates as a good teacher 
(didaskalos) who was treated unjustly, despite his denial of this role. For this reason, 
Xenophon begins the Memorabilia by faithfully restating Socrates’ own rebuttal of the 
various premises of the charge against him - especially the accusation of being a 
didaskalos -, but proceeds to demonstrate that despite his denial, nevertheless, both 
Socrates’ associates and detractors attempted in their conversations with him to 
understand these interactions in terms of traditional education (Mem. 1.2.2-3): 
πῶς οὖν αὐτὸς ὢν τοιοῦτος ἄλλους ἂν ἢ ἀσεβεῖς ἢ παρανόμους ἢ λίχνους ἢ 
ἀφροδισίων ἀκρατεῖς ἢ πρὸς τὸ πονεῖν μαλακοὺς ἐποίησεν; ἀλλ' ἔπαυσε μὲν 
τούτων πολλοὺς ἀρετῆς ποιήσας ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ ἐλπίδας παρασχών, ἂν ἑαυτῶν 
ἐπιμελῶνται, καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ἔσεσθαι· καίτοι γε οὐδεπώποτε ὑπέσχετο 
διδάσκαλος εἶναι τούτου, ἀλλὰ τῷ φανερὸς εἶναι τοιοῦτος ὢν ἐλπίζειν ἐποίει τοὺς 
συνδιατρίβοντας ἑαυτῷ μιμουμένους ἐκεῖνον τοιούτους γενήσεσθαι.
How then can such a man have made others impious, criminal, gluttonous, lustful, or 
lazy? On the contrary, he stopped many from doing these things by instilling in them the 
desire for virtue, and providing them with the hope that if they were prudent, they would 
become kalos k’agathos. And yet, he never promised to be a didaskalos of this, but he 
caused his companions to hope that by imitating such an exemplary person as himself 
they would become the same as he.
In Xenophon’s view, it is true that Socrates never promised to be a didaskalos, but he 
did set himself up in his relationship to his associates in the same way as a didaskalos 
does to his students. As Xenophon points out here, Socrates encouraged his 
companions - whether implicitly or explicitly - to imitate him in order to become kalos 
k’agathos. As we have seen above numerous times, this is the same method a 
didaskalos would have employed with his students, and although there was - strictly 
speaking - nothing wrong with being a didaskalos, with this title came specific 
connotations of responsibility.89 For this reason, Xenophon’s Socrates also refuses to 
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89 See above on Aristophanes’ Clouds “Episode Two” and Plato’s Apology and also Chapter 2, Section 
1.3 above for a thorough discussion of imitation in education and the resulting responsibility of a teacher 
for his students’ actions.
take on the title of didaskalos, claiming instead that he simply interacts with his 
associates as friends on whom he hopes to confer some moral benefit through his 
friendship.90 However, despite allowing his Socrates character to distance himself from 
the role of didaskalos and even agreeing with Socrates’ self-portrayal as helpful to 
others with respect to virtue,91 Xenophon himself,92 in practice, presents him otherwise. 
Throughout the Memorabilia and the Apology, Xenophon’s Socrates is described by the 
narrator and treated by his interlocutors the way a didaskalos would have been. He 
adapts his instructional approach depending upon the innate nature of each student93 
(Mem. 4.1.3ff); he believes the teaching relationship must consist of the three traditional 
elements of physis, epimeleia/askêsis, and mathêsis - the flip side of didachê - (Mem. 
3.9.1-3); and both he and his students explain what he does with the verb didaskein 
(Mem. 2.6.32-3; 3.5.24; 3.13.2; 4.2.4-6). At the end of the text, at Memorabilia 4.7.1-2, 
Xenophon sums up the ways that Socrates embodied the ideal didaskalos: 
πάντων μὲν γὰρ ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα μάλιστα ἔμελεν αὐτῷ εἰδέναι ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων εἴη 
τῶν συνόντων αὐτῷ· ὧν δὲ προσήκει ἀνδρὶ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ εἰδέναι, ὅ τι μὲν αὐτὸς 
εἰδείη, πάντων προθυμότατα ἐδίδασκεν·... ἐδίδασκε δὲ καὶ μέχρι ὅτου δέοι 
ἔμπειρον εἶναι ἑκάστου πράγματος τὸν ὀρθῶς πεπαιδευμένον.
Of all the men I have known he was the most careful to learn what knowledge each of 
his associates had. And he taught most zealously everything that is fitting for a man who 
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90 For example, see Memorabilia 1.2.8 and 1.6.13-14. Cf. Pucci 2002, 19: Socrates’ “main activity (see 
Mem. 1.6.14) consists in teaching what is good, and in providing an enticing and happy model of spiritual 
control over needs and desires.”
91 See Xenophon Apology of Socrates to the Jury 34: “If among those who make virtue their aim any one 
has ever been brought into contact with a person more helpful than Socrates, I count that man worthy to 
be called most blessed.”
92 That is, the persona of Xenophon in the Memorabilia, at least.
93 According to Morrison (1994, 183), Socrates in the Memorabilia used three traits as requirements of the 
people he associated with: 1. the ability to learn quickly; 2. the ability to remember what has been 
learned; and 3. the desire to learn. These things, Morrison argues, are natural gifts, varying from soul to 
soul, and they determine the outcome of Socrates’ interactions. This is also true for a didaskalos.
is kalos k’agathos to know, in as far as he himself knew it... And he taught the degree to 
which it is right for a well-educated person to make himself familiar with each subject.
In this depiction, Socrates was careful, zealous, thorough, and moderate - the very 
image of a kalos k’agathos himself.94 However, not everyone saw Socrates this way. In 
a conversation with Antiphon at Memorabilia 1.6.3, the Sophist accuses Socrates of 
being a κακοδαιμονίας διδάσκαλος, or teacher of unhappiness. The premises of his 
argument are these: 1) Socrates must be miserable since he eats and drinks poorly, his 
cloak is thin and tattered, and he does not charge money for his company; 2) Socrates 
is a didaskalos; and 3) The other didaskaloi at Athens try to make their students imitate 
them. Therefore, according to Antiphon, Socrates is a teacher of misery. This 
conclusion, like Antiphon’s later claim (1.6.15) that Socrates makes others into 
politicians, demonstrates a dangerous lack of understanding of Socrates’ methods on 
the part of his contemporaries. They saw him as indistinguishable in teaching technique 
from a garden variety didaskalos, but with much more subversive ideas. According to 
Xenophon, this treatment resulted in the people of Athens unfairly blaming Socrates for 
the criminal behavior of his so-called former students Critias and Alcibiades.95 As 
Morrison astutely points out (1994, 182), as a didaskalos, “Socrates gave his young 
associates a mental training that amounted to a powerful tool or weapon that they could 
then use for the good or ill of the society around them. If Socrates were to hand out this 
weapon indiscriminately, that is without regard to the character of the recipient, Socrates 
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94 For another example of Socrates as an ideal teacher in the Memorabilia, see 1.2.17.
95 For example, Aeschines (1.173) takes as a foregone conclusion that Socrates was executed because 
he was shown to have taught Critias, who was one of the Thirty. See Morrison 1994, 181: “The most 
important test cases for the charge of Socrates’ corruption of the young were Critias and Alcibiades.” For 
a thorough discussion of Xenophon’s treatment of the problem of Critias and Alcibiades in the 
Memorabilia see Gray 1998, 45-51.
himself would be a danger to society.” For this reason, Xenophon works hard to show 
that Socrates was not just a didaskalos, but a good didaskalos; he encouraged positive 
moral values in his associates, he taught them prudence before political science, and he 
was choosy about the moral character and intellectual gifts of his associates. However, 
the Athenians - like some modern scholars -96 believed Socrates to have been criminally 
negligent in this process. At Apology of Socrates to the Jury 26.8-27.1, Xenophon’s 
Socrates is clearly responding to this implicit charge when he denies ever having made 
anyone more wicked through his teaching:
οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ ἐμοὶ μαρτυρήσεται ὑπό τε τοῦ ἐπιόντος καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος 
χρόνου ὅτι ἠδίκησα μὲν οὐδένα πώποτε οὐδὲ πονηρότερον ἐποίησα, εὐηργέτουν
δὲ τοὺς ἐμοὶ διαλεγομένους προῖκα διδάσκων ὅ τι ἐδυνάμην ἀγαθόν.
I know that both the time to come and the time past will bear witness to the fact that I did 
not do anything wrong, nor did I ever make anyone more wicked, but rather, I benefitted 
those who conversed with me by teaching them for free whatever good thing I could.
Quite the opposite of Plato’s Socratic Apology, this passage shows Socrates as a self-
professed misunderstood and mistreated didaskalos. Xenophon chooses not to take the 
route that Plato did in defending Socrates against the Athenians’ charges by denying the 
role of didaskalos for him, so other grounds are needed for his defense. At Memorabilia 
1.2.21, Xenophon explains that even the best teaching can be forgotten by those who 
do not care to follow it, and so it was with Critias and Alcibiades. Before they began to 
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96 For example, Nussbaum (1980, 70) argues that Socrates in both Plato and Xenophon was not a good 
teacher because he did not take students’ innate ability into account: “Socrates teaches everyone he 
encounters; he neither conducts an initial test of the interlocutor to determine whether his moral training 
has prepared him adequately for questioning and dialectic, nor takes the responsibility for having 
concluded the educational process in a satisfactory way before discharging the pupil.” Concerning the 
Socrates of Plato and Xenophon (and even Aristophanes), the first part of this seems patently false. Time 
and again we see Socrates conducting an initial elenchus on his would-be interlocutors, and in the 
continuation of the passage of the Theaetetus discussed above, Socrates explains how he has turned 
some people away, either because he was not the right associate for them or because they were not 
properly suited to the process of birthing ideas. This is, in fact, one of the few ways one could argue that 
Plato’s Socrates is actually similar to a didaskalos.  
study with Socrates, Critias and Alcibiades had base natures, which were kept in check 
by Socrates’ influence, and after they had spent some time away from his company they 
forgot his precepts and their original personalities reemerged by association with other 
wicked men (Mem. 1.2.24-6): 
Καὶ Κριτίας δὴ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, ἕως μὲν Σωκράτει συνήστην, ἐδυνάσθην ἐκείνῳ 
χρωμένω συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν· ἐκείνου δ' ἀπαλλαγέντε, 
Κριτίας μὲν φυγὼν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἐκεῖ συνῆν ἀνθρώποις ἀνομίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ 
δικαιοσύνῃ χρωμένοις, Ἀλκιβιάδης δ' αὖ διὰ μὲν κάλλος ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν 
γυναικῶν θηρώμενος, διὰ δύναμιν δὲ τὴν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις ὑπὸ 
πολλῶν καὶ δυνατῶν ἀνθρώπων διαθρυπτόμενος…τοιούτων δὲ συμβάντων 
αὐτοῖν, καὶ ὠγκωμένω μὲν ἐπὶ γένει, ἐπηρμένω δ' ἐπὶ πλούτῳ, πεφυσημένω δ' ἐπὶ 
δυνάμει, διατεθρυμμένω δὲ ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις 
διεφθαρμένω καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἀπὸ Σωκράτους γεγονότε, τί θαυμαστὸν εἰ 
ὑπερηφάνω ἐγενέσθην; εἶτα, εἰ μέν τι ἐπλημμελησάτην, τούτου Σωκράτην ὁ 
κατήγορος αἰτιᾶται; ὅτι δὲ νέω ὄντε αὐτώ, ἡνίκα καὶ ἀγνωμονεστάτω καὶ 
ἀκρατεστάτω εἰκὸς εἶναι, Σωκράτης παρέσχε σώφρονε, οὐδενὸς ἐπαίνου δοκεῖ 
τῷ κατηγόρῳ ἄξιος εἶναι;
And so Critias and Alcibiades, as long as they were with Socrates, were able - with him 
as an ally - to master their wicked desires. But when they left his company, Critias fled to 
Thessaly where he associated with men who practiced lawlessness rather than justice; 
and Alcibiades, because of his beauty, was hunted by many great women, and because 
of his influence in the city and among her allies, was spoiled by many powerful men... 
Such was the fortune of these two men, and when on top of pride of birth, confidence in 
wealth, arrogance concerning ability, and temptation by many men, were added 
complete corruption and the fact that they were apart from Socrates for a long time, is it 
any wonder that they became overweening? If these men did wrong, then, is the accuser 
going to hold Socrates responsible for it? And does Socrates not seem to his accuser to 
be deserving of some praise for keeping these men disciplined when they were young 
and most prone to be lawless and ungovernable?
He goes on to argue that no other cases are judged in this way. For example, no one 
would hold the previous flute teacher responsible if his student left to study with another 
instructor and then turned out incompetent. For Xenophon, there is nothing inherently 
wrong with being a didaskalos, but there are limits to the influence of didachê, even that 
of an extraordinary didaskalos. Far from proving Socrates to be a bad teacher, the case 
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of Critias and Alcibiades simply shows that his didachê - like any teacher’s - is fallible.97 
Successful teaching depends almost as much upon the student as upon the teacher, 
and a teacher cannot really be said to teach what a student does not actually learn. As 
Morrison has noted (1994, 190), “Critias and Alcibiades came to Socrates, met his tests, 
and learned reasoning and dialectical skills from him, as well as temperance. Later 
when they parted from Socrates their temperance left them; but the reasoning and 
dialectical skills they learned from him presumably remained, to be put to evil ends.”98 In 
other words, just because a student turns out badly, this does not mean he had a bad 
teacher, or that his teacher is responsible for the student’s villainy. In the case of 
Socrates as the ideal didaskalos, it is Xenophon’s goal to show that a good teacher can 
only make his students better, not worse, and we see an echo of this concern in 
Socrates’ conversation with Critobulus in the Oeconomicus. At 3.11.6, Socrates explains 
to his friend that if a man instructs (didaskein) his wife in the correct things and she 
behaves badly, it is her own fault, whereas if he had not taught her the correct things 
and she behaved badly, he would be to blame. The reader is clearly meant to connect 
the former case with that of Socrates and his two wicked ex-associates. As Xenophon 
implies, Socrates is like the man whose wife, having been taught the correct things, still 
misbehaves, and like that man, he should not be held to account for the misbehavior. 
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97 Cf. Gray 1998, 58: “[Xenophon] does not deny that Critias and Alcibiades were corrupt, but argues 
about Socrates’ influence. Nor does he deny outright any of the specifics that the accuser says he taught 
- merely that he was not properly understood, or deliberately misinterpreted.”
S Pucci (2002, 32) presents an interesting paradox inherent in this argument: at Memorabilia 1.6.15 
“Socrates implies that those whom he instructs as politicians will act in accordance with his teaching, in 
fact, as mere clones of himself. Should we think of Critias and Alcibiades as two clones of Socrates or 
consider them, as Xenophon states, pupils with a limited interest in Socrates’ teaching, and a corrupt 
nature (Mem. 1.2.16, 24-25, 39, 40-46)?” 
98 See also Navia 1993, 102 for the reason for the reversion of Critias and Alcibiades to wickedness after 
associating with Socrates
Instead, the Athenians should simply be grateful that Socrates was able to restrain the 
wicked impulses of his associates for so long through the beneficial influence of his 
company. By reminding his readers of the positive – if temporary – affect Socrates had 
on the base natures of Critias and Alcibiades, Xenophon is able to portray Socrates as a 
praiseworthy didaskalos while simultaneously releasing him from Meletus’ charge of 
corrupting the youth.   
5. Socrates the Didaskalos
My aim in the preceding two sections has been to demonstrate that despite their 
differing approaches, Plato and Xenophon both consider it to be essential to refute the 
perceived accusation present in Aristophanes’ Clouds that Socrates was by trade a 
didaskalos who should be held responsible for his students’ misconduct. Plato finds it 
easier to do this by having Socrates simply deny the existence of teaching – especially 
the teaching of virtue – thereby relieving the philosopher of the title of didaskalos;99 
Xenophon, on the other hand, believes not only that good teachers exist, but that 
Socrates exemplifies this category. He balks, however, at subscribing to the preexisting 
cultural conception of a teacher as the sole source of moral influence and responsibility 
for his students, choosing instead to focus attention on the ways the outside world can 
corrupt a student despite his teacher’s best efforts and preparations to the contrary. 
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99 Cf. Morrison 1994, 207: “By denying that dialectic is teaching, Plato’s Socrates emphasizes that the 
origin of the views arrived at is within the interlocutor himself; and he deflects responsibility for the 
outcome from himself onto the pupil... By accepting the designation “teacher”, Xenophon’s Socrates - 
quite properly - accepts responsibility for the moral consequences of his dialectical conversations.” For 
more on this view, see also Morrison 1994, 191; Teloh 1986, 106. 
In opposition to common scholarly prejudice, I hope to have shown that Socrates was 
treated by his contemporaries not as a Sophist, but rather as a didaskalos, a charge 
which can only be understood in the context of the preexisting literary debate over what 
constitutes a good or bad teacher.100 Socrates was thrust into this debate and thereby 
focused attention on the figure of the didaskalos much more keenly than had been done 
before, not as a theoretical or methodological issue but as a personal day-to-day issue 
concerning the functioning of the city. Using Socrates as their exemplar, Aristophanes, 
Plato, and Xenophon each confronted in a different way the idea that a bad teacher 
posed a threat to the fabric of Athenian society as no other corrupt or incompetent 
professional could. A teacher's job was to shape the natures of his students into the 
appropriate forms to provide for their success as adults in society, and in the eyes of 
many of his friends and detractors, Socrates claimed to do just that. Despite his 
unwillingness to be a figurehead for traditional pedagogical practice – indeed, he 
thoroughly rejects the existing models of didachê, especially concerning the teaching of 
virtue –,101 among his contemporaries, Socrates came to stand for both the best and 
worst possible teacher in a way that no one before or after him has. 
226
100 See especially Chapter 3 above.
101 See Griffin 1995, 7: “The Sophists believe that one can, through their teaching, exchange money for 
virtue. But Socrates, although he makes speeches about virtue every day, does not believe in the 
exchange of money for it.”
EPILOGUE
1. Looking Back
As the preceding chapters have shown, it is neither an oversimplification nor an 
exaggeration to say that the didaskalos was invented in Classical Athens. In all of extant 
Archaic Greek literature, there is only one occurrence of the noun didaskalos and fewer 
than three dozen occurrences of its attendant verb didaskein, whereas these words 
occur over 1,000 times in the extant literature of the fifth and fourth centuries.1 Based on 
this evidence, even taking into account the relative sizes of the corpora under 
consideration and allowing for some distortion of the numbers due to the differences 
between poetic and prose conventions, it is still undeniable that starting around 480 
BCE, there was a sudden surge in literary concern with the teacher and his work. All at 
once, the didaskalos became ubiquitous in Classical literature of all genres. 
Further, this new focus on the didaskalos corresponded with a growing concern in 
Athenian culture about the importance of teaching and the effect a teacher could have 
on the stability of the polis. Specifically, during this time, authors from Euripides to 
Xenophon to Thucydides used the didaskalos as an entrée into a practical and 
philosophical discussion about citizen formation and its impact on the future of the city. 
This discussion took many forms during the fifth and fourth centuries: in some cases, it 
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1 It should come as no surprise based on my argument in Chapter 4 that the Classical text with the 
greatest concentration of didaskalic vocabulary is Aristophanes’ Clouds (with a relative occurrence rate of 
29 times per 10,000 words), followed by Xenophon’s Socratic works, including the Memorabilia (with a 
relative occurrence rate of 17 times per 10,000 words).
was a debate over the subjects that should make up the ideal curriculum; in others, it 
was a comparison of Athenian education with Spartan; and sometimes, it was a dispute 
over the relative value of teaching versus natural ability. What was almost-universally 
understood, however, was the tremendous power a teacher had to shape his students’ 
natures - to change them for the better or the worse - and the responsibility that 
accompanied that power. What’s more, the discussion about education in Athens spilled 
over into other types of civic discourse, and the teacher-student relationship came to be 
seen as the default dynamic for many kinds of political interactions. Orators, 
playwrights, and other political leaders were thought of as - and often framed 
themselves as - didaskaloi of the city: capable of guiding the citizens toward virtuous 
behavior and rightly held responsible for leading them into vice. 
Into this situation stepped Socrates, whose indictment and trial marked the culmination 
of a crisis in Athens that was neither military nor political, but philosophical. Socrates, as 
he is depicted in Aristophanes’ Clouds, and to a certain extent, also in the Platonic 
dialogues, was a proponent of the use of certain novel methods and principles in 
secondary education. These methods simultaneously drew both praise and criticism 
from his contemporaries, and by the last quarter of the fifth century, the literary figure of 
Socrates had become a framework upon which both sides could hang their opposing 
ideas about education. 
As an educational philosopher, Socrates encouraged his associates to think differently 
and to question their assumptions. In a way, then, Socrates’ trial and execution sent a 
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message to the people of Athens - and especially Socrates’ proponents - that the 
traditional content and mode of education were not to be tampered with. However, the 
literary discussion about education did not disappear with Socrates’ execution, but 
rather, over the course of the following century, it shifted away from both the familial 
sunousia of the heroic age, and the imitation-based didachê of the fifth century, and 
toward the establishment of a systematic, institutionalized paideia.
Despite the Classical conception of Socrates as a teacher, the afterlife of Socratic 
education does not overlap very much with that of the didaskalos: the two strands of our 
inquiry diverge widely in the Hellenistic period and beyond. While the teacher has faded 
into the background of institutionalized education, Socrates still looms large in modern 
pedagogical theory and practice. In the following pages, our purpose will be first to track 
the ways the didaskalos (along with his curriculum and methods) developed in the 
Hellenistic period, and second to trace the evolution of Socratic education from the 
decades immediately following the death of Socrates through the Hellenistic and Roman 
periods and into modern day.
2. Looking Forward
Because teaching in the Classical period had not yet been systematized, discussion 
about education at that time was uniquely theoretical, self-reflective, and wide-ranging. 
Arguments were made and sustained over whether education was even a worthwhile 
endeavor, and if so, what its aims should be, and who should be responsible for 
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carrying it out. By the Hellenistic period, however, it was more or less agreed upon that 
education was important, and the institution was well on its way to being organized and 
regulated. It was no longer up for discussion whether education should be undertaken 
and why; the focus shifted instead to reflection on the pros and cons of existing 
practices. That is, for the most part, authors in the Hellenistic period stopped 
speculating as much about the potential of education and turned their attention to the 
reality of it. 
2.1 What Became of the Didaskalos and His Curriculum?
The move toward institutionalized education had unexpected consequences for the 
didaskalos. In a world where education was being increasingly systematized into a 
standard set of subjects and practices, the role of the teacher came to be taken for 
granted; teachers were everywhere, uncontroversial and uninteresting, all-but-invisible 
in their ubiquity. Any person whose role could be interpreted as even vaguely 
instructional was called a didaskalos: everyone from the humble grammarian up to the 
teacher of rhetoric and philosophy, as well as anyone who taught a specialized technical 
skill like hairdressing or sewing.2 And, in fact, this continued to be the case throughout 
the Hellenistic and Roman periods, and into Late Antiquity, when even the scripture 
teachers in the early Christian schools were called didaskaloi.3 In other words, 
paradoxically, during the Hellenistic period (and beyond), references to the didaskalos 
increased in all other types of literature while simultaneously disappearing from 
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2 See Cribiore 2001, 50-51; Morgan 1998, 27-28.
3 See Marrou 1956, 342; Watts 2006, 14-17.
substantive discussions about educational philosophy. If one could say that the 
didaskalos had been elevated to a place of philosophical prominence and influence for 
a brief time in Classical literature, by the Hellenistic period he had been relegated to the 
schoolhouse once more. 
At the same time that education at all levels was being institutionalized, the teaching 
profession was undergoing an accompanying move toward further specialization.4 Any 
kind of teacher could be called a didaskalos, but not every didaskalos taught all 
subjects. To cite just a few examples, although any of these instructors might also have 
been referred to as a didaskalos, the grammatistês specialized in elementary level 
reading and writing, while the rhêtôr taught secondary- and post-secondary-level oratory  
and rhetoric, and the kathêgêtês tutored individual advanced students in literature and 
mathematics.5 
But in spite of the changes the Hellenistic period brought to the terminology and 
institutional nature of the teaching profession, the practices, curriculum, and social - 
albeit not philosophical - status of the didaskalos at that time were consistent with those 
of the Classical period.6 In other words, we should not make the mistake here of 
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4 Alongside this specialized system of formal education there also emerged a new and complementary 
concept of paideia as not simply general education, but the participation in and possession of culture and 
refinement. See Marrou 1956, 98-99; Watts 2006, 2-8.
5 For more on the delineation of tasks in formal Hellenistic education and the names given to educational 
professionals, see Cribiore 2001, 50-57.
6 On the social status of teachers in the Hellenistic period, and the teacher’s role as disciplinarian, see 
Cribiore 2001, 59-65 and 65-73, respectively. On the Hellenistic teacher’s curriculum and methods, see 
Cribiore 2001, Chapters 6 and 7 (pp. 160-219), Morgan 1998, 67-73.  
overstating the differences between Classical and Hellenistic education. It is tempting to 
assume that the abrupt late-fourth-century change in the quantity and type of evidence 
we have concerning education must have accompanied a similarly dramatic change in 
its content. This is not at all the case. In the Hellenistic period we do finally get evidence 
of the daily life realia of education that we so desperately wanted for the Classical 
period,7 but instead of revealing Hellenistic education to be a completely new system, 
the evidence shows that it had much in common with Classical education. For example, 
the ideal Classical curriculum as described in detail by Plato and Aristotle and that we 
can see evidence of in the description of the Phrontistêrion in Aristophanes’ Clouds, 
persisted in the Hellenistic period. In fact, the sequential study of grammar, geometry, 
astronomy, literature, music theory, rhetoric, and dialectic was referred to as enkyklios 
paideia, and these subjects came to be considered the basis for advanced study in any 
field.8 All of them were taught in some form in Classical Greece, but in the Hellenistic 
period they were expanded and developed into a regularized curriculum (Morgan 1998, 
38).
This Hellenistic curriculum was admittedly very different from the original trio of subjects 
- grammata, musikê, and gymnastikê - championed by the Better Argument in 
Aristophanes’ Clouds and described in detail by the title character in Plato’s Protagoras. 
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7 This includes a large number of schoolroom papyri and ostraca of homework assignments and other 
scholastic exercises written by both teachers and students, sets of letters between parents and their 
children who had been sent away to school, journals and other personal documents kept by teachers, 
and even, in the case of Graeco-Roman Egypt, a few schoolhouses complete with intact wall paintings 
and inscriptions.  
8 For example (Morgan 1998, 35), in the opinion of Philo and Plutarch, they were a preparation for 
philosophy; in Vitruvius’ view, for architecture; and for Strabo and Pliny the Elder they were the necessary 
foundation for any other activity in life. On enkyklios paideia generally, see Morgan 1998, 33-39.
Indeed, as we saw in our discussion of the Classical Athenian debate about the ideal 
curriculum in Chapter 2, the notion of the three-part Old Education was already coming 
into question during the later Classical period. By the early Hellenistic period, grammata 
had been given pride of place in the new curriculum, while the traditional pursuit of 
musikê, which consisted in learning to play and sing along with the lyre, was demoted to 
the status of a skilled technê, and from this field only the study of music theory 
continued as a core subject (Morgan 1998, 13). The physical side of education (i.e. 
gymnastikê), was removed entirely from elementary schooling and was conducted in 
part as a specialized pursuit under the supervision of paidotribai in the gymnasium,9 and 
in part in the context of the recently established Athenian institution for military training: 
the ephêbeia.10     
As we saw above, if we were to identify the most important point of departure between 
Hellenistic and Classical education, it would be their respective degrees of 
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9 The gymnasium was, starting in the Hellenistic period, a state-controlled building and institution for 
physical training (both military and athletic) that was open to all free-born citizens. Although the ephêboi 
are thought to have undergone some of their military training in the gymnasia, these facilities were 
primarily dedicated to general athletic training in competitive physical activities (like wrestling) for post-
adolescent young men (aged approximately 18-30). Athletic training for boys and adolescents (under age 
18) took place at the palaistra, or wrestling school.
S For the gymnasium as a location for physical education only, see Gauthier 2010, 90-94, esp. 91: 
“The gymnasion was entirely dedicated to athletic and military training.” It was only much later and in 
certain prosperous cities like Athens that some intellectual education began to be offered at the 
gymnasium in addition to athletic training.
10 According to Ober (2001, 203), the ephêbeia was “Athens’ first major concession to the idea that it 
might be desirable to teach the youth of the city about their civic obligations in a structured and state-
sponsored setting.” The set-up of the system was as follows: at age 18, Athenian males were inducted 
into a two year program of conjoined military and moral education in which they were personally overseen 
by paidotribai operating under the command of ten sôphronistai (one from each tribe). In the first year, 
they underwent extensive physical training, and in the second year, they served at frontier military 
outposts. 
S It is likely that there was some form of military training in Athens prior to the late fourth century, 
but there is no hard evidence for a formal ephebic system prior to the mid-330’s when Epicrates 
introduced a law about it, and no ephebic inscription has yet been found dated securely before 334 BCE. 
institutionalization and concomitant specialization. Whereas education in the Classical 
period can legitimately be described as a disorganized collection of individuals teaching 
whatever they wanted or were able, by the Hellenistic period, the system had developed 
into a consistent sequence of subjects and set of educational practices. In light of this 
fact, the movement toward separating letters, music, and gymnastics into three distinct 
educational systems is revealed to be just another manifestation of the Hellenistic shift 
toward systematizing every aspect of civic life. As Teresa Morgan (1999) has observed 
in reference to this shift (61): 
The achievement of Hellenistic Greeks was to turn literacy and literate education into a 
state-encouraged instrument of socio-political regulation... But though the status of 
education in the early Hellenistic kingdoms changed significantly, its contents and 
taxonomy did not. Those had all been put into place by the mid-fourth century. 
In other words, in many ways, Hellenistic education simply built upon the foundation that 
Classical education had established.11 Far from being an anomaly in the history of 
education, the Classical period turns out to be the seminal era in the development of 
pedagogical practices that persist even in the present day. 
Keeping in mind our observations about the development of education as a whole 
between the Classical and Hellenistic periods, let us turn now to a discussion of the 
aftermath of the educational crisis brought on by Socrates.   
2.2 The Heirs of Socrates in the Hellenistic Period and Beyond
Despite the focus of the final chapter of this study, Plato and Xenophon do not represent 
the last word on Socrates in Greek literature and thought. On the contrary, the quarter 
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11 On which, see Marrou 1956, 95ff.
century after his trial and execution saw the publication of approximately 300 texts 
about or involving Socrates, and the emergence of a specific genre of Socratic 
dialogues and recollections called Sôkratikoi logoi (Ford 2008, 30). Among the 
participants in this “Socratic movement”12 were not only Socrates’ contemporaries, Plato 
and Xenophon, but also Plato’s students Aristotle and Heraclides Ponticus who 
continued to compose prose dialogues,13 in addition to the numerous fourth- and third-
century members of Plato’s Academy - especially the Stoic Zeno and the Academic 
skeptic Arcesilaus, originators of the two most influential Hellenistic schools - who 
recognized Socrates as their chief authority and who viewed their own philosophical 
activity as a continuation of his (Vander Waerdt 1994, 4). 
Different philosophers, however, took up different parts of the Socratic legacy. 
Specifically, both the early Stoics and the Academic skeptics represented themselves as 
Socrates’ true heirs, with the latter claiming the mantle of Socratic dialectic and the 
former developing a philosophy based on Socratic ethics, and both groups believing 
their interpretation to be best (Vander Waerdt 1994, 7-8; 12). That is, the Stoics, led by 
Zeno, took up Socratic doctrine concerning virtue, and existence, and the nature of 
good and bad, and turned it into the basis of their philosophy.14 They were not 
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12 On the scope of the term “Socratic movement”, see Vander Waerdt 1994, 3-4.
13 Unfortunately, none of the dialogues of Heraclides Ponticus have survived, and of Aristotle’s dialogues 
we have only fragments preserved in later authors like Cicero.
14 On which, see Long (1992, 68-94), esp. 68: “Stoic philosophers had drawn heavily on Plato’s and 
Xenophon’s Socrates... the details cover numerous doctrines in ethics, moral psychology, and theology, 
including the priority of the soul’s good over everything else, the unity of the virtues, the identity of virtue 
with knowledge, and divine providence... The Stoics also treated Socrates’ life as a virtual paradigm of 
Stoic wisdom’s practical realization, and they were especially impressed by accounts of Socrates’ 
fortitude, self-control, and imperviousness to physical and emotional stress.”
interested in the dialogue form as a vehicle for communicating philosophy, Socratic or 
otherwise. The early Academic skeptics, on the other hand, were headed up by 
Arcesilaus, who continued the Socratic tradition of conducting elenchic-style dialogues 
that were only preserved in writing by his students, most notably Pythodorus.15 Like 
Socrates, the Academic skeptics believed that they knew nothing - and, further, that 
nothing is knowable - and their dialectic interactions were designed to reveal this fact. 
Quite unlike the Stoics, they did not subscribe to a common set of ethics or beliefs save 
for their belief in the nonexistence of knowledge. To put it another way, generally 
speaking, the Stoics believed Socrates’ true legacy was the content of his interactions, 
while the Academic skeptics believed it was his method of non-didactic questioning. 
These two philosophical schools - the Stoics and the Academic skeptics - represent 
Socrates’ afterlife via Plato. Yet Xenophon’s Socrates also lived on in the philosophy of 
the Hellenistic period. In fact, Xenophon’s interpretation of Socratic ethics provided a 
model that competed with Plato’s for the allegiance of Socrates’ Hellenistic heirs. As 
Paul Vander Waerdt (1994, 12) observes:  
Xenophon does not accept the Platonic characterization of Socrates as the wisest of 
human beings on account of his knowledge of his own ignorance...; he rather finds the 
foundation of Socratic virtue to consist in ἐγκράτεια, or self-control, in a kind of self-
sufficiency to which knowledge makes some, but perhaps not even the most important 
contribution. The central differences in the Platonic and Xenophontic accounts of 
Socratic ethics - on such questions as the unity of virtue, the possibility of ἀκρασία, the 
relation of virtue to the goods of fortune - all are related to this fundamental difference.  
236
15 For more on Arcesilaus and the beginning of the school of Academic skeptics, see Brittain 2008. 
S The chain of Skeptic Socratic teachers whose ideas were only written down by one of their 
students continued after Arcesilaus. The ideas of Arcesilaus’ student Carneades were recorded by his 
student, Clitomachus, whose pupil Philo of Larissa was likewise memorialized by his own student, Cicero. 
Hence, while the Stoics and Academic skeptics primarily developed Plato’s model of 
Socratic ethics and methodology, according to Vander Waerdt, a third philosophical 
school, the Cynics, followed Xenophon’s (12).
Further, in terms of genre and structure, Xenophon’s prose memoirs of Socrates 
prefigured the biographical tradition that was later taken up by Plutarch and Diogenes 
Laertius. Plato’s dialogue form, on the other hand, appears not to have played a big part 
in Hellenistic philosophy from 300 to 100 BCE.16 After the Socratic dialogues of Plato’s 
contemporaries and students in the late Classical period, this form effectively died out 
until Cicero all-but-single-handedly revived it briefly in the Roman period.17 
Only a few decades after his death, Socrates’ philosophic legacy had been separated 
into two distinct strands: the dialectic of the Academic skeptics and the ethics of the 
Stoics. Finally, in the second century CE, these two strands seem to have been drawn 
back together by the Stoic sage Epictetus, who conducted elenchic-style dialogues on 
Socratic ethics that were recorded by his student Arrian.18 Unlike his Stoic 
predecessors, in both his methods and the content of his lessons, Epictetus modeled 
himself on Socrates. As Anthony Long (1992, 67) has observed, “It is Socrates who 
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16 On which, see Robb 1994, 239: “The dramatic prose dialogue devoted to a philosophical topic is a 
transition piece that will soon give way to the expository prose treatise that became so firmly established 
in Aristotle’s school. The Athenian philosophical dialogue, like the Sicilian mime before it, was a feature, 
perhaps a necessary one, of the developing alliance between literacy and paideia that marks the fifth and 
fourth centuries but becomes an anachronism when that alliance has at last been completed.”
17 On the ways Cicero responded to the dialogues of Plato and Aristotle, see Schofield 2008, 63-84. 
18 In almost every way, Arrian positioned himself as the new Xenophon, both in the subjects of his other 
prose treatises (e.g. the Anabasis of Alexander, or On Hunting with Dogs), and also in his role as 
memoirist to a great Socratic philosopher. In particular, he greatly admired Xenophon’s straightforward 
prose style and he modeled his Discourses of Epictetus directly on Xenophon’s Memorabilia.  
authorizes everything Epictetus is trying to give his students in terms of philosophical 
methodology, self-examination, and a life model for them to imitate.” In one important 
way, however, Epictetus diverged from his Socratic model: he fashioned himself as a 
teacher. Tad Brennan has summed this difference up neatly in his chapter “Socrates 
and Epictetus” in the 2009 Blackwell Companion to Socrates (291-2): 
[Epictetus] has students - there is no coyness or qualification, none of the Socratic 
dance of disclaimers, in his institutional relation to them. He wants to teach them, and 
takes his role as teacher seriously... He sometimes expresses annoyance at his own 
limitations and failures,... but it is fundamentally different from the Socratic stance of 
being in principle incapable of teaching, of having nothing to teach.
  
As we saw in Chapter 4, it was fundamental to Socrates’ self-presentation that he not be 
seen as teaching his associates, in large part because of the potential responsibility and 
punishment that would have come down on his head with such an admission. One can 
only surmise that for Epictetus, on the other hand, there was no inherent risk in being 
thought of as a teacher. Indeed, it may even have been an imperative part of his role as  
a philosopher to teach the correct doctrine to his companions.19 Socrates’ fate was, in 
large part, a result of the socio-political climate in Athens at the beginning of the fourth 
century. With the institutionalization of education in the Hellenistic period, being a 
teacher became essentially harmless, and by the time of Epictetus in the Roman period, 
most of the earlier negative and dangerous implications of teaching seem to have faded 
away. Today we don’t usually speak of bad teachers as ruining their students so much 
as inadequately preparing them for later pursuits.      
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19 See Long 1992, 94: Epictetus “was obviously aware that Stoicism, however much it was prefigured by 
Socrates, was a subsequent development. Under his Stoic identity he presents himself as a pedagogue 
with a range of definite lessons to teach his students.”
Although the written dialogue ultimately died out in the Christian era, some of Socrates’ 
methods continued in a different form, and they persist in contemporary education in a 
way Plato, at least, could never have anticipated. Ironically, Socrates, the man who was 
executed in part on the accusation of being a bad teacher, is memorialized today as the 
ideal educator and the originator of one of the most effective pedagogical techniques of 
all time: the so-called “Socratic method”. The modern Socratic method, however, 
represents quite a departure from the literary Socrates’ characteristic elenchus, wherein 
the educator (i.e. the Socrates-figure), while making no positive claims of his own, 
interrogates and breaks down the interlocutor’s beliefs until the latter reaches the point 
of aporia, or recognition of his own ignorance. Only then does the educator, through a 
process of question and answer, move with his student toward the apprehension of 
some basic truth. While Plato’s Socratic method pre-supposes Socrates and his 
interlocutor to be equally ignorant co-travelers on the road to truth, the modern Socratic 
method is based on the understanding that the teacher knows something his/her 
student does not. So instead of questioning with the goal of dismantling the student’s 
beliefs, the modern Socratic educator uses the technique of question and answer to 
build up his/her student’s knowledge. Further, in contemporary education, the Socratic 
method might be employed in a class of 20 or more students, almost as a way to 
encourage general class participation, instead of one-on-one as a tool for deep 
investigation of a designated philosophical question. 
In the most fundamental way, what we call the Socratic method bears very little 
resemblance to the educational practices described by Plato, and is, in fact, antithetical 
239
to Socrates’ beliefs about education.20 Socrates vehemently denied being a teacher, but 
as we saw in the last chapter of this study, he was tried and executed in large part 
because he was seen as one, and both Plato and Xenophon worked hard to 
posthumously defend their idol against this very charge. And yet, regardless of what 
Socrates and his followers wanted, today he is remembered as the paradigm of the 
good teacher. Over the past two centuries, entire books - not to mention hundreds of 
articles in scholarly journals - have been devoted to praising the Socratic method and 
demonstrating its relevance and usefulness in teaching every possible subject. Unlike 
with Plato, for whom the dialectic method was a way for Socrates to educate without 
teaching, for us, using the Socratic method is considered one of the best ways to teach 
effectively. Paradoxically, Socrates, the self-professed anti-teacher, unintentionally 
originated one of the most influential teaching techniques in the history of Western 
education.        
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20 For modern misconceptions about the true Socratic method, see Fishman 1985, 185-88.
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